Magarsa Barii: A Pioneering and Revolutionary Oromo Nationalist and Chairman of the Oromo Liberation Front

Introduction

Magarsa Barii (Bariiso Wabe) was one of the OLF’s pioneering, brightest, and trailblazing founders and leaders. This article identifies and explains his roles and contributions in the Oromo national movement, beginning with his youth as a member of the youth wing of the Macha-Tulama Self-Help Association (MTA) (1963-1967), which the Haile Selassie government banned in 1967. First, it provides his background and addresses the methods and the theories relevant to the subject. Second, by focusing on his informal and formal education and the development of his political consciousness and nationalism, the piece discusses how Magarsa was involved in developing the political roadmap of the Oromo struggle by participating in researching and writing The Oromos: Voice against Tyranny in 1971, and forming the OLF between 1973 and 1976, and by becoming its chairman in 1977. Third, the piece identifies and explains Magarsa’s behavioral and leadership qualities. Finally, it demonstrates the challenges he faced with his comrades and the contributions he made by joining the OLA and refining and consolidating it. The strong foundation of the Oromo national struggle, built by Magarsa and his colleagues, continues to expand and mobilize the Oromo people for egalitarian democracy, self-determination, sovereignty, and just peace.

Background

Magarsa’s parents were dispossessed of their land and other properties in their Oromo country, which we now call Oromia. They were driven away by the Habasha colonial army and nafxanya settlers led by Menelik from Salale, a branch of the Tulama Oromo, in the northern Oromo region, and resettled in Boqojji, Dida’a, in the Chilalo District of Arsi.^[1] He had eight siblings, and he was the fourth child born in 1942 at Boqooji, Arsi. His parents were peasants, and they later moved to Bale because of the intensity of exploitation by the Nafxanya landlords in the early 1950s (Mardasa 2008, 186–201). During this period, Magarsa and Wolde Y. Hundee Huriso were shepherds, and their friendship was grounded in baqattummaa—the shared experience of displacement and the sense of Tulama Oromo kinship.^[2] Magarsa had shared experience of dispossession with Wolde and others, which fostered a profound solidarity, one that transcended ordinary friendship. The Tulama have been the major Oromo branch of central Oromia. By establishing their capital city, Addis Ababa, which the Oromo call Finfinnee, the nafxanyas terrorized, displaced, and committed genocide on the Tulama Oromo, starting in the late 19th century, as we shall see below.

The dispossession of the land and other resources of the Salale Oromo was a part and parcel of the Ethiopian colonial project to empower and enrich the nafxanya (gun-carrying) settlers in the Oromo country. In creating Addis Ababa in 1886 as the capital city of the emerging Ethiopian Empire, Menelik and his colonial army engaged in a series of wars of physical and cultural genocide, enslavement, land expropriation, eviction, and Christianizing Oromo place names by changing their Oromo names, erasing Oromo culture, replacing the Oromo religion of Waaqeffannaa with Orthodox Christianity, and Oromo identity (Kenei and Ta’a 2024; Tolera and Hebo 2024; Gutema and Tesfaye 2024). The historical scars of dispossession, displacement, and alienation of the Tulama Oromo in and around Finfinnee created “the belly of the beast” in the heart of Oromia, where surviving Oromo have been debased and insulted in their own country (Adugna et al. 2024). Consequently, today, almost all major economic and business institutions, as well as healthcare and educational infrastructures, are owned or controlled by the children of nafxanya settlers (Tesso and Tiko 2024; Hamdissa et al. 2024). Despite the propaganda claims of Amhara elites, the neo-nafxanaya government of Abiy Ahmed has consolidated these institutions, such as education, by giving Amhara elites key roles in the Ethiopian government (Hamdissa et al. 2024). As members of the Tulama Oromo community, Magarsa’s parents were victims of Ethiopian settler colonialism and colonial land dispossession. ^[3]

Magarsa was shaped by narratives of resistance and resilience, which were cultivated within families’ collective ethic of unity and mutual support during difficult times. He frequently remembered and spoke about the injustices faced by the Oromo people, the silenced history of their ancestors, and the dream for collective action for freedom.^[4] Also, these memories were never idle conversations; they reflected the awakening of a generation determined to reclaim its dignity. Magarsa, like other Oromo children, attended the fireside kindergarten where he learned about his family’s experiences and what had happened to them.^[5] This experiential education gave him firsthand knowledge of what life meant for Oromo peasants, who were uprooted, landless, and unprotected. Magarsa grew up in the Ethiopian Empire, where being Oromo was stigmatized, where the Oromo language and traditions were suppressed, and where myths associated with the “Galla” name were used to deny the Oromo collective identity and history.

In 1956, Magarsa started school at the age of 14 at the Mission Interior School in the city of Adaba, Bale (Mardasa 2008, 186–121). After completing grades one to four, he moved to Gindhir in Bale to complete grades five to eight. His uncle and white missionaries supported him to continue his education, in which he excelled. After passing the 8th grade with high grades, the Commercial School in Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) accepted him with some financial assistance. Later in high school, Magarsa joined fellow Oromo students who, like him, faced mental and social challenges because of the control, exploitation, and oppression by the Ethiopian colonial system.^[6] Together with his friends Lubee Biru, Gabisa Lamesa, and others, he joined the the Macha Tulama Self-Help Association (MTA) youth league, where he learned more about the Oromo nation and its deplorable social, economic, political, and cultural conditions.^[7] Warqinee Safi, Bayana Gudina, Hundee Ashatee, Fiqiru Tafassa, Dabale, and Gabira Giorgis were members of the MTA youth wing.^[8] According to Lubee Biru, a veteran of MTA, 20 members of the youth wing of the association played important roles in teaching young Oromos in high schools in Finfinnee about Oromo history, culture, language, and the mistreatment Oromos faced because of their Oromo identity.^[9] They also participated in expanding adult literacy education in the Oromo community.^[10]

The MTA, founded in 1963, was the first Pan-Oromo organization to emerge after nearly a century of enforced silence under the imperial Ethiopia prison-state, giving expression to the very question that was building in Magarsa’s mind. Like many of his generation, Magarsa was inspired by the wider spirit of anti-colonial movements that swept across Africa in the 1960s. His relationship with the MTA was both inspirational and practical. The Association’s vision of Oromo unity and self-reliance profoundly shaped his political consciousness, giving form and direction to the long-suppressed legacy of resistance inherited from his ancestors. While studying at the Commercial School of Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) and later at Haile Selassie I University, he was drawn to the association’s activities and ideals, which not only heightened his awareness of Oromo identity but also underscored the importance of collective action as the path forward. His engagement with this association shaped his worldview, nurtured his leadership skills, and prepared him for a broader role in the emerging Oromo national struggle.^[11] With his continued education at Haile Selassie I University, Magarsa’s political consciousness and nationalism further developed, as we shall see below.

