Islam and Muslims in Arsii and Jimmaa, Ethiopia, since 1974

Introduction

Ethiopian historiographies and other social science studies specializing in Ethiopia largely ignored Islam for a long period of time as the state’s perception of Islam has been “non-Ethiopian,” “other,” against the establishment, and even a "threat to"the country. Scholars such as Trimingham (1965), Cerulli (1971), and Abir (1970), etc., primarily focused on clashes between Islam and Orthodox Christianity. In fact, after the 1980s, scholars like Abdussamad Haji Ahmed (1988), Hussein Ahmed (1992, 1993, 1994; 2001). Mohammed M. Hassen (1994), Ahmed A. Hassen (2019) have made some contributions. These scholars attempted to establish Islam’s role in the country’s social and political affairs vis-a-vis Christianity, pursuing a balanced approach in Ethiopia socially and politically.^[1] Works by expatriate scholars and students are also important, although they could not receive wider recognition in the academic arena for analysis and reconstruct a new perspective for Islam in Ethiopia outside the ‘‘othering’’ approach.

This study intends to provide a critical and revisionist analysis emphasizing Islam and Muslims as integral parts of the Ethiopian society’s fabric; to reconsider the past biases and neglect of Islam and Muslims in Ethiopian historiography; to investigate the post-1974 conditions of Islam and Muslims in relation with two Islamic and Oromo dominated provinces in the Oromia National Regional State (ONRS), especially in a period after the revolution; to examine the contributions of Islam in social, economic and other aspects of the development of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian people focusing on Arsii and Jimmaa provinces. The study draws on rare archival documents deposited at the National Archives and Library Agency (NALA) of Ethiopia, oral interviews conducted in Arsii and Jimmaa, and published and unpublished secondary literature. Qualitative methods of historical analyses have been used, triangulating sources against one another to reach a reliable thesis.The Article establishes that Islam and the Muslim Ummah (Islamummaa, Muslims, respectively)could withstand subjugations and even served the study areas as a force of resistance and source of identity besides the original Oromummaa (Oromohood or Oromoness). It portrays that the equality of religions and socio-economic transformations adopted in the beginning by the Derg created an environment of elation and just revolution like land reforms. However, when the Derg adopted socialism as its ideology, sporadic early suppressions of religions were institutionalized, and the implementation of its policies discouraged religions and religious practices. The Derg actually depicted itself to be atheistic. Islam could however survive against all odds and so do other religions.

The study scrutinizes Islam and the conditions of Muslims in Ethiopia’s Multinational Federal state in Arsii and Jimmaa against the unitary state of the pre-1991 period. It analyzes conditions of religions during the new state of Federalism against the unitary government that prevailed in Ethiopia in the past. It argues that religious pluralism prevailed under a multinational state than ever before and suggests that the religious freedom and new opportunities enjoyed by the Muslims up to the mid-1990s suffered from socio-political fallouts subsequently. The author contends that Islam gained most and suffered most under the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) multinational Federal government. It faced the challenge of the introduction of ‘‘Government Islam’’ that created intra-religious troubles. Some inter-religious conflicts and competitions also occurred in the study areas because of government interference with religion, at this time Islam.

Arsii province is located in southeast Ethiopia, and Jimmaa is in the southwest. Although they are geographically located in the opposite direction at the opposite ends of the country, they have had a number of historical commonalities which entailed this study. Arsii is part of large Oromo land, Oromia, and forms a sub-section of the larger Arsiland consisting of Arsii, Bale, some parts of East Shewa, and Borana provinces, which the Oromo of Borana, Guji, and other ethnic groups of Ethiopia also inhabit. In terms of area, this province before 2006 had an area of 24,622 km² and was said to be the smallest out of 14 provinces until the de facto secession of Eritrea in 1991. However, as part of large Arsiland, this came about as a result of deliberate administrative restructuring only in the interest of the alien officials of different regimes (National Atlas of Ethiopia 1988, 2–4; Ketebo 1999: 13-14). Arsii [East Arsii] zone’s administrative capital is Asallaa, also the former capital of Arsii province, while Shaashamannee came to be the capital of the West Arsii zone. This study largely focuses on the Arsii zone after its new administrative restructuring, without excluding important issues related to other parts of Arsiiland in relation to the theme of the study.

Originally until the conquest of Menilek and the subsequent settlement of the northerners, mainly the Amhara people, the people of the Arsii region were only the Arsii Oromo from which the name of the area was derived, and the pre-Oromo communities, mostly Hadiya-Sidama clusters, who were entirely assimilated and became Oromo in their socio-political and cultural set up (Ketebo1999: 64). The Arsii Oromo became Muslims largely in reaction to the conquest of Menilek though there was already a bedrock of Islam prior to Menilek’s conquest. The settler population settled there following the conquest of Menilek, which was conducted between 1882 and 1886. Here, Menilek faced the fiercest longest resistance of all conquests waged to build the modern Ethiopian Empire state in the second half of the 19th century (Bahru 2002: 62-63). The settlers were Amhara and the Shewan Oromo communities, who were mostly followers of Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity (EOC).

