Introduction
The paper has four parts: First, it explores methodological and theoretical issues. Second, the piece discusses Baro’s political activism at the Haile Selassie I University (HSIU) and in the MTA. Third, it examines the processes of the rise and demise of the MTA. Fourth, the piece focuses on and examines the role of Baro in the MTA and beyond. This part also explains the lessons he learned from the leaders of the student and MTA associations and how Baro played the central role in forming the OLF that started to lead the Oromo national movement. It also explains the relationship between social movements and political activism in Oromo society.
Methodological and Theoretical Insights
I collected the data for this paper from historical accounts, books, articles, government records, documents of the OLF and other organizations, memoirs, electronic media, and other available sources. I also collected primary data on Baro’s roles in political activism and creating the OLF through intensive interviews with prominent individuals who worked with him and closely knew him. To date, social and national movement studies focus primarily on broad structural changes or behavioral issues and pay little attention to the role of human agency or leadership. However, this work combines a structural approach with the human agency or leadership model. The piece employs interdisciplinary, multidimensional, qualitative, and critical methods and theories to examine the dynamic interplay among social structures, human agency or leadership, and social/national movements.
These methodological and theoretical approaches help us critically understand the role of Baro Tumsa and his colleagues in creating the OLF and developing national Oromummaa, which has involved the flourishing of Oromo nationalism, Oromo national culture, history, and identity. In addition, they enable us to increase our comprehension of the complex issues of Oromo collective and individual leadership in the Oromo movement. In other words, these methodological and theoretical approaches provide insights into the complex and dynamic relationships between political activities and leadership by examining the Oromo national movement and its administration by focusing on the role of Baro. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Baro mobilized limited Oromo intellectual material resources and Oromo cultural capital to facilitate the formation of a liberation front that has been trying to solve the political and economic contradictions between the Ethiopian colonizing and dehumanizing structures and the colonized and exploited Oromo society. Initially, he selected, recruited, and coordinated a few Oromo organic intellectuals to study how colonialism affected the colonized population groups politically, culturally, economically, and psychologically. These actions helped in developing knowledge for liberation to overcome domination, which has involved the assimilationist policy for imposing the Ahmara language, cultural heritage, and national identity justifying Ethiopian colonialism and its political structures and ideologies.
Colonial states, dominant classes, powerful racial/national groups, corporations, and patriarchal institutions have produced false or biased knowledge, theories, and narratives to naturalize and justify all forms of inequalities and injustices. However, various progressive social movements have struggled to discredit such knowledge by producing alternative narratives, histories, theories, knowledge, and worldviews.[1] Consequently, there are two forms of contradictory processes of theory and knowledge production, descriptions, and modes of thought in the capitalist world system: one form is associated with a dominant narrative and knowledge for domination, exploitation, and the maintenance of the status quo, while the other is related to subaltern narratives and knowledge for liberation, social justice, and egalitarian democracy.[2] Even though various social movements, including the Oromo national movement, have introduced some social reforms, they have yet to develop a necessary critical theory of human liberation that invigorates the struggle to overthrow the dominant worldview to produce a new politico-economic paradigm—one which will facilitate the emergence of participatory and egalitarian democracy for all peoples.
Baro coordinated and organized his colleagues to initiate critical knowledge production and dissemination processes to liberate Oromo society. Subaltern movements and social revolutions have often captured state power and have become an integral part of the capitalist world system. As a result, social movements have only successfully introduced minor changes and reforms confined by the parameters of global capitalism. Nevertheless, the increasing crises of the capitalist world system—the possible depletion of the world’s valuable resources, global financial and ecological problems, growing social inequality, the intensification of terrorism from above and below, and the declining of material resources for ordinary people—indicate possible paradigmatic shifts that could shape the prospects for advancing new and system-transformative modes of thought, knowledge, and action.[3]
Learning from the past limitations of various social or national movements and social revolutions, critical scholars who engage in the Oromo struggle and Oromo studies and progressive Oromo forces must continue developing an alternative knowledge and a crucial ideology encapsulated in Oromo nationalism or national Oromummaa. This development can help reimagine a new Oromo worldview beyond domination and exploitation. This paper demonstrates that although Baro was well-versed in the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist and liberation traditions, he went beyond them and did not limit himself to these traditions. He was human-centric and genuinely democratic in creating Oromo national power, which external and internal reactionary political forces could not control. Mainstream classical scholars of collective behavior, such as Neil J. Smelser and modernization theorists like W. W. Rostow, wrongly considered social/national movements abnormal, irrational, or deviant.[4] These theorists believed that social breakdown, strain, deprivation, discontent, cognitive dissonance, ambiguity, and psychological frustration have facilitated the emergence of revolutions and movements and their collective behaviors.[5] Such theorists blamed the victims for struggling for their emancipation.
The mainstream theoretical approaches of social/national movements have failed to explain how politicized collective grievances could lead to collective actions. In the 1960s, resource mobilization theory emerged and challenged the classical model of collective behavior and social movements.[6] Gradually, national liberation movements such as that of the Oromo flourished in the world. Progressive movement scholars and activists started to use neo-Marxism and conflict theories as alternative theories to explain the relationship between political power, conflict, and domination. Neo-Marxism and conflict theories have been also built on other ideas, such as resource mobilization and political process theories. As a theoretical paradigm shift, resource mobilization theory challenged the collective behavior approach. This theory primarily depended on political, sociological, and economic theories and paid less attention to political interests, social psychology, and other issues.[7] Political process theory criticized resource mobilization theory in the 1970s by explaining social movements concerning capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, and state formation.[8]
The political process model criticized resource mobilization for (1) downplaying politics and political interests; (2) deemphasizing the role of grievances, ignoring ideology, and exaggerating rationalistic roles of movement actors; and (3) ignoring group solidarity as well as social psychology.[9] Combining the traditions of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and John Stuart Mill, Charles Tilly emphasized the importance of ideology, grievances, rationality, social solidarity, shared interests, and the availability of political opportunities for social movements to emerge and develop.[10] Tilly integrated the Marxian tradition that recognizes conflicting interests, the existence of conflict, and the importance of organization with the Weberian tradition that stresses commitment to belief systems.[11] Political process theory identifies factors such as the availability of material, intellectual, and cultural resources, the capacity to mobilize these resources for collective action, the importance of preexisting social networks, organizations, and institutions, and the rationality of participants in weighing costs and benefits for engaging in the collaborative activity of social movements.[12]
Similarly, criticizing resource mobilization theory, Doug McAdam further developed political process theory.[13] He identified that source mobilization theory blurs the difference between the oppressed classes and groups and the established polity members, exaggerates the elite’s financial support for social movements, minimizes the role of the masses in movements, lacks clarity on the concept of resources, and glosses over the issue of grievances. McAdam identified two conditions for social movements to challenge the established political system. These two conditions are the structure of political opportunities, such as political and economic crises, and the strength of indigenous political organizations equipped with cognitive liberation. Cognitive liberation has three dimensions: recognizing the illegitimacy of the established system, the capacity to overcome fatalism among the populace to believe in changing a social system, and the ability to think that introducing social change is possible.[14]
Baro’s understanding of critical theories was reflected in his organizational and policy activities, such as land reform issues and the national question. Baro and his colleagues who formed the OLF developed cognitive liberation among Oromo elites and students and started to fight against Ethiopian settler colonialism and its political system. Furthermore, another theory called the framing and social construction model emerged to criticize political process theory for giving a secondary role to collective grievances in the emergence and development of social movements.[15] This theory focuses on micro-level social dynamics and emphasizes framing, signification, media, and social psychology. It also considers symbolic interaction and cultural views that help construct meaning and understand grievances, motivations, recruitment, and identity formation. Framing and construction theory identifies three categories and focuses on them. These three categories are (1) the process through which social movements frame grievances as injustice and illegitimate and require a collective challenge; (2) the recognition of movements such as status and identity politics, religious movements, lifestyle interests, and environmental concerns; and (3) the necessity to understand the role of meaning and signification.[16]
Focusing on a micro-level analysis, framing, and social construction theory emphasizes the importance of cognitive liberation by politicizing grievances. Mental freedom allows people to integrate individual interests, values, and beliefs with social movements’ activities, goals, and ideologies. Movement emerges when there is cognitive liberation or the transformation of consciousness and behavior. Baro and his colleagues would not have been able to create the OLF without developing mental freedom. The transformation of political consciousness indicates that when movement actors do not recognize the legitimacy of a given establishment, they may organize and engage in collective action. Most political process theorists focus on structural factors of political opportunity and organization and pay less attention to subjective factors such as cognitive liberation.[17] William Gamson recognized the importance of micro-mobilization and mental freedom and identified the role of ideas and political consciousness in shaping collective action.[18] In micro-mobilization, know-how is crucial, and it includes “a repertoire of knowledge about how to engage in collective action along with the skills to apply that knowledge.”[19] Micro-level analyzing and convincing people to mobilize and organize them requires building loyalty, managing the logistics of collective action, mediating internal conflict, and framing and politicizing grievances concerning structural factors.[20]
Baro had a unique capacity to establish relationships with people of different experiences and backgrounds, build loyalty, and organize them. Referring to the micro-mobilization theoretical framework of Ervin Goffman, Steven M. Buechler defines framing as an “interpretive schemata that people use to identify, label, and render meaningful events in their lives. Frames allow people to organize experiences and guide actions in everyday life and social movements.”[21] The dominant classes and groups in the capitalist world system can control and exploit oppressed classes and subaltern groups because they have the know-how, skills, knowledge, and economic resources to develop central organizing ideologies necessary to translate into organizational capacity.[22] Even though the Oromo majority have been denied education and lived an impoverished life, Baro and his colleagues tried their best to develop the critical knowledge that would help them challenge the knowledge for domination, exploitation, and maintaining the status quo.