Methodological and Theoretical Insights

The analysis is based on the data collected from qualitative interviews, historical accounts, government records, OLF documents, memoirs, electronic media, and other sources. Social and national movement and leadership studies focus primarily on broad structural changes or behavioral issues, paying little attention to the role of human agency or leadership. However, this work combines a structural approach with a social constructionist model of human agency. It employs interdisciplinary, multidimensional, qualitative, and critical methods to examine the dynamic interplay among social structures, human agency, and social or national movements. These approaches help us understand the roles of Magarsa and his colleagues in creating and leading the OLF, as well as developing Oromo nationalism and the Oromo movement. In addition, they enable us to enhance our understanding of the complex issues surrounding the Oromo’s collective and individual leadership in the Oromo movement by exploring the intricate and dynamic relationships between social agencies and their leaders through an examination of the Oromo national struggle and the role of Magarsa.

In the late 1960s and 1970s, Magarsa mobilized the limited Oromo intellectual resources and the suppressed Oromo cultural capital to facilitate the birth of a liberation front capable of addressing the political and economic contradictions between the Ethiopian colonizing and dehumanizing structures and the colonized and exploited Oromo society. Initially, he worked with a few Oromo organic intellectuals to study how colonialism affected the Oromo nation politically, culturally, economically, and psychologically. These efforts helped develop the knowledge for liberation to refute the knowledge for domination that naturalized and justified Ethiopian settler colonialism, along with its social, political, and economic institutions and ideologies. Theoretically, while colonial states, nation-states, dominant classes, powerful racial-national groups, corporations, and patriarchal institutions have engaged in producing false or biased knowledge, theories, and narratives to naturalize and justify all forms of domination, inequalities, and injustices, various progressive social movements, such as the Oromo national movement, have struggled to expose and discredit such knowledge by producing alternative narratives, theories, knowledge, and worldviews (Mbembe 2008).

Consequently, there are two forms of contradictory processes of theory and knowledge production, narratives, and modes of thought in the capitalist world-system: one form is associated with a dominant narrative and knowledge for domination, exploitation, and the maintenance of the status quo, while the other is related to subaltern narratives and knowledge for liberation, social justice, and egalitarian democracy (Jalata 1996, 95–123). Even though various movements have introduced some social reforms, they have yet to develop a necessary critical theory of human liberation that invigorates the struggle to overthrow the dominant knowledge and worldview to produce a new politico-economic paradigm—one which will facilitate the emergence of egalitarian democracy for all peoples. As we shall see below, Magarsa, with his colleagues, initiated the process of knowledge production and dissemination for the liberation of Oromo society and other oppressed peoples. Subaltern movements and social revolutions have often captured state power and have become an integral part of the capitalist world system.

As a result, social movements and social revolutions have only successfully introduced minor changes and reforms, which are confined by the parameters of global capitalism. Magarsa and his comrades attempted to overcome this limitation by struggling for a fundamental social transformation in the Oromo society. The increasing crises of the capitalist world-system indicate possible paradigmatic shifts that could shape the prospects for advancing new and system-transformative modes of thought, knowledge, and action (Robinson 2010). Learning from the past limitations of various social or national movements and social revolutions, critical scholars who engage in the Oromo struggle and Oromo studies, along with progressive Oromo forces, need to continue developing an alternative knowledge and a crucial ideology encapsulated in national Oromummaa, which involves Oromo national history, culture, and Oromo nationalism. This development can help in reimagining a new Oromo worldview beyond domination and exploitation. This article demonstrates that although Magarsa was well-versed in the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist politics and liberation traditions, he went beyond them without being limited by them. He was human-centric and genuinely democratic to create Oromo national power, which external and internal reactionary political forces could not control.

Mainstream classical scholars of collective behavior, such as Neil J. Smelser and modernization theorists like W. W. Rostow, wrongly considered social or national movements abnormal, irrational, or deviant (Smelser 1962; Rostow 1960). These theorists believed that social breakdown, strain, deprivation, discontent, cognitive dissonance, ambiguity, and psychological frustration have facilitated the emergence of revolutions and the collective behaviors of movements (Buechler 2011, 91–106). Such theorists blamed the victims for struggling for their emancipation. The mainstream theoretical approaches to social or national movements have failed to explain how politicized collective grievances can lead to collective action, given that other conditions are present. In the 1960s, resource mobilization theory emerged, challenging the classical model of collective behavior and social movements (McCarthy and Zald 2001, 553–566).

Gradually, national liberation movements such as the Oromo movement flourished in the Rest of the world and the West. Progressive movement scholars and activists began using neo-Marxism and conflict theory as alternative frameworks to explain the relationships among political power, conflict, and domination. Neo-Marxism and conflict theories have been built on other ideas, such as resource mobilization and political process theories, even though they have been criticized for ignoring indigenous wisdom and theories. Resource mobilization theory, as a theoretical paradigm shift, challenged the collective behavior approach. This theory primarily relied on political, sociological, and economic theories, paying less attention to political interests, social psychology, and other issues (Tilly 1978, 42–43). Political process theory emerged in the 1970s by criticizing resource mobilization theory and by explaining social movements in the context of capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, and state formation.^[12]

The political process model criticized resource mobilization for (1) downplaying politics and political interests; (2) deemphasizing the role of grievances, ignoring ideology, and exaggerating rationalistic roles of movement actors; and (3) ignoring group solidarity as well as social psychology (Buechler 2011, 123–140). Combining the traditions of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and John Stuart Mill, Charles Tilly emphasized the importance of ideology, grievances, aspects of rationality, social solidarity, shared interests, and the availability of political opportunities for social movements to emerge and develop (Tilly 1978). Tilly integrated the Marxian tradition, which recognizes conflicting interests, the existence of conflict, and the importance of organization, with the Weberian tradition, which stresses commitment to belief systems (Tilly 1978). Political process theory recognizes factors such as the availability of material, intellectual, and cultural resources, the capacity of mobilizing these resources for collective action, the importance of preexisting social networks, organizations, and institutions, and the rationality of participants in weighing costs and benefits for engaging in the collaborative activity of social movements (Tilly 1978)

Similarly, criticizing resource mobilization theory, Doug McAdam further developed political process theory (McAdam 1982). He identified that mobilization theory blurs the distinction between the oppressed classes and groups and the established polity, exaggerates the elite’s financial support for social movements, minimizes the role of the masses in movements, lacks clarity about the concept of resources, and glosses over grievances. McAdam identified two necessary conditions for social activities to challenge the established political system. These two conditions are the structure of political opportunities, such as political and economic crises, and the strength of indigenous political organizations equipped with cognitive liberation. Cognitive liberation has three dimensions: recognizing the illegitimacy of the established system, overcoming fatalism among the populace, believing that social change is possible, and thinking that introducing social change is possible (Piven and Cloward 1979).