Jimmaa was one of the Shanan (Five) Gibe kingdoms before the conquest by Menilek’s troops in the early 1880s. Unlike the other four kingdoms, which militarily resisted instead of peaceful submission, Jimmaa submitted peacefully and maintained its boundaries and autonomy. It was the largest and most populous kingdom of the Gibe states. Its autonomy was ended by Emperor Haile Selassie in 1933. After the Italian Occupation, it was made part of the newly created KafaTeqlay-Gezat as Jimmaa awraja (sub-province). The rest Oromo kingdoms of Limmu-Enariya, Gumma, Gomma, and Gera were kept as districts and put under Limmu awraja. The capital of KafaTeqlay-Gezat was Jimmaa City within Jimmaa awraja. KafaTeqlay- Gizat was renamed as KafaKefla-Hager in 1974 under the Derg regime with the same administrative structure and the same capital. In 1991, when Federal system of administration was introduced by EPRDF, an awraja administrative structure was abandoned and only three major administrative hierarchies were enacted:Ganda (Kebele) - District (Aanaa or Woreda) and Zone. The two former Oromo-dominated awraja of Jimmaa and Limmu of KafaTeqlay-Gezat were merged into the Jimmaa zone with the capital at Jimmaa city after 1991 (Ketebo 2012: 31-33; informants). Jimmaa zone is believed to be the origin of coffee Arabica (Coffea arabica), the best type of coffee that takes today up to 90% of the world’s commercial coffee market.

Map 1.Ethiopia, Oromia and Jimmaa Zone

Source: Made by GIS expert Getu Lemi, Geography and Environmental Department, Jimma University. I would like to thank him for his contribution.

The recent National census of 2007 indicates that Ethiopia had 33.9 % (25 million of 74 million) Muslim population. This surpasses the 1994 census figure of 32.8 (Ficquet 2015, 94; the 2007 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia: Statistical Report for Country level: 108). But, this seems gross underestimation. This is because different sources give much more figures than this and the past regimes.

The region with the largest number of Muslims is Oromia. Out of 26, 993, 933 total population, in 2007, 12, 835, 410 were Muslims followed by Orthodox Christianity with 8, 204, 908 followers. It then accounted for 48 % of the population of the region; 51 % of the total Muslim population of Ethiopia. A large number of these lived in Oromia in Arsii, Bale, Hararge, Ilu Abba Bor, and Jimmaa (Ficquet 2015, 95; see also National and Regional Census of 2007).

When we come to the study areas, actually in detail, Islam, according to the 2007 census, had, and still no doubt has the largest number of followers with much more influence in the entities of our study, i.e., Arsii, and Jimmaa. Arsii zone had a total population of 2, 637 657, out of which Muslims took 1, 532 383, which was 58.09 %.The second religion in the number of adherents, Orthodox Christianity, had 1,056,310 (40.05 %). The other study area, Jimmaa Zone, with Jimmaa Special Zone, Jimmaa City, had, according to the result of the same year, 2, 607, 115 total population, out of which Muslims took 2,176,526 (83.48%). It was followed by Orthodox Christians’ number of 334,578, 12.84 % of the total population of the area. When we add up the two Zones taken as a benchmark that year, their total population was 5, 244,772 (19.43%) of the total population of Oromia. In terms of the number of Muslim population, they accounted for 3,708 909 or 28.9 percent of the Oromia’s Muslim population. Out of the 25,037,647 total countrywide Muslim population of the census result of that year, 14.8% was that of the two study areas. Even as undercounted or underestimated the number of Muslims in this two Zones was large. At the same time this Muslim population was largely Oromo population (National and Regional Census of 2007). The big percentage difference in terms of the Muslim population could no doubt be attributed to the 19^th-century ways of incorporating the two areas into the Ethiopian empire by Menilek. Arsii involved long, bloody conquests while the largest of the Gibe states, Jimmaa, was peacefully submitted. This was pursued by large northern settlements and land alienation in Arsii rather than Jimmaa or Shannan Gibe.

Islam and the State: Arsii and Jimma before the Ethiopian Revolution

Islam has a long history in Arsiland and Arsi province in particular. A number of Muslim Sultanates like Bali, Dawaro, Hadiya, Arababni, Sharka, etc. emerged and flourished during the medieval times of Ethiopian history, 1270 -1855 (Taddesse 1972: 142; Abbas 2002: 107) in this area or around it. A number of Arsii clans claim to have Muslim founding fathers and Islamic backgrounds, which were later weakened by the Oromo expansion and the subsequent intermingling of the Waaqeefannaa and Islamic practices (Abbas 2002: 99-120). According to Mohammed Hassen, this is also true for many Oromo groups starting from the 16th century before the beginning of the expansion and even afterwards as the pastoralist Oromo passed over or settled among the sedentary Oromo, with more exposure to Islam (Mohammed 1994: 150; Temam 2002:13-15). Informants in Arsii confirm this without a shadow of a doubt. They said for example clans like Amigna, Sa’imana, Abosara and some others have Muslim founding fathers and were Muslims long before other Oromo groups who took Islam during or after Menilek’s conquest at large.