Overall, Baro and his colleagues understood the importance of the critical integration of resource mobilization, political process, and framing and social construction theories, which were necessary for comprehending and building the Oromo national movement. The Oromo movement has continued to develop Oromo’s political consciousness by developing the knowledge for liberation to expose the fallacy and irrationality of Ethiopian knowledge for domination, control, and exploitation. Oromo organic intellectuals understood the role of the Amhara-Tigray ruling class with individuals it coopted from other groups and its oppressive and exploitative state structures, recognized the part of an Oromo human agency, and organized and struggled to change the deplorable conditions of the Oromo people. Furthermore, Baro and his comrades integrated indigenous Oromo knowledge encapsulated in the Oromo democratic tradition known as the gadaa/siiqqee system[23] with critical knowledge and theories. Rejecting the wisdom that has characterized the Oromo people as an object of history rather than the subject of history by changing their names to “Galla,” which connotes barbarism and lack of culture, Baro and Oromo organic intellectuals recognized that Oromo society has its unique epistemology and civilization.
Baro’s Political activism at the HSIU and in the MTA
In high school, Baro became active in Oromo politics and continued his activism into university life. [24] He attended the HSIU until 1966 when he graduated with a pharmacy degree. Later, he reentered the university in 1970 and graduated with a law degree in 1973. When he was fired from the Ministry of Health for introducing a reform that allowed many Oromos and others to get training and receive a certificate in Pharmacy to open their health clinics, he returned to the university to study law. Ibssa Gutama, a cohort, and a fellow Oromo activist student, noted that Baro was an active member and a leader of the student union at the HSIU.[25] The student union elected Baro as the president in 1964-5 because of his charisma, fluency in English and the Amharic language, political maturity, and persuasive arguments on the land and national questions, which have continued to be the hot and contested issues in the Ethiopian Empire to this day.[26] Baro had another advantage; his older brother, the Reverend Gudina, was a pastor and later a leader of the Mekane Yesus Church. Gudina raised and mentored his younger brother. The Reverend Gudina was a role model and fatherly figure for Baro.
Baro simultaneously participated in the Haile Selassie I University (HSIU) student union and the MTA. He entered the university in 1962, started to engage in the university students’ movement, and joined the MTA in 1963-64. These movements created conducive conditions for Baro to engage in Oromo political activism and organizational activities on different levels. During the decade of 1960, the political contradictions in the Ethiopian Empire were exploding among various sectors. At the same time, Oromo’s political awareness and consciousness were rising in different sectors of Oromo society and among Oromo’s university students and professionals. In the early 1960s, the Oromo national movement started to organize with the formation of the MTA, which initially laid the foundation of national Oromummaa (Oromo national history, culture, and nationalism). The association was formed in 1963 and peacefully mobilized various Oromo groups and individuals for social, economic, cultural, and political development.
After the Haile Selassie government banned the association in 1967, Baro and his comrades organized a clandestine political movement to lead the Oromo national movement. Metaphorically speaking, MTA was a preparatory school for Baro and other Oromo nationalists to expand their knowledge of nationalism, the politics of networking, and the skills and knowledge for building a liberation organization.[27] As we shall see below, the experiences obtained from MTA and other Oromo movements and the emergence of Oromo organic intellectuals such as Baro and his comrades contributed to the centralization and consolidation of the Oromo national movement. These factors facilitated the formation of the OLF and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in the early 1970s. There were three phases in the Oromo national struggle against Ethiopian settler colonialism and its internal and external supporters. During the first phase, various Oromo groups resisted Ethiopian colonialism locally in scattered ways.[28]
In the second phase, there were three types of struggles:[29] The urban-based Oromo intellectuals, army officers, soldiers, politicians, students, and merchants who could not tolerate Abyssinian racism and discrimination initiated the organized struggle. These elements created a social movement known as the MTA. The colonial government’s opposition to this association transformed it into a covert political action. The second type of struggle was the Bale Oromo farmers’ movement, which gradually developed into a loosely organized armed movement in Bale between 1963 and 1970. The third type of struggle was the Affran Qallo cultural movement that emerged in the same decade in Dire Dhawa, Eastern Oromia. In their ways, these three movements facilitated the development of national Oromummaa and gradually built connections. They laid conducive social, political, and cultural foundations for the birth of OLF in the early 1970s and its growth. Since the MTA was the central womb from which the OLF was born, let us explain how it emerged and was banned.
The formation and the banning of the MTA
The Ethiopian colonial government used a draconian policy to prevent people from organizing and struggling for their freedom and rights. However, in the mid-1950s, the Haile Selassie government introduced a revised constitution that allowed organizations and civil societies to function legally. Taking advantage of Article 45 of His Imperial Majesty’s 1955-revised Constitution and Article 14, Number 505 of the Civil Code of the Ethiopian Empire, a few Oromo nationalists formed the MTA on January 24, 1963, as a civilian self-help association. That year was a turning point in Oromo history because prominent Oromos merged their local self-help associations and formed the MTA.[30] One local self-help association was Hagere Hiyiwat Maradaja Mahibar, which Tesfaye Tessama and Taddassa Gabre established in 1963; Captain Ayale Walde-Selassie led this self-help association.[31] Captain Sahilu Biri, who later joined the MTA, was a member of this association.
Captain Seyoum Lama was leading a similar self-help association in Ambo. The leaders of the two associations requested Colonel Alemu Qixeesa, a retired military officer, to join their respective associations, but he convinced these leaders to merge the two into one. In 1963, they combined the two associations and gave the name Yee Jibatina Macha Self-Help Association.[32] Then, the new association elected the colonel to be its president.[33] At the same time, Haile Mariam Gamada, a lawyer, led Yee Shawa Tulama Maradaja Mahibar; both Haile Mariam Gamada and Alemu Qixeesa were Oromo nationalists. They knew about the deplorable conditions of their Oromo communities.[34] Haile Mariam Gamada agitated Alemu Qixeesa on the importance of forming one strong self-help association by merging their associations; the colonel agreed. Both started to convince members of their respective associations to merge their associations, realizing the importance of unity and strength. The members and leaders of the two associations agreed to establish a committee to formulate bylaws and a constitution. In 1963, the two associations joined and elected Haile Mariam Gamada as the president of the newly merged association and called it the Macha-Tulama Self-Help Association.[35]
Furthermore, explaining the significance of the sycamore tree (odaa), Haile Mariam Gamada recommended its picture to be the logo of MTA, and the members of the association accepted the logo. Since then, this logo has become the mark of all Oromo associations and organizations because it represents the Oromo gadaa/siiqqee system, symbolizing and expressing Oromo egalitarian democracy. Based on its constitution,[36] the MTA established two objectives: establishing schools and health clinics and building roads in the Oromo country. The second objective was the construction of churches and mosques for Christian and Muslim believers who did not have them and providing financial and legal assistance for disabled and unemployed persons. The first set of objectives aimed at improving the welfare of the Oromo nation; the second sought to mobilize the Oromo people toward a common goal by undermining the colonial policy of divide and rule based on religion, class, and region. Although the association’s constitution mentions assisting its members during accidents, illness, death, and other serious problems, the main emphasis was on Oromo national development. However, all members believed that the association’s primary objective was to eradicate hunger, disease, and illiteracy or ignorance, which have been the hallmark of the Ethiopian Empire.[37]
The association’s constitution expresses the following principles: “Love your brother as you love yourself and do for others what you wish for yourself.”[38] The association was open to anyone interested, regardless of ethnicity/nationality, race, class, and gender; individuals from other colonized nations did join MTA, as shown below. As the association’s popularity grew, members of Oromo military officers, ordinary soldiers, scholars, university and high school students, merchants, civil servants, and farmers became members. Oromo individuals who could not afford to pay membership fees could also join freely. As soon as the association obtained its legal status, other similar Oromo associations and individuals joined it. According to the constitution, the MTA elected the policy-making board of thirteen individuals and initially elected Colonel Alemu Qixeesa as the president and chair of the board, Baqala Nadhi and Colonel Qadida Gurmessa as vice presidents, Haile Mariam Gamada as the general secretary. The association also elected Mangistu Wolde-Yohanis, Baqala Walde-Mariam, Captain Yilma Walde-Samayat, Zawuga Boji’a, Sisay Asafa, Captain Mulisa Sori, Dajane Boji’a, and Walde-Mikael Kalacha as board members. The association elected Gabire-Silasse Waldiya as the secretary of the board. The MTA also created the secretariat office in which Haile Mariam Gamada was the general secretary.