Magarsa’s understanding of critical theories was reflected in his organizational and policy activities, including land reform and the national question. Magarsa and his colleagues, who formed the OLF, developed cognitive liberation among Oromo elites and students, and began fighting against Ethiopian settler colonialism and its political system. Furthermore, another theory, known as framing and social construction, emerged to criticize political process theory for assigning a secondary role to collective grievances in the emergence and development of social movements (Buechler 2011, 141–143). This theory focuses on micro-level social dynamics and emphasizes framing, signification, media, and social psychology. It also pays attention to symbolic interaction and cultural theories that help construct meaning and understand grievances, motivations, recruitment, and identity formation. Framing and construction theory identifies three categories and focuses on them. These three categories are: (1) the process through which social movements frame grievances as injustice and illegitimate and require a collective challenge; (2) the recognition of movements such as status and identity politics, religious movements, lifestyle interests, and environmental concerns; and (3) the necessity to understand the role of meaning and signification. (Buechler 2011, 145–159).

By focusing on micro-level analysis, framing, and social construction theory, the authors emphasize the importance of cognitive liberation for politicizing grievances. Mental freedom allows people to integrate their individual interests, values, and beliefs with the activities, goals, and ideology of social movements. When there is cognitive liberation or the transformation of consciousness and behavior, movements emerge. Without developing mental freedom, Magarsa and his colleagues would not have created the OLF. The process of changing political consciousness indicates that when movement actors do not recognize the legitimacy of a given establishment, they may organize and engage in collective action. Most political process theorists focus on structural factors of political opportunity and organization, paying less attention to subjective factors such as cognitive liberation (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982). William Gamson recognized the importance of micro-mobilization and mental freedom, identifying the role of ideas and political consciousness in shaping collective action (Gamson 1982, 6–9). In micro-mobilization, know-how is crucial, encompassing “a repertoire of knowledge about how to engage in collective action along with the skills to apply that knowledge” (Buechler 2011, 144).

Micro-level analysis and convincing people to mobilize and organize them require building loyalty, managing the logistics of collective action, mediating internal conflict, and framing and politicizing grievances concerning structural factors (Gamson 1982, 6–9). Magarsa had a unique capacity to establish relationships with people of different experiences and backgrounds, build loyalty, and organize them. Referring to the micro-mobilization theoretical framework of Ervin Goffman, Steven M. Buechler (2011, 146) defines framing as an “interpretive schema that people use to identify, label, and render meaningful events in their lives. Frames allow people to organize experiences and guide actions, both in everyday life and in social movements.” The dominant classes and groups in the capitalist world system can control and exploit oppressed classes and subaltern groups because they have the know-how, skills, knowledge, and economic resources to develop central organizing ideologies necessary to translate into organizational capacity (Jalata 1996, 95–123). Even though the Oromo majority have been denied education and lived an impoverished life, Magarsa and his colleagues tried their best to develop the critical knowledge that would help them challenge the knowledge for domination, exploitation, and maintaining the status quo.

Overall, Magarsa and his comrades understood the importance of critically integrating resource mobilization, the political process, and framing and social construction theories, which was necessary for comprehending and building the Oromo national movement. The Oromo movement has continued to foster Oromo political consciousness by building knowledge for liberation and exposing the fallacies and irrationality of Ethiopian knowledge elites in pursuit of domination, control, and exploitation. Oromo organic intellectuals, such as Magarsa, understood the role of the Amhara-Tigray ruling class and its oppressive and exploitative state structures. They recognized the role of Oromo human agency and organized and struggled to change the deplorable conditions of the Oromo. Furthermore, Magarsa and his comrades integrated indigenous Oromo knowledge, encapsulated in the Oromo democratic tradition known as the gadaa/siiqqee system (Jalata 2020, 13–29), with critical knowledge and theories. Rejecting the knowledge and ideologies that characterized the Oromo people as objects of history rather than subjects of history by changing their names to “Galla,” which connotes barbarism and lack of culture, Magarsa and Oromo organic intellectuals recognized that the Oromo society has its unique epistemology, agency, and civilization. How did Magarsa emerge as one of the top Oromo leaders of the Oromo national movement?

Education and the Development of Magarsa’s Political Consciousness and Leadership

In 1962, three Oromo students from Bale enrolled at the Commercial School in Addis Ababa.^[13]Ahmed Hussein Mamie Adie came from Azmach Deglahan Elementary School of Goba, Magarsa, and Eshetu Latu came from Gindhir Elementary School. Magarsa and Ahmed were assigned to the same class and became friends over four years at the Commercial School and two years at Haile Selassie I University, which later became Addis Ababa University.^[14] After 1971, when Ahmed returned to Ethiopia from the USA, their friendship evolved into a shared political struggle.^[15] The issues that helped maintain their relationship were that both came from the same region, Bale, had also Oromo experiences, and shared an interest in the struggle of the Oromo people.^[16] Another Oromo nationalist, Gabisa Lamesa, from central Oromia, also attended the Commercial School of Finfinnee with Magarsa. At this school, students were allowed to sing in their native languages, and Magarsa and Gabisa were introduced to each other while singing in Afaan Oromoo.^[17] They also met at the MTA’s gatherings, and later, on September 2, 1976, with others they formed the first Oromo newspaper, Bariisa (Dawn), and the OLF in the same year. It was Magarsa who suggested the name Bariisa.^[18] Mahdi Haamid Muudee was its chief editor until he was exiled in 1978.