According to Temam, prior to Menilek’s conquest of Arsii, Islam, and pilgrimage (Muuda) to the shrines of Sheikh Hussien and other shrines in Arsiland consolidated the unity of the Arsii Oromo. Waqeeffannaa, the indigenous Oromo belief system, started to be substituted by Islam and Christianity in Eastern Arsii first (Temam 2002: 21). However, before the conquest of Menilek, the Arsii Oromo were rather united by the moiety-clan-lineage organization and the Gadaa system. This social organization could be extended to Arsoomaa (Arsihood) and Waaqeeffannaa, which is closely associated with the Gadaa system (Ketebo 1999: 1-2).

In the Gibe region, Islam, in its initial expansion, was supported and sponsored by the state since the early 19th century. Although the exposure to Islam antedated the 19th century, its major dissemination could be attributed to the beginning of the 19th century and afterwards. The clerics and Jabarti traders are said to be the leading agents of Islamization of the region. The merchants played an important role in the beginning, while the clergy followed and served in both the expansion and consolidation of the Islamic religion (Mohammed 1994: 150-151). Initially, Islam was just the religion of the Gibe region’s monarchs and the nobility, and it took root among the broad masses in the second half of the 19th century. As Menilek’s conquest ended, the Gibe region’s independence in the 1880s, Islam faced competition first from Orthodox Christianity (Ketebo 2012: 72-74). However, Islam could not be weakened that much in the Gibe region right up to 1974, although it faced competition not only from Orthodox Christianity but also from Protestantism and other religions. The figures given above undoubtedly confirm this argument. It can be argued that it has already built a strong foundation among the Oromo of the Gibe region, who have already started taking it as part of their identity and refuge from any outside pressure, including the Imperial regime’s excesses.

Be that as it may, it was in Arsii that more settlements took place following Menilek’s conquest because of the stiffest resistance the Arsii Oromo put up in 1882-1886. Consequently, more pressure was placed on Islam and Muslims in Arsii than in the Gibe region during the imperial times from Menilek’s era to the end of Haile Selassie in 1974. There were, however, two exceptional times for the Oromo, the Muslims, and Islam as a whole, not only in Arsii and Jimmaa but all over the conquered south.^[2] These were the Iyyasu interlude (1911-1916) and the Italian Occupation (1936-1941), (Temam 2002: 56-57, 73). However, pressure was tough on Islam in favor of the established EOC; Oromummaa (Oromohood) and Islamumma (Ummah) survived heavy suppressions and became important commonalities that interlinked the Arsii and the Shanan Gibe Oromo and others. This condition is one of the factors that motivated the author to undertake this study on these two areas. The author contends that, Islamumma and Oromummaa preceded the conquests of Menilek at large and in many areas served during and after the conquest as forces of resistance against the conquest and subsequent subjugations. As stated elsewhere they were and still are the pillars of their identity.

Arsii and the Gibe Region during the Revolution

The Ethiopian revolution of 1974 injected different dynamics into the conditions of Islam and Muslims in Arsii and Jimmaa. As elsewhere in the south, the revolution was accepted with joy and jubilation in Arsiland in general, and Arsii province in particular, by the majority of the population. This was the case as the population of the region was exposed to all forms of oppression. They faced economic, social (religious and ethnic) subjugations because of their Muslim and Oromo identity, at the same time, from the times of Menilek until the downfall of Haile Selassie’s regime in 1974. They were economically exposed to excessive land alienation, tenancy, and the gabbar-naftagna^[3]system in general. First, the revolution brought the nationalization of rural and urban lands in 1975. Both were in favor of the majority Muslim and Christian populations. When the Derg declared the de facto equality of Christianity and Islam, ending centuries of EOC’s established dominant position, the Muslims had their moral and psychology uplifted further, and they accepted the Derg with approval and support. The following song captured their initial euphoria:

Ilil baga gammannee Oh! Let us congratulate ourselves

Ilil baga gammannee Oh! Let us congratulate ourselves

Odoo nyaatin gabbanne We are satisfied without eating

Dhuugaa baddee argaannee.^[4] We could find our lost truth.

In some areas, mosques were built for the first time and in many other areas they were multiplied. This was the case in Qarsa town, the capital of Munesa district in Arsii, where the district governor was a Muslim and allowed the first mosque to be built in the town around 1976. The mosque was constructed with a public contribution. Later, the land of this mosque was confiscated by other Derg officials, leaving the mosque only a small plot of land. Local officials played important roles in this process. As time passed, during meetings, cadres started preventing group prayer (Jama’a Salat) and told the Muslims to leave turn by turn and make Salat during prayer times. However, so often, the Muslims defied the cadres and left the gatherings and prayed together (Informants).