Furthermore, the association formed the financial committee, Budget committee, legal committee, education committee, history and news committee, document committee, intelligence committee, program and communication committee, road construction committee, health committee, religion, culture, and library committee, self-help committee, and the advisory committee. It created the last committee in 1965 and elected Brigadier General Taddasa Biru as its leader. After refusing to join the association for some time, he joined and led it.[39] The advisory committee members were General Jagama Kello, Tessama Nagari, Lt. Girma Wolde-Giorgis. and Brigadier General Taddasa who was Amharaized or Ethiopianized than others by accepting Orthodox Christianity, married an Amhara woman, and was devoted and loyal to Haile Selassie. Initially refusing to join the association, he said: “I do not engage in clan politics … Do you forget that my children’s mother is an Amhara? Are you saying that I should leave them?”[40] In 1966, the general changed his mind and enthusiastically joined the association. The reason was that the then Prime Minister, Akililu Habtewold, invited him for dinner and told him, “Tadesse, after you started leading the literacy campaign in Amharic, you frequently said learn and learn. To say learning is good. But we should know who to educate. We rule the Oromo by leaving them behind for a century. If we educate these people, they are like an ocean, and they flood us.”[41]
The prime minister expressed this racist view because he did not know that the general’s background was Oromo; he thought he was a committed Orthodox Amhara with a high sense of Amhara supremacy or Ethiopianism. The general later reflected on the prime minister’s statement: “The whisky in front of me seemed [poison] to my blood. Since I could not control myself, I asked, was this whisky poured for me? Then I said I was on medication; I could not drink. Goodbye, and I left.”[42] What he heard from the prime minister changed the general’s mind, and he later went to the office of MTA and joined it. However, he did not disclose what changed his mind for some time. One day, one of Haile Selassie’s ministers said to the general the following:
Last night at the prime minister’s home, while Dejazmach Sahilu Difaye, Dejazmach Aeemiro Selassie-Abebe, Dejazmach Warqu Inqu-Selassie, and I were meeting, one of the officials said: ‘Why did not you tell Tadesse that by saying everybody should learn, he denies us shoe shiners.’ Continuing the discussion, another official said, ‘not only about learning, but he also joined the Oromo association to seek political power.’ When the prime minister asked: ‘Why is he involved in the Oromo association,’ one of the officials said, ‘Is he not Salale Oromo?’ After hearing this, the prime minister held his head by his hands, stood up, made noise, and said, ‘I must go somewhere. Apologize me.’ After saying goodbye to the prime minister, one of the officials asked, 'What kind of relationship exists between the general and the prime minister?[43]
“The prime minister said, 'Before what I told Tadesse spreads, I got permission from Janhoy (the king) to kill the general.”[44] In 1966, the general told the leadership and certain members of MTA about the information, and they were shocked and decided to protect the general. Even though the prime minister’s words and what he heard about his intention made him angry, the general increased his determination and commitment to expanding literacy education among his people by using the MTA.[45] After receiving its legal status in 1965, the association consolidated its leadership, increased its branches and membership all over Oromia, and intensified its development activities. It constructed schools, expanded literacy campaigns, and built roads by mobilizing economic and human resources. Olana Zoga noted that the MTA created “a government within a government to deal with development programs and activities.”[46]
In an empire where government officials robbed the people and did not care about development, the association made relentless efforts and achievements. As we shall see below, the association expanded to the East, such as the administrative region of Arsi, and to the West, such as the Wallaga administrative region, the more the Haile Selassie government opposed the association and started to take actions that would undermine and destroy it. An open conflict started between the regional government of Arsi and the MTA in 1966 when the association organized the Itaya public conference.[47] The prominent individuals who played a significant role in organizing this famous conference were Haji Robale, cultural leader; Tasisa Eeba, member and government employee, Ordofa, and Dhadhi Fayisa.[48] The MTA’s Arsi branch was established in 1966 and played an essential role in organizing the conference; its leaders were Usman Sheik, chairman, Galatee Xadacho, treasurer, and Ahmad Buna, secretary.[49] This public conference was victorious because it brought Muslims and Christian Oromo together, who were divided and conquered by Ethiopian colonialism, religion, and geopolitics. The underground movements led by Kadu, Dule, Abdi Hamida, Tesiso Gudato, Bushira Warque, Doti Tura, Gabira-Mikael, Falama, Bayana Badhaso, and Ashanafi Wadesso were also empowered and joined the MTA and immensely contributed to advance its cause.[50]
Unfortunately, Sahilu Difayee, the nafxanaya administrator of the Arsi region, sent the police and fired on the people who were returning from the conference and killed a woman;[51] the nafaxayas (colonial settlers) said the following: “Since your country is Kenya, we will return you there.”[52] The Oromo still hear this statement from the nafxanayas, irritated by the Oromo struggle for national self-determination and democracy. According to these racist colonial settlers, the Oromo must accept their colonization and domination if they want to stay in the Ethiopian Empire. Atsede Habte-Mariam, a prominent Oromo woman, played a significant role in the opening of the Wallaga branch of the association in June 1966. In this branch, Captain Qana’a, Tessama Nagari, Bayana Abdi, Abdissa Mosa, Olana Bati, and Tasisa Eeba played essential roles.[53] The government vehemently opposed the integration of the Wallaga Maradaga Mahibar (Wallaga Self-Help Association) and MTA association to prevent the unity of the Oromo people; it dispatched its agents to spread rumors to turn members of the two associations against each other.[54] Finally, the members of the two associations agreed to participate in both without any restrictions.[55]
Furthermore, Haile Marim Gamada designed a policy to expand MTA to Hararghe, eastern Oromia.[56] He worked with Qanyazmach Abdulaziz Mohammed to bring together the MTA and Afran Qallo Cultural Movement in 1966.[57] In the same year, other Oromo who live in Hararghe, following the policy designed by Haile Mariam Gamada, established a branch of MTA. Elected leaders were Major General Ababa Gamada, president; Captain Hailu Ragasa, vice president; Kasa Walde-Mariam, treasurer; Kumsa Tuguba, vice treasurer; and other members were Captain Mardasa Lelisa, Captain Taka Tulu, Shambal Gabre-Giorgis Asrat, Shambal Dabala Dinsa, Asafa Lamu, and Haile Mikael Magarisa. The MTA covered the Oromo country by starting in the center and expanding quickly. It increased its popularity and expanded its branches in rural and regional areas. Consequently, the association was seriously concerned about the colonial government and its functionaries. It established numerous branch offices in eight administrative regions.[58]
Within three years, its registered membership reached more than two million.[59] Since the association was committed to eliminating racial oppression in the empire, members of the other colonized nations accepted the objectives and programs of the association and joined it. Prominent individuals, such as Mamo Komoolcha and Obiisee Baraqo of Gedo; Abayineh Fano, Kata, Eeratam Ereecha, and Bogale Walalu of Gamo; Mulu Maja and Dasta Fisaha Xoona of Walayita; Walde-Amanuel Dubala of Sidama; Gabre Odo of Gimira; Basha Godu of Kolo Konta; Aida Hisalo and Walde-Mikael of Afar and Issa; Haile Donomoro of Mocha; and Abdurahman Ojolo of Benishangul joined the association and also served as its advisors.[60] The success of the MTA by increasing members, opening many branch offices, attracting influential Oromo personalities, recruiting non-Oromo leaders, and growing visibility captured the attention of the Haile Selassie government that maintained its power through exploiting and perpetuating ignorance in Oromo society. Specifically, successful Oromo military officers, administrators, parliamentarians, prosperous merchants and farmers, intellectuals, and university and high school students carried out the banner of all Oromo to design and implement development programs to change their society. These conditions raised tough questions in the minds of Amhara-led government officials who feared for their political and cultural supremacy and economic privileges.
Consequently, the government’s security and military wing penetrated the association, spied on its leading figures, and decided to act against the leaders.[61] The association’s intelligence committee discovered that the Haile Selassie government ordered its security and police to infiltrate and attack the association and its leadership.[62] Since the Haile Selassie government, directly and indirectly, provoked the MTA leadership, its prominent leaders decided to take preemptive action. In 1966, at Brigadier General Taddasa’s house, leaders such as Ketema Yifru,[63] Kabade Bizunesh, Daniel Abebe, Mamo Mezemer, Tesfaye Dagaga, Bekele Mekonnen, Moga Firisa, and specific soldiers met and decided to bomb and kill Haile Selassie when he was going to a church ceremony.[64] However, the government intelligence networks learned beforehand about the plot, changed the time Haile Selassie would travel to a church ceremony, and identified and captured all leaders involved in the coup plan. Government officials used the police and the Orthodox Patriarchs to capture leaders like Bekele Mekonnen, Kebede Bizunesh, and others by appealing to religion and claiming that Haile Selassie would pardon them.[65]
The coup plot failed because it was not well organized; the police and security forces surrounded the general’s house to capture the general and other leaders. But he escaped from these forces to continue the struggle. The planted agents betrayed the leaders by leaking the plan to the government. Some individuals crossed the leaders of MTA; one of these was Abajfar Waqaayyo, who facilitated the capturing of General Taddassa Biru when hiding at his home.[66] The Haile Selassie government charged for treason sixteen national and regional leaders of the association at its kangaroo court.[67] The nine national leaders were Brigadier General Taddasa Biru, Lt. Mamo Mezemer, Seifu Tesemaa, Dhadhi Fayissa, Lamessa Boru, Mekonnen Wassenu, Haile Mariam Gamada, Colonel Alemu Qixeesa, and Brigadier general Dawud Abidi. The following leaders from the Bale administrative region were also charged: Ahmad Emama, Adam Sado, Umar Hussien, Abubakar Darga, Aliye Ahmad, Qassim Hussein, and Hassen Jima. The Oromo people never expected justice from the Ethiopian colonial government. The kangaroo court decided to punish Brigadier General Taddasa Biru and Lt. Mamo by death, but later changed the punishment of the former to life imprisonment and killed the latter by hanging. General Taddasa Biru was released from prison in 1974 and murdered by the military government in 1975.[68]
The court decided on the sixth of seven national leaders, from three to ten years.[69] Since Haile Mariam Gamada was heavily tortured, which killed him later, he was carried to the court only one time. One can call the Amhara government’s hanging of Mamo Mezemer at the central prison lynching. The lynch mobs included ministers and generals such as Akililu Habte-Walde, prime minister, his brother Akalwarq, Sahilu Difaye, Kifile Irgatu, Darassee Dubalee, and Yilma Shibashi, who enjoyed the killing of the best and brightest Oromo. The government accused Mamo of a crime he never committed; the government agents planted the bomb that exploded at a cinema house to implicate Mamo Mezaemer.[70] His crime was to be the best and brightest Oromo officer and intellectual. He struggled to emancipate his people and wrote Oromo history that the security agents found in his house.[71] After attacking, imprisoning, and killing the MTA leadership and members, the government banned the association in 1967. The Haile Selassie government used its security networks, the army, police, the media, the Orthodox Church, and other institutions to destroy the MTA. The Amhara ruling class did not allow the existence of self-help associations in Oromo society and kept the Oromo in the ocean of poverty, ignorance, and poverty.