In 1964, when a large religious gathering took place at a stadium in Finfinnee, organized by Billy Gram, a famous American televangelist, Magarsa and Lubee Biru attended this religious event. When the preacher asked who believed in Jesus Christ, both raised their hands, stood, testified to their Christian faith, and gave their names.^[19] Lubee greeted him after the gathering by identifying him as Oromo by his name.^[20] After exchanging introductory information, they were separated. Another day, they met again at the Sudan Interior Mission in the same city and joined the Youth for Christ Group to receive Bible education.^[21] Their interest in Afaan Oromoo, Oromo culture, the Oromo cause, and Christianity brought them together. According to Lubee Biru, Magarsa was fiercely interested in Afaan Oromoo.^[22] During the summer of 1964, they continued to meet at different places in Finfinnee to discuss Oromo issues. They later discovered that both had connections with two prominent Oromo nationalists, Baro Tumsa and Addisu Tolasa, which further strengthened their relationship.^[23]

Rather than returning to Bale during the summer, Magarsa stayed at Lubee’s uncle’s home with Lubee. When they traveled together in Finfinnee, they spoke loudly in Afaan Oromoo to annoy those who disliked the Oromo language and to encourage Oromos who were afraid or ashamed to speak in their mother tongue in their own city. During the holidays, they joined Oromo groups that danced in Oromo.^[24] In his discussion with Lubee, Magarsa emphasized the issue of land, explaining that his parents were tenants who were evicted from their ancestral land in Salale.^[25] Lubee was fascinated by the story that Magarsa told him; Magarsa listed several names of his ancestors from his mother’s side. Most Oromos can list only the names of their ancestors on their father’s side up to 8 or 9 generations.^[26]

While attending the Commercial School, Magarsa was exposed to the MTA’s vision and activities, which awakened his political consciousness and his sense of Oromo collective identity.^[27] He participated in MTA programs, which advocated for literacy, health care, and the development of Oromo society. After completing the Commercial School, he passed the High School Leaving Certificate Exam and entered the Haile Selassie I University in 1968. In the late 1960s, he participated in the student protest movement by promoting the slogan of “Land to the Tiller.” ^[28]Also, the Bale Oromo struggle and the MTA were expanding and helping him develop political consciousness and Oromo nationalism. His involvement in these political events increased his understanding of the essence of Ethiopian settler colonialism and its negative impacts on the Oromo society.^[29] The school became a site where his intellectual curiosity deepened, and his sense of revolutionary responsibility grew. Between 1968 and 1971, the university opened a new political and cultural vision and opportunity for Magarsa, who began to participate in the Ethiopian and Oromo students’ movements. He met Oromo student leaders, including Baro Tumsa, with whom he later founded the OLF.

In 1971, as we shall see below, he was one of the Oromo organic scholars who participated in producing The Oromos: Voice against Tyranny. His political motivation and interest in participating in the student movement opposing the Haile Selassie government and the colonial landholding system were shaped by his parents’ lived experiences as Oromo people and by his education. Between 1968 and 1971, he studied business administration, completing it with great distinction and receiving an award from Emperor Haile Selassie.^[30] In 1971, after his graduation, he was hired by the Ethio-Eclectic Power and then transferred to Ethio-Telecom, where he worked until 1974, when the revolutionary crisis toppled the Haile Selassie government. After graduating from the university, he continued the underground Oromo movement that he had joined after the MTA was banned in 1967.^[31] Magarsa became a committed Oromo nationalist through a combination of personal experiences, historical awareness, and engagement with the silenced Oromo cultural and political movements. From 1975 to 1976, with full awareness of the underground leadership of the OLF and consultation with Oromo elders, the military government appointed Magarsa as an Assistant Administrator of the Bale Province.

As the Ethiopian colonial state was committed to continuing the domination of the Bale region, the Somali government sought to Somalize the Bale Oromo through Somali agents, leveraging shared linguistic and cultural affinities, Islamic networks, and a narrative of “Western Somalia” tied to Greater Somalia.^[32] Magarsa and Colonel Adam Jilo worked to protect the young generation from foreign influence, safeguarding the integrity and unity of the Oromo people.^[33] Whenever Magarsa and his superior, Colonel Haile Mariam Leencoo, the governor-in-chief, addressed meetings or mass rallies, Leencoo’s opening words often carried a tone that could terrify the listeners.^[34] But Magarsa would then begin his speech with the phrase: “Abshiir Sareen duttu nama hin nyaattu”—literally, “Don’t be afraid, a barking dog does not bite;” this expression immediately transformed the atmosphere, turning fear into laughter and easing the tension among the audience.^[35] The repetition of the laughter was used to surprise Colonel Haile Mariam, and he closely monitored his rhetoric.

The Derg regime subjected Magarsa to elaborate surveillance, reflecting the military regime’s growing suspicion toward any locally respected Oromo figure who enjoyed legitimacy and acceptance.^[36] That Magarsa had been recommended by both the OLF underground leadership and prominent regional figures as the most capable administrator for stabilizing Balee, the central government perceived his popularity as a potential threat. To disable his activities, they planned that every aspect of his life came under state supervision—his movements tracked, his actions and words examined, his visitors screened, and his communications intercepted—producing an atmosphere of unrelenting surveillance. The surveillance on Magarsa demonstrated the Derg’s deeper fear of Oromo leadership. By placing Magarsa under tight observation, they signaled that even cooperation with the state did not shield Oromo elites from mistrust. In effect, the Derg’s actions undermined its own efforts at political stabilization: rather than empowering a legitimate Oromo leadership that could bridge local grievances and state authority, it treated him as a latent enemy.

This contradiction became a hallmark of the regime’s approach to the Oromo society, where suspicion repeatedly overrode political rationality.^[37] In Colonel Haile Mariam Leencoo’s absence, the general director, who functioned as a deputy administrator, accompanied him; if both were absent, the chief secretary trailed him. In the absence of all three, the security chief, Colonel Getachew Waqjira, shadowed his movements. Notably, all these officials were Oromo, and except for Leencoo, they spoke Afaan Oromoo and were sympathetic to Magarsa’s message. Magarsa bypassed bureaucratic formalities, choosing instead to prioritize open dialogue on historical grievances—both publicly and within the bureaucratic atmosphere of the time during the day and during the nights with known former leaders of the Balee movement, such as Waaqoo Jiloo, a respected elder, who played a key advisory role in the early 1960s peasant mobilization around Waqo Gutu. Magarsa had dual roles in the administration: one was to carry out his administrative duties for the government. The second one was to clandestinely raise Oromo political consciousness by establishing underground political networks. Eventually, Colonel Ali Musa, member of the local Revolutionary Committee of the Derg in Balee, could not tolerate what Magarsa and his comrades were doing. He wanted to initiate an “abyotawi ermeja” (a revolutionary measure) against him and some of his associates, including Colonel Adam Jilo.