The Shanan Gibe Muslims consolidated their spiritual practices even under pressure as the Derg’s socialist ideology created cadres that tried to put restrictions on Islamic practices and values like Salat. People in Gera even resisted the existing pressure and came to practice Islam more than during Emperor Haile Selassie’s regime (Informants). The number of mosques increased and Madrassa continued to expand. Archival sources show that Da’wa was also continued. However, those who came from other areas were imprisoned in some districts by local cadres, such as in Assandabo town of Omoo-Nadda district in July 1976. This made the new Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council, EIASC (commonly called Majlis), founded only in the same year, and its first President, Haaji Muhammad Sani Habib, busy exchanging letters with the higher officials (NALA: Folder No. 17.1.8.11, File No. 17.1.8.11.04). One such letter of appeal to Police Headquarters highlights this in Amharic: ‘’ Twenty-five Islamic education teachers, including Haaji Musa Muhammad Kikiya, went from Addis Ababa to Assandabo in Jimmaa on July 9, 1976. They were imprisoned by the local authorities while preparing to teach at a mosque and later transferred to Jimmaa city main prison. … .‘’ (Ibid). This measure actually shows the true intention, anti-religious policy of the Derg, towards religions and it was only a matter of time to manifest it so glaringly though the Council Head was appealing hard and writing letters soliciting the Derg in vain endlessly.

The NALA archives suggest that Muslims in urban areas, suffered from tedious and long bureaucratic processes even to print receipts to collect contributions from the public for mosque construction or maintenance. This process in the 1970s went all the way from Kebele (local administrative unit) up to the Ministry of Interior and later the Security Office, and it took a long time to get permission just for printing receipts for collecting contributions. The Printing Press was available only in Addis Ababa, that is, Berhanena Selam Printing Press. Moreover, a small quota was given to pilgrims for Umra (minor pilgrimage) and Hajj (major pilgrimage) to the holy places of Islam, Makkah and Madina in Saudi Arabia. As these sources show, in October 1979, the quota given for Hajj for Arsii was only twelve. The quota of the country is not cited in these sources. The 1980 quota was even less than this; ten pilgrims. During these years, the quota for Umra was 45 for Arsii and Bale each and 5 for Ilu Abba Bor region out of 500 allowed nationwide. The criteria for conscription for qualification are tough. They were being free from anti-revolutionary deeds, be able to produce guarantee and be free from debt (NALA: Folder No. 17.1.4.9, File No. 17.14.9.02; and Folder No. 17.1.112.17./01.1973).^[5]The process was long and rough; started at Kebele and went all the way up to ministries.

The formation of the Revolutionary Ethiopian Women’s Association (REWA) and the Revolutionary Ethiopian Youth Association (REYA) in 1980 created more discomfort not only for the Muslims but also for the Christians. These revolutionary mass organizations entered every house and forced out youngsters needed to assist family members and women who fed the families. More than this, women, young boys and girls were also taken for sports and musical bands established from the Kebele to the national level. Some were appointed or recruited and passed days away from their families. Such acts created a gap in the family fabric and sometimes caused feuds. Many families and clerics were unhappy that ladies were out against the Islamic Sharia law (Teferra 1997: 241; Ketebo 2018: 164, 186; Informants).

The Derg also put restrictions on the pilgrimage (Muudaa) of Sheikh Hussein to Anajina, which could bring together as a commonality the Southwest Maccaa and Arsii Oromo for a very long time. However, Temam seems to attribute the weakening of Muudaa to Anajina only to what he called the rise of Wahabiyyaa/ii during the Derg socialist military regime. According to him, it was during the Derg time in the 1970s and 80s that Wahabiyyaa/ii evolved in Arsiland and opposed pilgrimage to Annajina (the largest shrine of Sheikh Hussein in the entire Arsiland, located in Bale, Gololcha district). He added that the Wahabis branded those pilgrims not good Muslims; the whole practice non-Islamic and called for its termination. He expressed Wahabiyyaa/ii as ‘‘foreign and extremist’’ while those who went to Anajina and its branches as ‘‘liberal Sufis’’ doing home-based tradition. He strongly criticized what he called ‘‘intolerant and fundamentalist’’ Wahabis (Temam 2017: 5). He also seemingly criticized the Derg for allowing this.

His blaming Wahabiyyaa/ii, also called Salafiyyaa, for extremism and prevention of Muudaa to Anajina apparently shows partiality. What he called Wahabiyyaa/ii had no power to forbid Muudaa to Anajina. It was just Derg government’s local officials, who did that following the direction of Scientific Socialism already declared as Derg’s ideology in December 1974. Thus, for the Derg, what Temam called Sufis and Wahabbiyyaa/ii were not different. Derg, in fact, opposed spirituality as a whole since it followed atheist policy, materialistic, and believed that ‘‘nature will be under its control.’’ I remember that once in the 1980s, the security forces dispersed the pilgrims of Sheikh Hussein from the Gaaxee’s shrine at a gunpoint in the Digalu-Xijoo district of Arsii, southeast of Asallaa.

The Ethiopian Muslims, in general, and the Arsii and the Shanan Gibe Oromo, in particular, do not know much about ‘‘Sufi,’’ ‘‘Salafi, Wahabiyyaa/ii, etc.’’ These are terms of the clerics, and the ordinary Muslims though Sunni and practiced basic tenets of Islam could not differentiate between the two sects of Islam. Some are governments’ creations to weaken Islamic awareness. I argue that many Muslims do not like such connotations and take them as divisive maneuvers used by the Ethiopian state to weaken Islam.