Considering the poverty and suffering of the Oromo people, those few Oromo individuals who joined Ethiopian colonial institutions (such as schools, the parliament, the Army, and administration) and Oromo merchants and farmers started to think about improving the Oromo living standard. By participating in colonial institutions, they learned more about the oppression and exploitation of the Oromo people. “As more Oromo became civil servants, army officers, and NCOs and more Oromo schoolboys graduated from the university, and as more Oromo members of the parliament managed to get elected, the various Oromo groups found that, in addition to humiliating experiences, they shared a common language, similar values, and history of colonial experience. [The Army, the parliament, and the university largely generated the new pan-Oromo consciousness]”[72] These Oromo individuals were brought together in urban areas by the same colonial institutions that discriminated against them and used them as agents. Both individual experiences and the exploitation and oppression of their people made them politically aware and inclined to organize themselves. Because of the potential of the association, the government began to provoke it to have a pretext to ban it. Local and regional government functionaries also created obstacles when leaders traveled from place to place to describe the association’s objectives.
The government became suspicious and began to suppress the organization’s activities. Local governments attempted to disperse the gatherings of leaders and members at Kachisi, Jeldu, Kalacha, Bishoftu, Bako, and Dheera.[73] It did not like to see all Oromo —Muslims and Christians, soldiers and civilians, urban dwellers and farmers—assemble to discuss improving their conditions through education and development. The colonial government began constant harassment of members and leaders of the association. It did not tolerate this peaceful attempt “to restore the inalienable rights of the Oromo people.”[74] The regime accused the leaders of being conspirators aiming to overthrow the government. As A. P. Wood aptly comments, “Although nominally a self-help association, it began to articulate the dissatisfaction of the Oromo with the government and particularly with their position in society. This position caused much government concern. The association was banned.”[75] Although the MTA was primarily engaged in a peaceful struggle, there is evidence that some revolutionary figures, such as Lt. Mamo Mezemir, were preparing to establish a covert connection with the Bale Oromo armed struggle. In his letter of September 10, 1965, Mamo Mezemir stated:
The history of humanity shows that people who rise in the struggle for freedom and independence, in defiance of death, are always victorious… The life and death struggle of the oppressed masses in the Ethiopian Empire against the hegemony of the Amhara and their allies headed by American imperialism is a sacred liberation struggle of millions of oppressed and humiliated people … That struggle will intensify as the oppressed people’s organizational means and consciousness become deeply rooted. As you learned in our discussions, the Macha and Tulama democratic movement, which … [raised] the consciousness of the Oromo people, is in the present concrete situation, working day and night to put in hand coordination activities within our reach. The militant members are now working on organizing a nationwide people’s movement, which [works to realize]the aspiration of the Oromo people. Keep up your heroic armed struggle, defending every inch of the Oromo Nation to the last drop of your blood. The decisive war of resistance you are conducting in Bale will be victorious despite the maneuvers of imperialism, Zionism, and local reaction. We shall continue doing everything we can to keep in touch with you.[76]
Many Oromo individuals, such as Haji Adam Sado from Bale, were accused and imprisoned for supporting the association and establishing connections between it and the Bale Oromo farmer movement.[77] Regarding the association’s general impact, Mohammed Hassen argues that it was “a landmark in the history of the Oromo people since colonization, leading as it did to a countrywide political awakening.”[78] This self-help association gained local support everywhere in Oromia. Many Oromo who had joined the colonial institutions rejected them during this time and came back to rescue their people from poverty, ignorance, and all forms of suffering. The association also had strong relations with the Affran Qallo musical group, and many famous singers came to Finfinnee and sang at various association meetings. The MTA recreated the Oromo identity and pride, which were attacked and weakened by Ethiopian settler colonialism and political structures. The dissolution and political repression of the associations led to the emergence of a clandestine liberation organization known as the OLF/OLA.
Baro’s Participation in the MTA
The MTA was formed in 1963, one year after Baro joined the Haile Selassie I University. Joining the MTA allowed Baro to meet and know Oromo nationalists, ordinary members, and students with whom he built a new political organization after the Haile Selassie government systematically dissolved the MTA.[79] Baro was a well-known young figure, an active association member, and a politically active college student.[80] For example, Taha Abdi knew Baro at the university and the association’s meetings around the mid-1960s.[81] Also, Addisu Tolesa, Lubee Biru, and Demisie Serda frequently met with Baro at the association’s meetings.[82] Later Baro Tumsa and Asafa Dula were legal advisors of the MTA.[83] Getachew Baissa considers Baro an activist scholar who coordinated the youth wing of MTA; he closely worked with Taddasa Biru.[84] Baro was not an ordinary association member because he was educating members through lectures and presentations on the health conditions of the Oromo and other peoples in the Ethiopian Empire.[85]
In 1965, according to Lubee Biru, one day, Baro made a presentation in Afaan Oromoo, which was a rare thing, explaining how malaria disproportionately affected the Oromo people in the Rift Valley area compared to other people in the Nile basin.[86] He specifically described that the Oromo people paid more taxes than the Amhara farmers because of their population size and abundant resources. However, the Oromo in the Rift Valley area did not receive adequate medicine and health services from health professionals, such as dressers, nurses, and doctors. The Amhara-led government allocated more resources and health professionals in the Nile basin, where more Amhara lived. Because of their ethnonational affinity to the ruling class, the Amhara benefited substantially in health and other services. Baro demonstrated his assertions with rich statistical data, evidence, and the government’s policy measures. Lubee, an eleventh-grade student, attended the meeting with about 400 association members.[87] Baro’s intellectual caliber, mastery of Afaan Oromoo, scientific capability, commitment to the Oromo cause, courage, and wisdom impressed Lubee. He wanted to be Baro’s friend and work with him on the Oromo issue. Lubee later learned that Baro was working on the Oromo issue with his uncle, Ilala Ibssa, a member of the MTA.
Addisu Tolosa introduced Lubee to Baro. Baro, Addisu, and Lubee frequently met to discuss the Oromo issues, such as the banning of the MTA and the imprisonment and killing of its prominent leaders.[88] Baro, Addisu, and Lubee met at the Reverend Gudina Tumsa’s home in Finfinnee. Baro and his brother, Nagaasa, lived at their elder brother’s home. Lubee remembers the three significant issues Baro mentioned the first day: one, he said that there were many Oromo in Shagar (Finfinnee) that we did not know. For example, one family from his neighbor that he thought to be Amharas was, in fact, Oromo. He discovered that when the family’s relatives visited, they spoke in Afaan Oromoo. Two, Baro said that the government could imprison us one day, and we should start to think about what we could do before it happened. Finally, he said that the three of us should continue to meet and discuss secretly, and they decided to meet again in a week. During their second meeting, Baro brought a book entitled The Battle of Algiers: A Brutal Portrait of Urban Guerrilla Warfare, written by Gillo Pontecorvo in 1966. The book explains how Algeria’s National Liberation Front (NLF) engaged in urban guerrilla warfare against the French colonial government and the colonial settlers from 1954 to 1962 and how the French Army was involved in terrorism and massive human rights violations to suppress the FLN. Baro assigned Addisu and Lubee to read the book; after they finished reading it, the three discussed the essence of the book and started assessing the lessons they could learn.
The trio first decided that they could not be silent when the government imposed death and lifelong imprisonment on Lt. Mamo Mezemir (1929-1969), a firebrand young Oromo nationalist, and B/General Taddasa Biru (1920-1975), who revolutionized the activities of the MTA. They decided to write a manifesto describing the dire conditions of MTA leaders whom the Ethiopian government persecuted. Before writing the manifesto, the trio identified and discussed the significant points and assigned Lubee Biru to write the first draft. After Lubee completed writing the draft paper, Addis and Baro read, commented on, and enriched the version. The title of the seven-page article was “Yee Oromoo Roroo Iska Machee?” (For how long the suffering of the Oromo is to continue?) The end of the paper mentioned, “Yee Oromoo Mangisti Quami Bala Silxaan” (The Transitional Oromo Government Authority). According to Lubee, Ibssa Gutama, another Oromo nationalist, added to the end of the manifesto, “Yee Oromoo Natsa Awochi Gibar” (the Oromo Liberation Front). One day before we typed and distributed the paper, Baro visited Lubee’s uncle’s (Ilala’s) home and found out that Lubee was living at his uncle’s home. He was shocked by this reality. Before this time, Ilala did not know that Lubee was working with Baro, and Lubee also did not realize that Ilala and Baro were working together on Oromo issues. This reality made one thing clear for Lubee: Baro was working with networks of Oromo nationalists beyond the trio he belonged to. Ilala and Baro invited Lubee to join and discuss with them. As you can see below, Ilala was indirectly involved in producing and distributing the manifesto.