This information was leaked and reached the Interior Minister, Colonel Leggese Wolde Mariam, who was a sympathizer of the OLF. Consequently, he sent a helicopter and flew Magarsa to Finfinnee. The others disappeared, and among them was Colonel Adam, who fled to Somalia, where he was imprisoned for years. Later, he was deported to Ethiopia, where he was kept in Ma’ikalawi until Mengistu left the country. Magarsa stayed at the Yekatit 12 Political school for three months, then returned to his job at the Telecommunication head office until he joined the OLA in Hararghe in 1978. Magarsa, with his comrades, such as Kabada Tulu, Hawal Jida, Ahmed Abdulqadir, and others, were clandestinely organizing Oromos; Magarsa was helped escape by airplane before Ali Musa, a notorious Derg member, killed him, and many of his comrades were murdered by Ali Musa.^[38]

Magarsa’s Role in Producing the First Oromo Liberation Manifesto

On 1 May 1971, Magarsa was one of the seven Oromo scholars who clandestinely drafted The Oromos: Voice against Tyranny, which became the first Oromo political manifesto. These intellectuals who researched, collected data, and penned the first draft of the manifesto were Magarsa Barii, Nagasso Gidada, Yohannis (Dima) Noggo, Boru Dhadacha, Birhanu Chala, Tsegaye (Tesso) Namarra, and Addisu Tolesa.^[39] Baro Tumsa and Abiyu Galata edited the manifesto and published it.^[40] The document focuses on the colonization of the Oromo by Ethiopia, class and land issues, the national question, the Oromo liberation struggle, and the decolonization of Oromia and Oromo society. It developed the general roadmap of the Oromo national struggle and elaborated an appropriate political form and organizational structure for the Oromo movement.^[41] The manifesto identifies and explains three central themes: The first theme concerns the Oromo’s victorious past, which the enemies of the Oromo attempted to erase and replace with the false Habasha (Amhara-Tigray) historical narratives.

According to the manifesto, before the Ethiopian colonization of the Oromo, the Oromo had Biyya Oromoo (the Oromo country), a glorious history, and practiced democratic governance known as the gadaa/siiqqee system, which the colonial government outlawed and suppressed. However, Amhara writers, such as Aleqa Taye, claimed that “the first [Oromo] came out of the water,” while others argued that the Oromo were “invaders” of Ethiopia and lacked a meaningful civilization or culture.^[42] The Habasha colonial system manufactured propaganda on the Oromo to justify their colonization and refute their indigeneity. As The Oromos notes, the indigenous Oromo settled in their homeland in the Horn of Africa before “the so-called Sabeans crossed the Red Sea and started settling on the East African Coast.” These settlers gradually dominated indigenous Africans, such as Agao and Qimant, and emerged as Habashas, which later became Amharas and Tigrayans (Jalata 1993). In search of land, enslaved people, cattle, and other resources, the Amhara-Tgray warlords and their followers expanded their colonial presence into the Oromo communities of northern Shawa starting in the thirteenth century (Bulcha 2011). According to The Oromos, they started their initial colonization by converting a few Oromos to Orthodox Christianity and by killing prominent Oromo political and religious leaders.

The neighboring Oromo communities fought against the invading Christian kingdoms until the rise of Ahmed Gragn, a Muslim Imam, who briefly conquered the Menz kingdom and other communities between 1527 and 1543 (Faqih 2003). The Oromo suffered immensely from the jihad war because they were involved on both sides of the conflict against the invading Christian and Muslim empire builders. While Christian and Muslim forces were contesting for power and control over resources in the Horn of Africa, the northern and southern Oromos were fighting to defend their territories and resources. While the Amhara Christian kingdoms attacked the Tulama Oromo clans, such as the Gaalaan, Yaya, Waji, Abichu, and others, the Muslim empire builders also attacked the Oromo branches living in what is now Somalia and other areas (Bulcha 2011). Before the sixteenth century, Christian empire builders from the north and the Muslim empire builders from the southeast attacked the Oromo. As a result, the Oromo gadaa assemblies moved from one center to another as they defended their territories. "The main gadaa centers were established at Odaa Mormor (near the Blue Nile), Odaa Nabee (in Shagar), Odaa Roba, and Madda Walaabuu in Balee. In these centers, two different institutions, gadaa and qaaluu [an indigenous Oromo religious institution], served as the centers (Oromia Culture and Tourism Bureau, (OCTB 2006)).

The renewal and centralization movement of the gadaa system occurred at Odaa Roba by replacing “Odaa Nabee, which had been a politico-religious center for several hundred years before the fourteenth century” (OCTB 2006). Subsequently, “Odaa Roba [became] a new holy politico-religious center of the Oromo people at large that the various representatives of Oromo groups periodically visited from all directions for such celebrations like Jilaa Gadaa [pilgrimages]” (OCTB 2006). Later, the politico-religious center of Odaa Roba moved to Madda Walaabuu (Spring of Freedom), likely due to pressure from the Muslim empire-builders from the Somali and Afar areas (Jalata 2020). With the support of other Oromo branches, the Balee Oromo, living around Madda Walaabu, reorganized and reconsolidated their political power and the gadaa system starting in the fourteenth century (OCTB 2006).

Between 1518 and 1519, the general assembly of the Oromo nation was held for six months at Madda Walaabuu to deliberate on how to defend and liberate the Oromo people and their country from the Christian and Muslim invaders; delegates from different parts of the Oromo country participated in this assembly (OCTB 2006). The main question Walaabuu Jiloo, Abbaa Gadaa of Madda Walaabuu, asked at the general assembly was, “Maal Taana?” (“What are we going to be?”). After thorough discussions and deliberations, the general assembly defined the main enemies of the Oromo people as the Christian and Muslim empire builders. These enemies were attacking the Oromo country and people by enslaving, killing, taking their land and other resources, and forcing them to abandon their culture, religion, and identity. The Christian and Muslim empire builders occupied Oromo lands, which the Oromo struggled to recover (Bates 1979). The wars between the Christians and Muslims endangered the Oromo’s survival as a people. With the renewal and reorganization of gadaa, the Oromo carried out butta wars every eight years, when power transferred from one gadaa grade to the next. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, as they intensified their territorial recovery through the butta wars, many Oromo branches were under a single gadaa government (Baissa 2004).