Limitations on the number of pilgrims to holy sites of Islam continued despite the presence of Ribaxii (Building) of Woqfi (Gift to Allah, God) near Ka’aba (the holy shrine of Islam) in Makkah, built by King Abba Jifar II towards the end of 19th century. It was built to accommodate Ethiopian pilgrims free of charge during the pilgrimage, which still today gives service. The Derg also killed a number of Muslims, designating them reactionaries, who contradicted the spirit of revolution. We can mention sons of Tijaniyya order (tariqa) founder and others: Sayid Mahmud, Sayid Yassin, Sayid Mu’awiyya in Jimmaa and Limmu awraja. Abba Biya Abba Jobir, our versed informant, who was then the administrator of Kafa province in anticipation, sought to send them out to Saudi Arabia, fearing the Derg’s intention. However, the local Muslims protested against the administrator to avoid their departure as they loved them. Abba Biyyaa told me that he could consult Colonel Mengistu and send important Muslim elites like his father, Abba Jobir Abba Dula and his uncle, Abba Jebel Abba Jifar. He also managed to send twenty-two other qoro from all over Jimmaa and Limmu awraja (Informants).

In general, during the Derg times, according to informants, there had not been much restrictions on Muslims and Orthodox Christians. Mosques were constructed in new concentrated peasant villages (Safara), while churches were left behind at former scattered villages. Friday’s collective prayer (Juma’a) continued to be prayed in congregation. Yet, there were no small huts (Zawiya) for family prayer in the Safara as space was not sufficient for such huts. The common cemetery was also left back in the pre-villagization homesteads. They also carried dead bodies for burial to former burial sites. This was another superimposed hardship of the Derg regime on the Muslims of Arsii and Jimmaa and elsewhere in Ethiopia (Ketebo 2018: 185; Informants).

After the Derg consolidated its power, the pressure on Muslims and other religions grew tougher and tougher and the Muslims even feared to raise religious questions in Arsii. They were collected to villages and agricultural cooperatives, which made them so busy, fearful, and weak from hard work at agricultural cooperatives to ask questions about religion. The Derg officials call Muslims, especially those used to ask religious questions, idealists, backward, and reactionaries. Yet, it is to be recalled that the Derg was very harsh against the Protestants more than other religions, which it considered as ‘‘collaborators with the imperialists.’’

However, it is said that when the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) intensified their military struggle against the Derg government after 1984, the pressure on religion was mitigated. But, the problem of this time was that of the youth, as they were willy-nilly sent to war fronts. These affected students of high schools and the Qur’anic students (Darasaa). They were so often abducted while going to schools and Qura’nic learning centers or from other areas by coercion ((Informants: Arsii, Jimmaa). I witnessed this as I was a high school student from 1983 to 1986 at Asallaa Comprehensive Secondary School in Arsii.

Islam and Ethiopia’s Multinational Federal State in Arsii and Jimmaa

After the military regime of Mengistu Hailemariam was toppled by the northern insurgency and subsequent takeover of the EPRDF in May 1991, there was some respite. Churches and mosques were expanded all over Jimmaa and Arsii. Humanitarian NGOs (Munazamat) were allowed to function; Muslims and Christians could go out freely to foreign countries for religious and profane purposes. This was not the case during the Derg regime. Many members of the diasporas came back with resources, new knowledge and skills after attending education abroad. The three holidays: Eid Al Faxir (end of Ramadan), Eid Al Adha (the sacrifice of Ibrahim, Abraham and Ismail, Ishmail), and Maulid (the Birth Day of Prophet Muhammad) continued to be celebrated as the National holidays. It was the Derg that for the first time, allowed the celebration of Muslim holidays as National events at open sites (Mohammed Dejen, 2016: 10; Informants).

However, five subsequent events changed the amicable relations between the government and the Muslims in Oromia in general and Arsiland, Arsii, and Jimmaa zones in particular towards TPLF-led EPRDF government. The question of election of the Majlis members that started in the mid of 1990s; the government’s endeavor to introduce Al-Ahbash form of Islam in 2011; the Oromo Protests against TPLF drawn Master Plan of Addis Ababa, Finfinnee (April 2014 – January 2016), the killing of Haaccaalluu Hundeessaa, the famous nationalist Oromo artist (on 29 June 2020) and the interrelated Somali National Regional State’s attack on Oromia and the subsequent displacement of the Oromo from the Somali region.

Like other parts of Oromia, in Arsii and Jimmaa zones, all these phenomena were followed by opposition from the Oromo youth and other sections of the society. The government response was deceiving through hollow propaganda and in the end, usage of force against the protesters and opposition party leaders, who opposed such schemes and actions. On August 2, 2013 in Kofalee district, West Arsii, fourteen Muslims were killed. Many more were injured and arrested from the Waabee mosque by the army. Earlier, many Muslims were also killed in Gadab-Hasasa and the neighboring districts of Arsiiland for opposing the government’s attempts to introduce its form of Islam through EIASC and the above mishaps sponsored or directed by the TPLF (Informants).