The paper said we could not be quiet if you would kill our leaders, and our people were everywhere. Oromo were your soldiers, servants, wives, and guards, and they could kill, poison, and harm you. When you would attack our leaders, you would strike all of us, and we would not let you go free. The trio faced specific problems in typing and duplicating the paper because they did not have a typewriter or a duplicating machine and did not have typing skills. Addisu identified a man called Birhanu Gamada, who graduated from a commercial school, and who had typing skills; later Addisu requested him for help. Even though Birhanu initially agreed to type the manifesto, he disappeared before the appointment, and the problem remained unsolved. The typing machine problem was not easily solved. Colonel Dababa brought a particular device from his office. But they could not use it because of its notable characters that one could easily identify. Then Ilala got a typing machine from his office. Since Lubee was assigned to find a typist, he started to search for one. He requested Gabissa Lamesa, but he refused to type the paper. Then Lubee asked Mulu Biru, his sister who graduated from a typing school.
Without knowing and reading what it was, Mulu typed the paper. When Lubee asked about the document, she did not realize it because she typed it without reading it. Mulu typed the document in one night, and Ilala returned the machine to his office in the morning. Still, the problem of duplicating the paper to distribute its copies remained unsolved. Addisu and Lubee decided to buy a duplicating machine without deciding where to keep it. Lubee thought Addisu would keep it at his home, and Addisu assumed that Lubee would keep the device. Finally, Addisu convinced Lubee by telling him that many people would visit his place and could expose the secret. Lubee took the duplicating machine to his aunt’s home and hid under her bed. Adunya Ragassa, whom Lubee had known for a very long time, lived close to his aunt’s house, and Lubee sought his advice in helping him find a place to duplicate the paper. He told Lubee that he knew a person who loved General Taddasa and owned a private school. He opened this school with the assistance of the beloved general. Adunya introduced Lubee to a gentleman who agreed to keep the machine at his school and help duplicate the paper in five hundred copies. After the duplication of the paper, Addisu took four hundred and fifty copies for distribution, and Lubee kept fifty copies. The underground networks organized by Baro distributed the copies in Finfinnee and other places in three days.
Lubee traveled to Dire Dhawa in Hararghe with fifty copies of the paper. He took this action to confuse authorities that Lubee was not involved in this matter since he was far away. He distributed the copies to Oromo, whom he knew, stayed there for a few days, and returned to Finfinnee. One day, while Ilala was driving in Finfinnee, a man driving a car very fast passed him, lowered his window, and told him that the security suspected his home was the source of the manifesto. The man was the attorney general of Haile Selassie, and he was also an Oromo and a member of MTA. Furthermore, a Gurage who worked with Lubee at Gooma Quxaba told Lubee that spies often parked around the workplace and asked him about Lubee. One day, a spy called Solomon Kebede, and his group kidnapped Lubee from the front of the MTA office. In 1967, three spies covered Lubee’s face with black cloth, took him to Marcato and from Marcato to Holeta, and drove him back to Finfinnee. They imprisoned and tortured him in a well-built villa by tormenting him day and night in a cold room to force him to confess that Ilala and Baro wrote the manifesto. The agents found Baro’s name in Lubee’s pocket. Lubee’s and Ilala’s friends in high positions put some pressure on Darasee Dubalee, the Police Commissioner, under which jurisdiction Lubee was imprisoned and tortured. Lubee refused to release any information, and he was set free.
Lubee noted that Baro was an extraordinary nationalist who worked with many Oromo in Finfinnee and beyond; he educated and persuaded many Oromo of different social statuses to participate in the Oromo struggle. According to Lubee, Baro talked to individuals on their levels without pushing his ideas on them; he mostly listened to people. He preferred speaking to one person at a time for security reasons and protecting information. Baro believed in organizing Oromo so that they could liberate themselves from Ethiopian colonialism. After the Ethiopian security force recognized Lubee’s involvement in the Oromo struggle, Baro, Addisu, and Magarsa Bari advised him to go to the United States of America, join his uncle Sisai Ibssa, and continue the Oromo struggle from a distance. Lubee’s cousin, Baliyu, also encouraged Lubee to go to America and helped him by encouraging his relatives to contribute money for his travel and other expenses. He left Finfinnee, Oromia, in 1971 and continued to communicate with Baro from a distance until he was killed in 1978. Then, he communicated through letters with his friend Magarsa Bari, who later became the chair of the OLF. Lubee believes that Baro’s death denied the Oromo an outstanding leader who could lead the OLF effectively. His death robbed the Oromo of the wisdom and knowledge needed to build a better-organized Oromo society. Lubee also noted that nobody from people he knows has Baro’s wisdom and organizing capacity. He also mentioned that the killing of Baro damaged the Oromo national movement.
According to Lubee, Baro was a trustworthy, intelligent, farsighted, reliable, friendly, and magnetic leader; consequently, he established close political relationships with many Oromo elites of different regions of Oromia.[89] He was polite and could speak and communicate with every Oromo. Baro respected and believed that every person could contribute to the Oromo cause in different capacities. Since he thought that every Oromo was worthy, everybody Lubee knew liked and trusted him. Taha Abdi also remembers that Baro created several secret study circles in which both worked together.[90] These study circles selected essential discussion topics, including political economy, politics, and current news. Individuals could participate in more than one study circle. Explaining how politics and the Oromo cause brought them together, Taha expressed that Baro’s trustworthiness, integrity, dedication, and knowledge attracted him to work with him until he was assigned to create a diplomatic relationship with Sudan and prepare to launch an armed struggle in Wallaga.[91] In 1977, Taha left Finfinnee via Eritrea with the help of the Eritrean Liberation Front.
Taha also listed many other qualities of Baro: He was capable and brave to work within the Ethiopian system and simultaneously prepare the Oromo people for an armed struggle to liberate themselves from Ethiopian colonialism and nafxanya institutions. Taha mentioned that Baro expressed himself through his work and delivered what he promised; it was joyful to work with him because he was a listener, tolerant, consensus builder, humble, and compromiser. More than everything, he believed in creating an independent liberation organization that would ensure the liberation of his people and country. Baro and his older brother, the Reverend Gudina Tumsa, and their comrades kept the fire of the Oromo national movement underground alive after the banning of the MTA.[92] They facilitated the birth of the OLF in the early 1970s.
The Role of Baro in the Founding of OLF
Baro was the principal figure in conceiving the idea of and forming the OLF as we know it today. Most people who worked with him had expressed this reality; for instance, as Leenco Lata noted, Baro “functioned as the Oromo organization” before 1972, when he called the first meeting to form the OLF.[93] Mohammed Ibrahim (Boru Bariso) considered Baro “the motor of the Oromo struggle.”[94] Similarly, Yohannis (Dima) Noggo and Yohannis (Leenco) Lata said: “Without Baro, there was no OLF.”[95] Getachew Baisa also mentioned that “the OLF meant Baro, and his tragic death blinded our eyes and damaged our central brain.”[96] For Demissie Sarda, Baro was “a godfather” of the Oromo national movement.[97] Another source mentioned that Baro was the mastermind behind the OLF.[98]
A prominent activist woman scholar whose family members were close friends of Baro’s family and who keenly observed his discussions on politics, social and cultural affairs, and organizational matters noted that “Baro was the father of the OLF, even though he disassociated himself from being portrayed this way by crediting the pioneers of Oromo nationalists, such as General Taddasa Biru, for the formation of the OLF.”[99] The same activist scholar expressed her admiration for him by saying he was gifted in social skills, communicating and dealing with children, women, and everyone with respect and a sense of equality. The knowledge and wisdom, cultural and social capital, and personal and behavioral qualities of Baro laid the foundation for the birth of the OLF as a social movement, organization, and institution[100] that has played multiple and complex roles in Oromo society for almost a half-century.
For Deressa Kitte, Baro was a seasoned activist-politician, humble, selfless, and ready to give his life for the liberation of his people; he also noted that Baro was humane and kind, considerate, hardworking, intelligent, confident, trustworthy, and consistent.[101] Baro regularly contacted ordinary people and religious leaders, such as priests and sheiks, peasants, businesspeople, workers, soldiers, and government officials, to raise their political consciousness and to promote the Oromo national cause.[102] Whenever Baro received sensitive information, he dispatched it to his followers to protect themselves and the Oromo national movement through his connection to different government branches, particularly the security apparatus.[103] Because of his personal qualities, characteristics, respect for others, commitment, intelligence, selflessness, charisma, and love for all Oromo regardless of their differences, all Oromo, except a few who joined Ethiopian organizations, worked with Baro, who persuaded them to join the Oromo national movement.