The Oromo reorganized and rebuilt the gadaa system to strengthen their military and organizational capacity to recover their lost territories and accommodate their growing population and herds (Legesse 1973). The Oromo fought 12 butta wars between 1522 and 1618, recovering and reestablishing the Oromo country known as Oromia today (Ta’a 1986). According to The Oromos, “the sixteenth century’s so-called ‘[Oromo] invasion’ was neither an invasion nor a migration. It was instead a national movement of the Oromo people incited by the southern Oromos and supported by the northern Oromos, then under the domination of the Abyssinians with the specific goal of liberating themselves and their territories from colonial domination.”^[43] The second central theme of the manifesto describes the colonial relationship between the Oromo nation and the Abyssinian/Ethiopian Empire: “The [Zague] dynasty, [which replaced the Axumite kingdom] ended by intrigues staged by remnants of the oldest Axumite Kingdom who had fled to the South, to what is today the region to the extreme northern part of Shawa, to solicit the hospitality and assistance of the Oromo people of the region.”^[44] It took the Amhara warlords and their supporters eight centuries to shift their relationship with the Oromo from incursion to colonization, driven by two factors. The first factor involved the alliance between European imperialism and Abyssinian colonialism.

Using Orthodox Christian ideology, the Abyssinian ruling class collaborated with the European imperialist powers. Menelik gained access to European technology, weapons, administrative and military expertise, and other skills, which enabled him to create the modern Ethiopian-dependent colonial state (Jalata 1993, 86–88). The third central factor was the emergence of the Amharanized Oromos as a collaborative class. An Oromo collaborator known as Gobana Dacee, from northern Shawa, played a significant role in helping Menelik colonize the Oromo and other peoples for personal fame and wealth, but he lost them after finalizing the colonization process. Menelik mobilized the Oromo military collaborator class, such as Gobana Dacee, and conscripted Oromo mercenaries to invade and colonize Oromia and other territories. Following Menelik’s footsteps, Haile Selassie consolidated settler colonialism in Oromia by strengthening the Habasha political and religious institutions and garrison cities, developing an intermediary class, and establishing colonial education, the colonial landholding system, and the media. Most Oromo farmers and herders became tenants and were forced to produce food and other commodities for their colonizers and the colonial state. The fourth central theme in The Oromos focuses on developing Oromummaa (Oromo national history, culture, and nationalism) and on building Oromo national organizational capacity. By being involved in producing this document, Magarsa emerged as one of the intellectual and political pioneers who laid the foundation of the Oromo national movement in the 1970s.

Magarsa’s Involvement in the Formation of the OLF

Magarsa was one of the key figures in establishing the Central Coordinating Body that engaged in the process of founding and building the OLF. In 1973, there was a meeting of the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) preparatory body (2017, 40–68). Although he was not there, in 1973, Baro stated that General Taddasaa Biru instructed him to form the central coordinating body based on the existing Oromo political networks (Wakgari 2020, 35–36). The body established four significant committees: military, political, cultural, and foreign relations committees, and other committees. The political committee, with seven members, was responsible for drafting the political program. Baro was its chairman, and Magarsa was a member. As the chairman of the Central Coordinating Body, Baro organized a secret meeting in 1974 in which the six leaders, including Magarsa, participated in preparing the first draft of the OLF program. The central coordinating body developed its draft program in 1974, which was amended and adopted in 1976. On the program cover, the OLF has used the odaa tree (sycamore), which symbolizes the gadaa/siiqqee system, or Indigenous Oromo democracy. The OLF program suggests ways of liberating Oromia and the Oromo people from Ethiopian settler colonialism and the Oromo collaborator class.

The primary political purpose of the OLF is the following: “The fundamental objective of the struggle is the realization of national self-determination for the Oromo people and their liberation from oppression and exploitation in all their forms. [The goal] can be realized through the successful consummation of the new democratic revolution by waging anti-feudal, anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist struggle and establishing the people’s democratic republic of Oromia.” The OLF program also notes that the sovereign Oromia state can voluntarily build a democratic federal or confederal multinational state with other oppressed nations. In 1976, the central coordinating body selected the leadership of the OLF, electing Yohannis (Dima) Noggo as chairman, Muhe Abdo as vice chairman, and Taha Abdi as secretary. The organization elected Baro as the public relations officer. The OLF founding congress began meeting clandestinely on June 11, 1976, in Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) at the Reverend Gudina’s home for four days. The Congress revised its earlier program and bylaws, adopted them, introduced more formal structures, and admitted new members (Oromo Democratic Front 2017, 78–79). The members of the central coordinating body were identified and invited as representative leaders, which included those who participated in the Oromo struggle, such as the guerrilla fighters, secret study circles of professionals, workers, the military, and youth, to participate in organizing the founding conference of the OLF (Oromo Democratic Front 2017, 78–79).

These representatives included Magarsa Barii, Baro Tumsa, Ahmed Buna (Goota Babaas), Jamal Robale, Muhee Abdo, Mulugeta Mosisa, Damisse (Gadaa) Techane, Ibssa Gutama, Yohannis (Leenco) Lata, Yohannis (Dima) Noggo, Badho Dachasa, Kabada Damisse, Damissie Dhaba, Abdi Ahmed, Alamayo Taraqa, Taha Abdi, Gabisa Lamesa, Gabisa Haile-Girorgis, Yeshixila Dibaba, Adino Waqjira, Awaqee Gebre-Selassie, Mohammed Ibrahim (Boru Bariso), and others (Oromo Democratic Front 2017, 78–79). The representative members reflected the diversity of the OLF leadership across different Oromia regions and demystified the notion that only Oromo individuals from Wallaga dominated the OLF. Not all representatives could attend the founding congress. The twenty-eight representatives who attended the founding conference became the central committee and later decided to increase its size to forty-one members. The founding congress elected the executive committee and the editorial board. The OLF’s structures included the chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, executive committee, and editorial board. The Editorial Board created two organs, namely Bakkalcha Oromiyaa and Warraaqqaa (Oromo Democratic Front 2017, 78–79). Magarsa played a pivotal role in the OLF’s formative stage. As one of the founding fathers, he mobilized and recruited members of his generation, helping lay the organizational foundations essential for its emergence and development.

His dedication went beyond activism: he devoted almost half of his daily twenty-four hours and a portion of his salary to supporting preparatory work, highlighting the material sacrifices that accompanied his ideological commitment.^[45] After Yohannis Noggo (Diimaa), the first chairman of the OLF, left his position to pursue a scholarship at the end of 1976, Magarsa was elected OLF chairman in 1977, during a critical period of organizational continuity.^[46] Why did his comrades elect him as the chairman of the organization? His comrades elected Magarsa because he was genuine, selfless, intelligent, and had a good personality and excellent human relations.^[47] He was a revolutionary with deep conviction and determination to liberate the Oromo society.^[48]His leadership qualities were manifested in his commitment to the Oromo national cause, his selfless contributions, his knowledge of Oromo history and culture, and his understanding of the politics of the Horn of Africa and the world.^[49] His other qualities included his kindness, sincerity, (sense of humor, frankness, straightforwardness, compassionate personality, self-confidence, theoretical and practical knowledge of the Oromo struggle, his wisdom of consensus building, his social and cultural maturity, his political analysis and knowledge of Oromo, Ethiopian, and world politics, and other qualities that made him trustworthy.^[50] So, all these personal and leadership qualities convinced his comrades to elect him as the chairman of their organization.