Because of their strong resistance, the Arsii and Bale Muslims were even unjustifiably called ‘‘terrorists and Al-Qaeda.’’ Brutal measures were taken on the peaceful worshippers in mosques in many places like Addis Ababa and elsewhere. In the middle of 2012, the former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, addressed the parliament: ‘‘Ye al-Qaeda hiwas lamajemariya gize…ba Arsiina Bale tagagntuwal.’’ This means that ‘‘Al-Qaeda cells have been discovered for the first time in Arssi and Bale’’ (ETV Broadcast of 17 April 2012; Mohammed Dejen, 2016, 16).^[6] This statement shocked the Muslims and caused an outcry all over Ethiopia, though unfounded and blatant lie. This seems a way of attracting Western, particularly American, attention to comrades after the 9/11 attack on America and the struggle of Islamic movements in Somalia. Against Jimmaa zone Muslims, the government sometimes staged accusations of the expansion of Wahabiyyaa and Khawarija.^[7] Both were accused to be against the government.

During the EPRDF era, despite later setbacks, mosques, Madrasass, and Markaz (schools of full Qu’ran chapters’ recitation without seeing the Qur’an) were expanded. Markaza Abba Jifar is one important such center in Jimmaa city, where the youth learn recitation of the Qur’an to be Hafiz, reciters of the whole thirty chapters of Qu’ran from the mind. Muslims were also appointed in large numbers to important positions and could also govern their localities, including the study areas, through the Federal formula of the country. The Mayor of Addis Ababa from 1998-2003, Mr. Ali Abdo, became the first Muslim to be in this position. He is from Arsii. But questions like having interest-free banks were put on a halt. This question was answered only under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed after the resignation of Prime Minister Haile Mariam Dessalegn on 15 February 2018 (Informants). It could be also argued that, Muslims and Protestants were also brought to power according to the multinational Federal administrative policy, a departure from the past. Both of the above prime ministers are the followers of Protestant Christianity.

Maybe influenced by some literature or the words of the Prime Minister, Éloi Ficquet stated that Salafism has been spread from Bale and Arsii to other Muslim areas like Harar, Jimmaa, Addis Ababa, parts of Wallo, East Shewa, and Silte areas, among others. He also added that it was introduced to Arsii and Bale in the 1940s by the returnees from Saudi Arabia and accepted as it coincided with local wishes (Ficquet 2015, 93–122). Ficquet incorrectly divided Islam into ‘‘Ethiopian Islam and Arab Islam,’’ associating Sufism with the former and Salafism with the latter (2015: 93-122). But the Ethiopian Muslims do know only Tawhid (Oneness of Allah) and Shirk (associating other deities with Allah). However, such terms as Wahabiyyaa in Jimmaa and Wahabiyyii in Arsii and Bale were popularized so much to divide Muslims by the EPRDF government and its cadres.

Following the assassination of Haaccaaluu Hundeesaa and the subsequent imprisonment of Oromo political party leaders like Jawar Muhammad and Baqala Garbaa, there was an attempt, particularly in Arsii, to divide the Oromo people alleging that the Muslims were attacking Christians. This was a total fabrication for political ends, as Haccaaluu himself was not a Muslim but an Oromo Christian. For instance, on 19 August 2020, an Imam by the name of Sheikh Umar Suleyman was killed by security forces in Hasasasa town of West Arsii with his newly delivered wife and a child of three months. He was 70 years old. Shortly afterwards, on 24 August 2020, the same thing happened in the Baddessa district of Hararge against another Imam called Sheikh Abdullah Ahmed. He was killed by a regular army member at a funeral ceremony of a 10-year-old boy killed by the same forces. This was done to frighten people, designating them ‘’ "Shanee,"Oromo Liberation Army fighters or their associates, or ‘‘Muslim terrorists.’’ It was to paint the popular movement with the picture of terrorism and suppress the wide strikes that followed the assassination of Haaccaaluu (Informants). Thus, what was going on at the center affected Muslim and Christian relations everywhere in the country.

In Jimmaa province, there were incidents between Muslims and Christians, especially in September 2008. First, it was an episode that started in the capital of Dhedhessa district, Dambi town, present Buno-Bedelle zone (then Ilu Abba Bor zone) by certain Christian youths, who tortured Imams of mosques, desecrated mosques and the Qur’an that triggered a clash between the two communities. These perpetual attacks at the end kindled conflict that later expanded to the neighboring districts. Bashasha town, the birthplace of Prime Minister Abiy in Gomma district, became the epicenter of the conflict. Subsequently, the Agazi Special Commando, as usual in those days, took very harsh measures against every Muslim without discrimination and ended the conflicts. In 2012, the same thing happened when the Qur’an was desecrated in Assandabo town of Omoo-Nadda district by a certain Christian. Several Protestant churches were burned down from February to March 2012. Troops were sent to quell the situation. They stationed there and in the neighboring areas for months, killing, torturing, and imprisoning the Muslim people. One glaring example is that an Imam in Xiiroo-Afata district was unjustly forced to confess that he was the one who desecrated the Qur’an in the first place. When he refused to confess, he was put to death and buried clad in his clothes. Others were arrested in mass and sent up to the main Jimmaa city’s zonal prison and were given long sentences of 5-20 years (local). Thus, the EPRDF government showed its bias as it did not punish the Christians who ignited the conflicts.