Starting in the late 1960s, Baro and his comrades organized secret study circles after the Haile Selassie government banned the Macha-Tulama Self-Help Association (MTA) and repressed the Bale Oromo armed rebellion and the Arfan Qallo Oromo cultural renaissance.[104] In 1971, Baro indirectly organized a group of seven university students and intellectuals who wrote the first manifesto of the Oromo movement known as The Oromos: Voice against Tyranny. At the same time, Oromo political refugees in Somalia and the Middle East started establishing political organizations and receiving military training to return to Oromia and engage in a protracted armed struggle.[105] In 1971, a few Oromo elites in Aden, Yemen, with other nationalities, created a political organization called the Ethiopian National Liberation Front (ENLF) under the leadership of Hussein Suura.[106] Later, Yusuf Bakar organized another organization called the Organization of Oromo People’s Liberation Struggle (OOPLS), in opposition to the ENLF.[107]
Baro and his comrades worked hard to clandestinely bring together Oromo nationalists in the diaspora and Oromia to discuss and build consensus on selecting an appropriate model for the Oromo national struggle. They demonstrated their intellectual and political maturity by critically understanding the cumulative colonial experiences of the Oromo and developing a pragmatic model of the Oromo effort, which was forming and maintaining an independent front for the Oromo national movement.[108] Also, their resistance to alien ideologies, although they extensively read Marxist and liberal literature, and their efforts to build the Oromo national struggle on the Oromo historical foundation, reflected Oromo culture and political maturity. Baro and his comrades focused on developing national Oromummaa (i.e., developing Oromo nationalism through retrieving Oromo national history and culture).[109] They believed the Oromo should have an independent liberation front to embrace Oromo cultural and historical foundations and empower themselves to liberate and create their sovereign country and free society.[110]
How did Baro and his comrades, who the government educated as members of an Oromo collaborator class, emerge as revolutionary leaders? Even though most educated Oromo have become the agents of Ethiopian colonialism, a few used colonial educational opportunities to equip themselves with liberation knowledge. This knowledge helped them raise their political and cultural consciousness and mobilize and organize their people to uproot the Ethiopian system of colonial domination, exploitation, and dehumanization. The Ethiopian colonial system has produced, through its educational institutions, a small number of Amaharaized Oromo leaders who would function as intermediaries between the Ethiopian colonial ruling class and the Oromo people.[111] The system intentionally denied education to most Oromo and limited the number of educated Oromo.
Furthermore, the Ethiopian colonial state has used various political and cultural mechanisms, such as assimilation, political marriage, religion, and divide and conquer policies, to disconnect most educated Oromo intermediaries from their cultural and historical roots and demand continuous loyalty. Only a few persons clearly understood these complex problems by familiarizing themselves with Oromo’s national history, culture, values, and various forms of Oromo’s resistance to Ethiopian colonialism. Some of those who became Oromo nationalist leaders were collaborators who were initially neutral or opposed to the Oromo national movement because of the lack of political consciousness or opportunism. Oromo collaborative leaders have ensconced themselves in garrison and Oromo cities that Ethiopian colonial settlers have overwhelmingly populated.[112] Ethiopian political, religious, and media institutions have influenced the most educated Oromo collaborator leadership. Consequently, some educated Oromo have joined Ethiopian political organizations and institutions. The few Oromo nationalist intellectuals who emerged from this system were targeted for destruction both by the Ethiopian and Somali governments when Oromo opportunist and reactionary elements who collaborated with the enemies became subservient and intermediary leaders.
Let me now further explore how Baro and his comrades immensely contributed to the birth and growth of OLF. They built secret study circles and social networks. They depended on previous Oromo self-help associations and conscious Oromo bureaucrats and military personnel from different parts of the Oromo country to form the OLF.[113] Initially, most Oromo did not know one another because the colonial government did not allow free association and organization. The colonial government partitioned their regions into colonial territories, such as Wallo, Hararghe, Shawa, Arsi, Wallaga, and others. It gave them these divisive names rather than calling them by the branches of the Oromo people, such as Barentu, Borana, Tulama, and Macha. The colonial government erased the collective and original name, Oromo, and replaced it with Galla, which is a derogatory and racist name.
Baro was the center of Oromo’s political gravity in the 1970s and "the most sophisticated and effective organizer."[114]As the pillar of nascent Oromo nationalism, Baro established relationships with members of every sector and class of Oromo society; he built connections with many individuals from the lower classes to the highest government bureaucrats, such as members of the highest political, military, and other professional elites, from radical university and high school student to professors and teachers, and from ordinary working individuals to members of well-to-do classes because he believed that Oromo nationalism would link them to one another.[115] He used various platforms, such as schools, colleges, military establishments, government bureaucracy, and civic and government institutions, to contact and establish enduring relationships with Oromo individuals of diverse backgrounds. Colonial institutions, such as colleges, the military, and the bureaucracy, brought together a few Oromo professionals and intellectuals. So, it is paradoxical that colonial institutions, notably the Haile Selassie I University, later Addis Ababa University, built to maintain the Ethiopian colonial system, brought together and unintentionally produced a few conscious Oromo leaders.
Baro worked closely with Oromo University students and other intellectuals for many years. Furthermore, he and his comrades formed and built social networks and covert study circles to educate and raise the political consciousness of some educated Oromo elites. They recruited reliable, committed leaders to create the OLF. In addition, they relied on preexisting associations, such as the Wallaga Maradaja Mahibar (Wallaga Self-Help Association) and the Macha-Tulama Self-Help Association (MTA), to identify, mobilize and organize trustworthy members of the educated Oromo elites. After the banning of MTA in 1967 by the Haile Selassie government, Baro started to recruit individuals secretly to form study cells for security reasons. His associates also recruited conscious Oromo government officials to mobilize human and financial resources for the Oromo national movement. For instance, Fiqadu Waqjira (Qaxalee), a member of these two associations, met Baro between 1964 and 1965 and got closer to him in 1976 when working as a land reform surveyor.[116]
By traveling to different parts of Oromia, Fiqadu learned about all regions of Oromia (the Oromo country) and Oromo branches. Baro was very much interested in learning about these issues from Fiqadu. Later, when the government appointed Fiqadu as the Director of the Land Settlement Authority of the Ministry of Agriculture, Baro requested him to hire seven prominent leaders, including Kebede Demise and Muhe Abdo. Consequently, Faqadu hired them and gave them work, and at the same time worked on the organizational activities of the OLF secretly.[117] Baro’s political activities were not limited to domestic political and organizational activities. In 1970, Baro established relations with Oromo political refugees in Yemen, such as Hussein Suura, and in Sudan, such as Ejetta Fayissa, two former members of the MTA.[118] Baro and Abbaa Biyyaa contacted Hussein Suura in Aden, Yemen, who organized a political organization.[119] Yusuf Bakar and Yohannis Petros, the two University students from Hararghe, facilitated communication between Hussein, Baro, and Abbaa Biyyaa. Then, Hussein sent a messenger from Aden to deliver copies of his organization’s political program, for distribution.[120]
The messenger entered the empire clandestinely with a bag of copies of the document and boarded the train in Dirree Dhawa to travel to Shaggar/Finfinnee. Somewhere on his way, members of the Finance Police entered the train at a checking point and started searching the bags of all passengers merely to find contraband goods. A member of the Finance Police who opened a bag full of copies of the document declared the existence of ENLF papers and arrested the bag owner. In prison, the messenger mentioned Baro Tumsa, Abbaa Biyyaa, Yusuf Bakar, and Yohannis Petros, even though he had not met them but had only heard of their names. The persons he directly knew were Yusuf Bakar and Yohannis Petros. When an informant told Baro that the messenger mentioned their names, Baro arranged for Yusuf and Yohannis to escape to Sudan; Baro probably arranged their escape to Sudan through Assafa Nagasa, a nationalist merchant who lived in Mandi, a small city in Wallaga, close to Sudan.[121] The police later arrested and interrogated Baro and Abbaa Biyyaa but lacked evidence of their involvement with the messenger and released them. As the crisis of the Ethiopian Empire was increasing toward the end of 1973, Baro was extremely busy contacting selected Oromo parliamentarians, teachers, students, military officers, and other ranks.[122]
In 1973-74, political upheavals intensified as taxicab strikes, student riots, and military mutinies expanded. In addition, political crises further developed in 1974, and students, workers, Muslims, farmers, and soldiers staged demonstrations. Consequently, Prime Minister Akililu Habtewold was replaced by Endalkachew Mekonin. The Oromo nationalist nucleus was busy writing and distributing pamphlets and organizing Oromo students, teachers, military forces, and the public. Many political events were taking place. Baro and his associates continued their political and organizational activities. Leenco Lata noted that in the summer of 1972 when Baro said to him that we needed to create a liberation organization, he was surprised. In Leenco’s words: “A group of us [met] at my residence, and [Baro] told us that the time has come to form an organization. I was amazed because I thought I was participating on the fringes of an organization already in existence. When I think back, [he] knew that Oromo individuals lacked self-confidence and were thus more inclined to participate in organizations formed by other people. From the banning of Macha-Tulama [Self-Help Association] to the day he called us together, he functioned as the Oromo organization many people believed was working underground.”[123] According to Leenco, in 1973 Baro called together that day Abiyu Galata, Yohannis (Dima) Noggo, Yohannis (Leenco) Lata (himself), Addisu Beyene (who later defected to MAESON), and Magarsa Barii. At this meeting, Baro requested Abiyu to develop strategies, tactics for the organization and structures, and the division of labor based upon which the previous committees were formulated. This group of six, including Baro, created a central coordinating body of the OLF on July 1, 1973.[124]
The Central Coordinating Body and Committees
The central coordinating body of the OLF included General Taddasa Biru, who then was serving life imprisonment in Galamso, Hararghe, Baro Tumsa, Magarsa Bari, Abiyu Galata, Yohannis (Leenco) Lata, Yohannis (Dima) Noggo, and Addisu Bayana.[125] Although he was not there, General Taddasa decided to join this organizing body.[126] The central coordinating body established three main committees: political, social, and cultural. The political committee had seven members responsible for drafting the political program.[127] The chairman of the political committee was Baro Tumsa, and he invited a secret meeting in 1974 in which six leaders participated in preparing the first draft of the OLF program. Committees, such as the organizational and political committee, the military committee, the foreign relations committee, and the workers and farmers committee, were also established under the central coordinating body.