Magarsa’s Role in the OLF and the Executive Committee

In 1977, the Central Coordinating Body convened the executive committee congress to discuss how to lead the Oromo national struggle by establishing connections between urban and rural areas and between the OLF and the Oromo in the diaspora. From its formation, the OLF faced a crisis as many Oromo activists, trained in study circles, conveniently joined the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MAESON), the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), or other Ethiopian political organizations, exposing information about the OLF to them (Kumsa 1998, 156–157). During the same time, the military regime faced serious crises both internally and externally. Externally, Somalia was invading the Eastern, Southeastern, and Southern Oromia. Internally, there were conflicts among political groups and the military regime. To fight against the invasion of Somalia, the military government mobilized 300,000 peasant militia.^[51] At the same time, the OLF military operations were growing and expanding in Eastern Oromia. Jaarraa and Mulis were able to recruit and send many Oromo youngsters to Somalia (the majority went on their own initiative) to get the arms the Somali regime was distributing and later join the OLA upon their return. As the field activity steadily grew, the OLF leadership sent more members to join the fighters.^[52]

Gradually, the opportunity to work clandestinely became dangerous in urban areas as the Derg focused on the OLF and its activities. As a result, the OLF leadership decided to convene the OLF executive congress to assess the emerging situations and take appropriate decisions and actions. This congress was held at Baro’s home in Finfinnee in 1977; it was held in frightening conditions because the dead bodies of Red Terror victims littered Finfinnee’s streets. The invasion of Somalia heightened tensions, and there was a real fear that Somalia’s Army could advance as far as Adaama, Central Oromia. The attack completely shut down the railway line between Finfinnee and Djibouti. Despite all these dangers, OLF delegates met at Baro’s home for two consecutive days. They made two critical decisions: Establishing the five-member Supreme Politico-Military Command (SPMC). Magarsa Barii was elected as the chairman, Damisse (Gadaa) Techane as the vice-chair, Leenco Lataa as the secretary, Baro Tumsa as the public relations officer, and Muhee Abdo as a member of the SPMC.^[53] The leadership divided Oromia into six regions, each with its own regional politico-military command; in the late 1970s and 1980s, only the Hararghe and Wallaga politico-military commands were established. Of course, the Eastern Region expanded to the South-Eastern Region of Arsi and Balee. The second decision was to move the OLF’s headquarters from Finfinnee to the field, resulting in the leaders’ departure to the field. At the end of 1977, Baro Tumsa and Magarsa Barii were the top OLF political leaders who clandestinely moved to Eastern Oromia to join the OLA.

In 1977, when the Oromo farmers were suffering from the bullets of two enemies in Eastern Oromia, namely the Siyad Bare government of Somalia and the military regime of Ethiopia, Magarsa joined the OLA with his comrade, Baro Tumsa, in Eastern Oromia. Taddassa E. Fido and Faqadu Waqjira drove them to Getachew Baissa’s home in Adama at night, where they stayed overnight. In the morning, Getawchew drove them to a location near Matahara, crossing the Awas/Awash River to reach the area, and Baro and Magarsa walked to Gugu Mountain, entered Hararghe, and joined the OLA.^[54] Baro and Magarsa reorganized the nascent OLF fighters by establishing military and administrative command structures, dividing labor, setting rules and regulations, and teaching them the OLF’s program.^[55] At the 1978 Eastern Regional Politico-Military Command Conference, Magarsa and Baro explained the OLF program and identified the Oromo national struggle’s friends and enemies.^[56] At this conference, Jaarraa was elected the chairman of the regional politico-military head, Mulis as his deputy, Badho as the political officer, Olana Lamu as the army’s commander, Abdu Jalil as the secretary, and Mogasa Saba as the head of the economy.^[57]After the regional conference was held, Baro was allegedly assassinated by his comrade, Badho Dachasa. The mystery of Baro’s death remained unsolved because the regional leaders were not willing to investigate the crime (Bakakkoo 2023). In fact, the regional leaders broke away from the OLF and created a religious-based organization called the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO). Magarsa unsuccessfully appealed to Jaarraa and Mulis to solve the emerging political problem.^[58] Unfortunately, the IFLO and the OLF started to fight and kill each other by dividing the Oromo people.

In 1978, encouraged by the defeat of the Somali Army in Eastern and Southern Oromia by the Ethiopian Army and the Oromo People and hoping that the Somali government would stop its ambition of colonizing part of Oromia and opposing the Oromo struggle, the OLF foreign relations team, namely Taha Abdi and Taddassa Eba from Sudan, requested the Siad Barree regime to allow opening of an office in Mogadishu to hold a meeting of the OLF leadership from east and west of Oromia.^[59] The OLF faced strategic and practical problems because the OLA was functioning separately in East and West Oromia during that period (Bakakkoo 2023; Lataa 2023). When the Siad Barre government allowed the OLF to open an office in Somalia without first assessing the potential negative consequences, the foreign team invited Magarsa and his team to travel to Mogadishu to meet and deliberate on the Oromo national struggle.^[60] While travelling to Mogadishu for the meeting of OLF leadership, the tragic murder of ten executive and other leaders, namely, Magarsa Barii, Chairman, Gada Gamada (Damise Tachane), Deputy Chairperson, Abbaa Xiqi (Aboma Mitiku), Secretary, Dori Barii (Yigazu Banti), Falmata (Umar Chachabsa), Fafam Doyo, Irana Qachale (Dhinsa), Dhadhacho Boru, Dhadhacho Mulata, and Mari Galan occurred in 1980 at Shinniga, Ogaden, by a Somali force.^[61] The assassination of Baro Tumsa in 1978 and the murder of Magarsa and his team in 1980 resulted in the first and second initial leadership crises in the Oromo national movement, which was resuscitated and continued by a few determined and brave Oromo nationalists and revolutionaries.