Besides, at the end of 2011, Al-Ahbash-trained Sheikhs took positions in Jimmaa zone and Jimmaa city as ‘‘true’’ agents of Islam supported by the government. The Imam of the Grand Mosque in Jimmaa City, Munir Masjid, Sheikh Khedir, took the lead in pushing ahead with the government-sponsored Islam, Al-Ahbash. Once he is reported to have said: ‘‘we will change the course of Jimmaa’s history.’’ According to informants, he meant by this, "We adopt al-Ahbash form of Islam for Jimmaa.‘’ According to the government, this is ‘‘moderate’’ Islam instead of a ‘‘conservative or extremist’’ form of Islam, Wahabbiyyaa (Informants; see also Østebø 2013, 1029–1060).

Furthermore, in 2011, the Ministry of Education (MoE) drafted a law and announced the prohibition on wearing of Niqab (face covering cloth) and congregational prayers on University campuses and in other public places. This was initiated under the guise of secularism as the state policy. MoE nationally prepared a training program on a number of issues to prevent ‘‘taking root of extremism and consolidating secularism.’’ Among others, we attended the one given at Jimmaa University for teachers under the title of: ‘‘Lemat Democrasina Ye Haimanot Akrarinat’’ (‘‘Development, Democracy and Religious Extremism.’’ I attended the one chaired by Dr. Kaba Urgessa, State Minister of Education, in October 2011. Those accompanied the state Minister and the State Minister himself based on the document of training criticized the historical Islam as Wahabiyya which is intolerant and unEthiopian. They argued that it would be better to replace it by moderate form of Islam, implying al-Ahbash. Surprisingly they were all non-Muslims and know not very much about Islamic doctrine.

Jimmaa was subjected to heavy military presence while the Al-Ahbash issue was going on in 2011 and 2012 because of the opposition of its majority Muslim community. Things particularly flared up during holidays to muzzle any opposition voices. But, the Muslims made their voices heard either by showing Yellow papers or by voicing Takbira (saying Allahu Akbar, Allah is Great) during Eid prayers. The Eid Al-Faxir of August 18, 2012 was one of the most apprehensive moments in Jimmaa city. Things went out of control when Sheikh Kedir, Al-Ahbash supporting Imam, appeared escorted by police to lead Eid prayer. This was for the first time that in Jimmaa, Eid Al-Faxir was disturbed in the struggle against Al-Ahbash. It seemed just Revolution like that of the Arab Spring. The death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on 20 August 2012 could give some respite for the Muslims and the government.

Prime Minister Haile Mariam’s tenure (September 2012–February 2018) was very bad for the Muslims and Oromo in Addis Ababa and other urban areas of the country. He once said on ETV, ‘‘The Muslim extremists want to impose Sharia law on everybody in Ethiopia against our constitution, and we fight it.’’ On August 12, 2013 he additionally warned Muslims that: ‘‘we will take the ultimate measure and there will be no mercy.’’ The Oromo were even massacred in such areas as Bishoftu while celebrating Irreecha, at Hora Harsadii (Harsadii Lake). This happened, for instance, on October 2, 2016. Those killed were Muslims, Christians and Waqeefannaa religion followers. Killings, beatings, lootings, harassment, martial laws, etc., were the order from 2015 – 2017 (Informants). Thus, the relations between the EPRDF government and the Ethiopian Muslims opposing the Al-Ahbash movement continued and were aggravated by the Oromo youth (Qeerroo) movement, which was started with the adoption of a new Master Plan for Finfinnee, Addis Ababa in March 2014 and the displacement of the Oromo from Jigjiga amid the ongoing frontier clashes between Oromia and Somali regional states. Change could only occur with the coming to power of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on March 27, 2018.

Shortly after assuming power, Premier Abiy Ahmed, who is from Jimmaa and has a Muslim background, called for unity on 4 July 2018. Subsequently, Sheikh Muhammed Amin, President of the Majlis, which worked with the EPRDF government and accepted the Al-Ahbash movement, resigned on April 1st April 2019 (ENA,July 18, 2022). On June 11, 2020, the Ethiopian House of People’s Representatives passed a remarkable resolution that eluded the preceding regimes, including EPRDF, which the Muslims expected for centuries. This is a resolution issued in Decree No. 1207/2020 that legalizes the Ethiopian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, EIASC ( for short Majlis) as representing entity of the Muslims at home and globally (Ethiopian Majlis.org.et/Who-we-are. https:ena.et/web/eng/w/en37245). Similarly, Protestant Christianity is also given the same legal recognition. EPRDF could not pass such legislation, and it is a landmark in the history of the struggle by Muslims and Protestant Christians in Ethiopia.