The military committee had two parts:[128] One dealt with the Ethiopian army, to which Captain (later Colonel) Demisse Deressa was assigned, and the police, to which Lamesa Borru was posted to recruit reliable and trustworthy military officers for the Oromo national movement. The second one was the guerrilla branch, which Elemo Qilixuu led. These committees engaged in political work among various entities or groups. One such committee was the recruitment committee, which was assigned the duty of recruiting members of the armed forces and the police. Colonel Demisse Deressa was appointed to head this committee and later became a member of the Derg (the Provisional Military Committee). Baro and Leenco were assigned to work with Demisse to expand political work among the army and the Air Force members.[129] With Lemessa Boru, a military man, Baro, and Leenco extended their political work into the Faxinnoo Darash (Rapid Deployment Force) of the police. Leenco noted that during the end of 1973 and early 1974, social and political crises were emerging, and different political organizations were forming:
Various groups were busy recruiting members to create their political organizations. We, who were forming the OLF, were very disappointed with our secret activities’ lack of progress and took additional risks to hasten the end of the emperor’s regime. Most evenings, we met with [groups] to conduct political discussions and education. [Baro] and I often traveled with Demisse to Bishoftu to participate in conversations with members of the Air Force and the airborne units. We were working with Lemessa to penetrate the Faxinnoo Daraash. Our work with Faxinnnoo was significant in early 1974 when students and other members of society were staging anti-government demonstrations almost daily.[130]
The recruitment committee worked on convincing Oromo members of the Faxinnoo Daraash, which was the force that would disperse the demonstrators, to refuse to hurt the people. Baro and Leenco produced a pamphlet distributed clandestinely among the Faxinnoo Daraash.[131] Unfortunately, the contact soldier in the Faxinnoo was a government informant. Instead of spreading the copies of the leaflet in the Faxinnoo camp, he gave it to the Police commander, Yilma Shibeshi.[132] The commander instructed the apprehension of Baro, Lemessa, and Leenco. Consequently, the police arrested three of them at the Third Police Station. The informant was also detained temporarily to make it seem that he was arrested, too. Leencoo noted that Baro:
Displayed no fear and anxiety at all … and was defiant during interrogation, [and] in one incident when I was brought into the room while his session was still going on. Most importantly, this is when I closely observed [Baro’s] ability to make friends easily… Within a couple of days, [Baro] was on the best terms with the illiterate but arrogant police officers from Menz. They ultimately allowed him to open his cell window to talk to them face-to-face. When he was not called away for questioning, he would thus stand at his window, entertain these policemen, and engage himself in return.[133]
The police discriminated against Oromo political prisoners concerning illegal political activities. Leenco said, “One group of Amhara scholars, including then-university professor Eshetu Chole, was caught red-handed preparing pamphlets the same day we were detained. They were released after spending only a couple of nights at the same police station where we were being held.”[134] This discrimination angered certain Oromo, who staged demonstrations in front of the Third Police Station. On one of the demonstration days, “when the emperor was [passing], a group of Oromo [were] standing at the gate of the station. One of these Oromo was Elizabeth Karorsa, who convinced the others to join her in appealing to the emperor on [their] case on the emperor’s return. When the emperor’s motorcade returned, she and her collaborators fell in front of his car, the usual way of drawing attention.”[135] The emperor asked the group to meet with him at the palace later.
One of the persons who accompanied Elizabeth to meet the emperor was Bayana Abdi, a parliamentarian. After these persons complained to the emperor that Oromo prisoners were treated differently, Haile Selassie instructed the police commissioner to bring the prisoners to the palace. After the commissioner brought the prisoners, the emperor lectured them about their wrongdoings and released them. When the government released Leenco and Baro, they discovered that Captain Kebede Qajela’s attempted to stage a coup that had failed before it got off the ground.[136] Following the release of Baro and Leenco from prison, they along with Oromo leaders who came from Aden to Finfinnee such as Hussein Suura, Elemo Qilixu, and Yusuf Bakar met to discuss the Orom issue and the Oromo national movement and to settle some disagreement among them.[137] There was a disagreement between Hussein Suura, the leader of the ENLF, and Yusuf Bakar, the leader of OOLPS, in Aden, and they were invited by the central coordinating body in Finfinnee in 1973 to settle their differences on the two names. Both sides presented their cases, and Sheik Hussein Suura explained why the name ENLF was relevant in advancing the Oromo interest; he also asserted that the ENLF name would mobilize the support of all oppressed peoples in the Ethiopian Empire and the assistance of many countries for the Oromo cause.[138]
Contrary to this argument, Yusuf Bakar articulated that raising Oromo’s political consciousness and building Oromo unity using the Oromo name rather than that of Ethiopia was necessary. He further said the Oromo movement should be organized by the Oromo name rather than Ethiopia, a colonial empire. Since the political position of the central coordinating body was similar to that of Yusuf, it endorsed the idea of continuing the struggle in the Middle East by the name of OOPLS.[139] The central coordinating body was entirely committed to national Oromummaa (Oromo national history, culture, identity, and Oromo nationalism) and building an independent Oromo liberation front.[140] Sheik Hussein Suura stayed at the Reverend Gudina Tumsa’s home.[141] Magarssa was responsible for hosting Elemo and Yusuf. (I believe Yusuf may have remained with Taha for some days). Leenco was taking care of Hussein, and he assigned somebody to take over his duty of looking after Hussein in case he was re-arrested.[142] Leenco could not continue to take care of Hussein because government security was following him.[143]
Elemo and Yusuf were also safely staying with Magarsa Bari. Baro, Leenco, and others worked hard to finalize their discussions with Hussein, Elemo, and Yusuf. After a short period, Hussein returned to Yemen safely, and Elemo and Yusuf went to Carcar Xiro in Hararghe to launch an armed struggle. During this time, the empire’s political crisis was widening and deepening. Baro contacted General Taddasa Biru, who was under life imprisonment in Galamso, in eastern Oromia, and the general escaped and arrived in Finfinnee in 1974.[144] During the eve of the 1974 revolution, three critical things were happening in Eastern Oromia. First, a few Oromo nationalists from the Middle East were clandestinely bringing guns and ammunition to Hararghe to initiate an armed struggle. Second, General Taddasa Biru escaped from life imprisonment and went to Finfinee. Third, the Oromo in Eastern Oromia faced hunger while the nafxanya settlers hoarded a lot of grains. At the end of 1973, Hasan Ibrahim, popularly known as Elemo Qilxu, and others who received guerrilla training in the Middle East engaged in the armed struggle by siding with the starving Oromo peasants and distributing the hoarded grains by killing the enemies of the people without adequate preparation for the armed struggle.[145]
In July 1974, more than 300 soldiers surrounded the small guerrilla group headed by Elemo in the Habro district. The gallant guerrilla group faced stiff resistance but killed seventy-five Ethiopian soldiers and wounded more than one hundred government soldiers. Elemo and five of his friends were killed on that battle day.[146] Yusuf escaped to Yemen and later settled in Germany. Baro and his comrades continued coordinating cultural, diplomatic, political, and military networks and engaged in organizational activities necessary to create and build the OLF.
Conclusion
Baro started his political activism in high school and continued activism and organizing activities at the Haile Selassie I University. He extended these activities to the MTA, which had extended networks to all Oromia regions and the regions of other colonized peoples. Because of his cultural capital, wisdom, integrity, commitment, and courage, Baro helped the transition of the Oromo national movement from the banned MTA to the formation of the OLF. He brought together Oromo human and intellectual resources, which the Oromo struggle needed to move forward. The Oromo people had an excellent opportunity to have Baro Tumsa, a selfless organic intellectual and organizer. His unexpected killing in 1978 in the process of armed struggle was a national tragedy for the Oromo national movement and Oromo society.
Critical thinking and studies, such as subaltern studies, assist to confront and expose the false claims of universalism, dominant ideology and worldviews that attempt to hide colonial history and imperialist practices in Africa and other places. See Achille Mbembe, “What is post-colonial Thinking? An interview,” Esprit, eurozine, Interview by Olivier Mongin, Nathalie Lempereur and Jean-Louis Schlegel, original French and translated by John Fletcher, 2008.
For detailed discussion, see Asafa Jalata, “The Struggle for Knowledge: The Case of Emergent Oromo Studies,” African Studies Review, Vol. 39, No. 2(Sept. 1996), pp. 95-123.