Following Premier Abiy’s direction on July 18, 2022, instead of interim EIASC, new General Assembly and Executive Committee members to serve for the coming three years were elected. Accordingly, Shaikh Haji Ebrahim Tufa became President from Oromia, while Shaikh Abdurahman Sheikh Badrudin and Sheikh Abdulaziz Abdulwole were elected vice presidents. Sheikh Hamidin Musa was elected as General Secretary of the Islamic Supreme Council (https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en 37245). This committee is presently in office, and there is no voice of division and Al-Ahbash as a result. These and others included in the committee are distinguished Ulama (Islamic scholars), and they were elected freely, without government interference, as was the case hitherto. Nevertheless, it is a conviction of this author, notwithstanding what is enshrined in the Constitution of 1995 of FDRE the EIASC, and the governments and religions are not independent of each other. Against the constitution, there are latent intervention from the government in the affairs of religions latently or openly, as we witness. The role of the rulers, from Mengistu Haile Mariam up to Abiy Ahmed, has also been decisive in affecting the conditions of religions and religious leaders despite policies, including the Constitutions.

During Abiy’s Prosperity Party’s (PP) five-year tenure, Da’wa (Islamic teaching and preaching) was expanded, and mosques were built in many areas; both rural and urban though at some costs in the latter. The coming to power of Prime Minister Abiy was later followed by a new wave of attacks against Muslims and Islamic property and institutions, particularly in the Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) till very recently this year, with some reactions in the south. This is a worrying sign for all Ethiopian peoples, not only Jimmaa and Arsii; unless the extremists’ onslaught is terminated with immediate effect, the country’s diversity will be at stake. The government and other stakeholders should take these warning signs seriously and resolve problems through the dialogue of intra-religious and inter-religious sections of society as far as religions and other stakes are concerned. In fact, it could be debated whether government actions and signals could affect intra-religious and inter-religious tensions positively or negatively. Thus, the 1974 Ethiopian revolution opened the door of equality between religions and diverse Ethiopian ethnic groups in revolutionary ways through multinational Federalism fifty years on still today. Thus, a plurality of religions prevailed during EPRDF. It can be contended that Protestantism has got the most out of EPRDF policies and the constitution that establishes a Multinational federal state. This is thus another revolution or build-up on the 1974 revolution. However, opposition voices are heard loudly from certain sections of the Ethiopian society than ever before against multinational Federal state and religious equality than ever before. Such voices better be checked for the unity and diversity of the Ethiopian people in a multinational Federal state, which has no choice for Ethiopia.

Conclusion

The historiography of Islam has been a subdued subject in Ethiopia as the imperial regime considered it alien and a threat to the country and the regime. Those who wrote about Islam took official lines or their own anti-Muslim biases and their conflict with Christianity. Islam is however one of the ancient universal religions of Ethiopia. Thus, it deserves further studies to address its neglect and to correct biases and distortions against it. This study attempts to do that drawing on a diverse array of sources and an insider’s view. It reveals that the absolutist monarchical state of Emperor Haile Selassie, as it did in Shannan Gibe and Arsii, had excluded Muslims and the Oromo from education, social spectrum, administrative, and political affairs of the country. They could not even govern themselves. The Oromo in the study areas in particular were exposed to double oppressions, i.e. religious for being Muslims and ethnicity for being Oromo. They could not even go to schools fearing conversion to Orthodox Christianity above all others.

Based on the available sources, analyses and the objectives set, the study finds out that there has been progress in the right direction for the Muslims since the revolution of 1974. Steadily since the Derg times and the revolution, Muslims have been transformed from ‘‘Muslims in Ethiopia’’ to ‘‘the Ethiopian Muslims.’’ Other religions like Waaqeefannaa of the Oromo and Protestant Christianity also have attained freedom since the EPRDF in 1991. But, not all Ethiopians see this development positively. Moreover, the governments’ policies and intentions revolve around politics and maintaining power. The core issue of resolving the popular problems both latent and overt has been overshadowed. Thus, all mass institutions including the Majlis are seen from this angle. To this effect, covertly, ‘‘Majlis cadres’’ and ‘‘Shaikh politicians’’ have been interspersed into religious institutions. It is also the finding of this study that, though state and religion are legally separate according to the 1995 constitution, they have not actually been. There have been biases, covert suppressions, interferences, and favor towards one or the other religions from the Imperial regime onwards. Although the revolution brought about permanent changes of equality of religions officially, one or the other religion has been favored under different regimes latently from the Imperial Regime to the present time. The global and internal dynamics also have played their roles in affecting the relations between religions, within religions and between state and religions in the study areas in particular and Ethiopia in general.

The recent polarization of some sections of the Ethiopian society against ‘‘other religions and peoples’’ be addressed strategically through dialogue. Such developments already have been affecting Arsii and Jimmaa zones and others as this study finds out. Thus, to maintain unity, peace, harmony and development of our country. Measures should be taken by all stakeholders, first and foremost by the government and elites, religious or lay. Otherwise, the presently shown Yellow Card could be changed to the Red Card and affect the whole country.

This study advances limited Islamic studies in less studied areas and in temporal scope to the present time, maybe for the first time, and explored a number of biases and distortions against Islam and Muslims and tried to rectify them. It is thus hoped that future studies could build on it to address social issues that Ethiopian historiography so often ignores.

Ethiopian and Oromia Television News of different times (2010 – September 2023). I also found my own Memo and observation very important to produce this study. Ethiopian News Agency (ENA) also provided some material.

Many oral informants have also been interviewed in Addis Ababa (Finfinnee), Arsii and Jimmaa over a long period of time till 2023 to produce this article.