See for example, William I. Robinson, “The Crisis of Global Capitalism,” in The Great Credit Crash,, (London: Verso), pp.289-310; Jackie Smith, Social Movements for Global Democracy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008.)
See for example, Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, (New York: The Free Press, 1962); W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Development: A Non-Communist Manifesto, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 4-16
Steven Buechler Understanding Social Movements: Theories from the Classical Era to the Present. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2011, pp. 91-106
See for example, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “The Enduring Vitality of the Resource Mobilization Theory of Social Movements” in Jonathan H. Turner (ed.), Handbook of Sociological Theory, (New York: Springer Science and Business Media, LLC), pp. 553-566.
See for example, Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978); Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 42-43)
Ibid.
Steve Buechler, Understanding Social Movements, pp. 123-140).
Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, ibid.
Ibid.
Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, ibid.
Frances Piven and F. Richard Cloward. 1979. Poor People’s Movements, (New York: Vintage).
Steven Buechler, Understanding Social Movements, pp. 141-143.
Steven Buechler, ibid, pp. 145-159.
Charles Tilly, ibid; Doug McAdam, ibid.
William Gamson in Bruce Fireman and Steven Buechler, Encounters with Unjust Authority, (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1982), pp. 6-9.
Steven Buechler, Understanding Social Movements, p. 144.
William Gamson, Ibid.
Ibid, p. 146.
Asafa Jalata, "**The Struggle For Knowledge: The Case of Emergent Oromo Studies, " *African Studies Review, ***Volume 39 , Issue 2 , September 1996 , pp. 95 - 123
Asafa Jalata, The Oromo Movement and Imperial Politics: Culture and Ideology in Oromia and Ethiopia, (Lenxington Books: New York, 2020), pp. 13-29.
Derartu Wakgari, “A Biographical Account of Baaroo Tumsaa, 1942-1978,” MA Thesis, Wollega University, School of Graduate Studies, 2020, p. 23.
Ibssa Gutama, interviewed by Ayetu Tumsa, no date.
Derartu Wakgari, ibid.
Telephone interview with Taha Abdi, June 18, 2020; telephone interview with Lubee Biru, June 8, 2020.
For further discussion, see Asafa Jalata, Oromia & Ethiopia: State Formation and Ethno-national Conflict, 1868-2004, (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, Inc.).
Ibid., pp. 175-200.
Olana Zoga*, Gizat na Gizot: The Macha-Tulama Association*, Addis Ababa, 1985 Ethiopian Calendar, pp.13-22.
Ibid., p. 13.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid,
Ibid.
“Ye Mecha Na Ye Tulama Meredaga Demb,” Metcha Tulama Association’s program,Tir 16, 1955, Ethiopian Calendar.
Olana Zoga, ibid., p. 16.
Ibid, p. 17
Ibid., pp. 24-25.
Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid., pp. 24-25.
Ibid., p. 25.
Ibid., pp. 25-26.
Ibid., p. 26.
Ibid., pp. 27-29.
Ibid., p. 37.
Ibid., p. 51.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 100.
Ibid. pp. 51-52.
Ibid., pp. 112-114.
Ibid. p. 114.
Ibid., pp. 60.
Ibid., p. 61
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 63.
Ibid., pp. 62-63.
Mohammed Hassen, “The Oromo Nation,” p. 36.
Mohammed Hassen, “The Oromo Nation Under Amhara Colonial Administration,” School of Oriental and African Studies, June 1981, p. 36.
Ibid., pp. 74-91.
Ibid., p. 116-118.
Ibid., p. 118.
Ketema Yifru was the only prominent government official who was not suspected and imprisoned by the Haile Selassie movement although he attended the meeting that planned to kill the head of the state.
Ibid.
Ibid. pp. 124-133.
Ibid., pp. 130-132.
Olana Zoga, ibid., pp. 224-225.
General Taddasa’s release in 1974 was widely known among the Oromo; according to the announcement about his murder in 1975 over the Ethiopia radio, he was killed because he was the opponent of the “Ethiopian Revolution.” In reality, he was killed because of his commitment to the Oromo national struggle.
Ibi., p. 261.
Olana Zoga, ibid., pp. 222-296.
Ibid., pp.249-250; 426-428.
Paul Baxter, “The Problem of the Oromo,” Nationalism and Self Determination in the Horn of Africa, I. M. Lewis (ed.), (London: Ithaca Press, 1983), p. 139
Olana Zoga, ibid.
The Oromos: Voice Against Tyranny," (Finfinne, May 1971), p. 23.
A. P. Wood, “Rural Development and National Integration in Ethiopia,” Review of African Political Economy 26 (1983), p. 516.
Cited in M. Hassen, “The Oromo Nation,” pp. 35-36.
Interview with Shaid Ahmed, April 21, 1988, in Minneapolis, Minn. Conducted by Hailu Kenno for me. Mr. Ahmed lives in exile in the USA.
M. Hassen, “The Oromo Nation,” p. 35.
Derartu Wakgari, “A Biographical Account of Baaroo Tumsaa, 1942-1978,” MA Thesis, Wollega University, School of Graduate Studies, February 2020, pp. 31-34.
Telephone interview with Xaha Abdi on June 18, 2020. Xaha was a founder of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and he has been a prominent member of the OLF. He Led the OLF foreign relations for many years. Telephone interview with Lubee Biru on June 8, 2020. Lubee has been a long-time Oromo nationalist, and played a central role in developing national Oromummaa (Oromo national culture, history, and Oromo nationalism) in North America and in organizing Oromo national institutions and organization in the diaspora.
Interview with Xaha Abdi, June 18, 2020.
Zoom interview with Addisu Tolesa on June 4, 20021. Ayetu Baro Tumsa conducted this interview. Lubee Biru, ibid. Telephone interview with Demisie Serda, May 30, 2021.
Demisie Serda, ibid.
Interview with Getachew Baissa, June 15, 2020.
Lubee Biru, ibid.
Telephone interview with Lubee Biru, June 8, 2020.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Telephone interview with Xaha Abdi, June 18, 2020.
Telephone interview with Xaha Abidi June 18, 2020.
Ibid.
Olana Zoga, ibid., pp. 300-302.
Leenco Lata’s note, requested by Ayetu Tumsa, no date.
Telephone interview with Mohammed Ibrahim (Boru Bariso) on June 14, 2020.
Baaroo Tumsaa: Qabsoo barattootaa hanga qabsoo hidhannoo ABO, Naqamtee hanga gammoojjii Harargee, https://www.bbc.com/afaanoromoo/oduu-55920688?at_custom4=2E8197A8-9EDE-11EB-B7A6-EE4516F31EAE&at_medium=custom7&at_custom1=[post+type]&at_custom2=facebook_page&at_campaign=64, accessed on 11/8/2021.
Telephone interview with Getachew Baissa, June 15, 2020.
Telephone interview with Demise Serda, May 20, 2021.
Derartu Wakgari, “A Biographical Account of Baaroo Tumsaa, 1942-1978,” MA Thesis,Wollega University, School of Graduate Studies, February 2020, p. 39.
Telephone interview with an anonymous woman activist scholar on February 20, 2022.
Ibid.
Telephone interview with Deressa Kitte on January 2, 2022.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Asafa Jalata and Mohammed Hassen, *The Macha-Tulama Association: Its Importance in Oromo History, (*Knoxville, TN: UTK Printing Press, 2014).
Oromo Democratic Front (Adda Dimokiraatawa Oromoo), Imala Qabsoo Oromoo Fi Mul’ata Ado: Qabsoo Oromoo Bifa Jaarraa 21ffaan Geggeessuu (The Journey of Oromo Struggle and ODF’s Vision: The Oromo Struggle in the 21st Century), printed in 2017, self-published, pp. 40-68.
Ibid., p. 73.
Ibid., pp. 78-79.
Abiyu Galata’s note, requested by Ayetu Tumsa, no date.
Telephone interview with Faqadu Waqjira, who is a member of the Oromo Liberation Front from the early 1970s to today, June 17, 2020.
For instance, see The Oromos: Voice Against Tyranny, Finfinnee, May 1971; The Oromo Liberation Front Program, Finfinnee 1974.
Asafa Jalata, “The Oromo Nation: Toward Mental Liberation and Empowerment,” The Journal of Oromo Studies, Vol. 1 & 2, 2016: 203-237.
Asafa Jalata, **"**Oromian Urban Centers: Consequences of Spatial Concentration of Power in Multinational Ethiopia, Journal of Oromos Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2, January 2011, pp. 39-74.
Oromo Democratic Front, ibid., p. 74.
From Abraham Mosisa’s written response to my written interview questions, June 23, 2020.
Ibid.
Fiqadu Waqjira, ibid.
Ibid.
Oromo Democratic Front, ibid., p. 82.
Leenco Lata’s note, requested by Ayetu Tumsa, no date.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Abiyu Galata, ibid.
Ibid.
Deressa Kittee,ibid.
Oromo Democratic Front, ibid., p. 77,
Ibid., p. 90.
Derartu Wakgari, ibid., pp. 35-36.
Ibid., pp. 77-78.
Leenco Lata note, ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
ibid.
Oromo Democratic Front, ibid., p. 78-79.
Ibid. p. 79.
Ibid,
Telephone conversation with Abbaa Caalaa Lata on January 2, 2022.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Oromo Democratic Front, ibid.
Ibid., p. 80.
Ibid., pp. 83-84.