Magarsa’s Behavioral and Leadership Qualities

Magersa was a straightforward leader who could never tired of listening to others.^[62] When people spoke with him, they recognized his respectfulness, resoluteness, humility, patience, attentiveness, devotion, cautiousness, seriousness, and his love for the Oromo people.^[63] He persistently connected his initiatives to the broader vision of the Oromo struggle. Magarsa possessed political wisdom committed to dialogue and deliberation. He listened carefully to all sides before acting and promoting dialogue with even those who opposed his views.^[64] Magarsa operated at the intersection of indigenous tradition, rooted in the Oromo practice of deliberative politics, which honored dialogue and consensus. Yet, he possessed the foresight of a modern strategist, balancing an immediate action with a vision for lasting unity. In a time of deep political fragmentation, this rare combination made him not just a respected leader but a central force capable of bringing diverse Oromo voices together. Because of these reasons, he was elected as the chairman of OLF.

Magarsa was a pan-Oromo nationalist who was not constrained by clan, lineage, belief, or factional interests that could cripple the Oromo liberation movement. He viewed those who pursued such divisions as obstacles to the very foundation of Oromo unity and collective action. In meetings, he listened more than he spoke; and when he did speak, he offered not ready-made solutions but questions that compelled those who disagreed to hear one another. For him, the Oromo principle of consensus-building through dialogue was not a relic of the past but a living instrument of collective survival.^[65] He believed that liberation begins in the mind. He thought that people with fear and an inferiority complex could not stand upright in the pursuit of freedom. Therefore, his first struggle involved awakening the Oromo by understanding their history, the democratic principles of the gadaa system, and the memory of Oromo heroes and heroines whose legacies had been erased, distorted, or silenced by the enemy.^[66] His ability to bring elders, youth, women, and intellectuals into the same circle was admirable. Strategically, Magarsa always looked beyond the present battle. He reminded his comrades that the liberation of Oromia was not only about breaking chains of colonialism but about building independent institutions that would outlive him or any other leaders. He also understood the importance of creating revolutionary and enduring institutions. He envisioned a free Oromia where power would be rotated as in gadaa cycles of periodic leadership succession, where accountability was not optional but the foundation of governance.

For him, victory without a vision for tomorrow was just another defeat postponed. Magarsa’s politics was a politics of reconciliation—not by covering over differences, but by naming them honestly and then binding them into a greater unity.^[67] Magarsa’s greatness lay not in force of arms or fiery speeches, but in his ability to sieve and sift and separate petty ambition from genuine struggle, short-term gain from long-term liberation, opportunistic unity from authentic solidarity. He was a bridge-builder, a reconciler, and a strategist with the patience of a farmer and the vision of a statesman.^[68] According to his comrades who worked with him in urban areas and the jungle, Magarsa exhibited a remarkable combination of integrity, empathy, discipline, resilience, and bravery; he was honest—openly admitting mistakes, telling the truth, and keeping his promises.^[69] His empathy was evident in his attentive listening, his offer of comfort, and his refusal to judge. Conscientious and disciplined, he planned carefully, met deadlines, and remained steadfast in the face of difficulties. Resilient and optimistic, Magarsa encouraged others, highlighted positive possibilities, and maintained hope even in challenging circumstances. Generosity was a defining aspect of his character; he shared resources, endured hardships for others’ benefit, volunteered his time, and helped without expecting reward.

Inquisitively, he asked challenging questions others avoided and explored new ideas openly. Magarsa was confident and decisive, unafraid to speak his mind, take initiative, and make clear, thoughtful decisions. He was a revolutionary model in behavioral and leadership qualities, as testified by his comrades who worked closely with him in the Oromo national movement.^[70] Without knowing that Magarsa was the chairman of OLF, Dhugasa Bakakkoo, the former commander of the OLA in Eastern and Southeastern Oromia, worked with him as a guerrilla fighter between 1978 and 1980; he testified that he combined leadership and followship qualities, never complained about hunger and lack of clothes, walking day and night tirelessly in forests and long distances, believed in continuous education and consciousness raising, reading about various revolutions and teaching his comrades.^[71] He demonstrated that he was a true leader through his actions.^[72] Dhugasa, along with Qindessa Sirnesa and Dawee, worked under Magarsa’s leadership in an ad hoc committee that he chaired for six months to reconcile the factions led by Bobassa and Jaarraa in the OLA. Although the contradictions were not resolved due to the stubbornness of the two leaders and their ideological differences, Magarsa increased the army’s discipline by rebuilding and preparing it for the armed struggle. This saved the OLF and the OLA from disintegration by establishing rules, regulations, and laws, thereby consolidating the OLA.^[73]

He was a selfless leader because he did not seek fame, power, or wealth. He worked tirelessly to change the deplorable condition of his people, who had been suffering under the Ethiopian colonial system in a sea of poverty and ignorance for almost one and a half century. As Dhugasa Bakako described, Magarsa worked at many levels to organize, participate in, and lead the political and armed struggle. He ensured that the organization’s rules and laws were equally applied to both members and leaders of the OLF and the OLA.^[74] Magarsa was “a revolutionary model” and “almost a perfect leader.”^[75] He was neither a doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist-Maoist nor a nostalgic traditionalist.^[76] Although he engaged deeply with Marxist theory, using it to analyse structures of exploitation of imperial domination, his political vision remained firmly rooted in the Oromo democratic tradition of gadaa.^[77]

He lived as an egalitarian democrat, guided by safuu Oromoo (moral and ethical order of fairness and justice), and a sense of collective responsibility. For Magarsa, Marxism sharpened his critique of oppression, but gadaa provided the practical and normative framework for imagining a free Oromia. In this synthesis, he embodied a thinker and leader who combined rigorous critical analysis with indigenous democratic principles, forging a distinctly Oromo approach to liberation. Scholars of social and revolutionary movements define leadership as activities, relationships, and strategic choices packaged into policies to mobilize and organize a category of people to achieve defined objectives. For instance, Robert Gibb sees leadership as informal and interactional activities, which “include the negotiation of a collective identity and the development of a shared understanding among actors of the political and institutional environment … in which they are operating” (Gibb 2001, 70). Magarsa was an effective listener and communicator. In interactional relationships, speakers become listeners, and listeners become speakers in a transformative way (Barker et al. 2001)

There is consensus among scholars of leadership studies that leadership, as an activity, involves intellectual directives and organizing. As intellectuals, political leaders develop theoretical, ideological, and organizing visions to identify and solve specific political and social problems. Magarsa clearly understood the external and internal challenges and issues of the Oromo society. Influential political leaders are theoreticians and social technicians who develop activity plans to solve identified problems by proposing appropriate policies and actions. Leaders with cognitive and behavioral deficiencies cannot develop influential ideologies, build networks, or develop intermediate leadership (bridge leaders), and they are afraid to delegate authority to specialized bodies or individuals (Barker et al. 2001). Self-centred and autocratic leaders hinder the development of competent, confident leadership teams, as bridge leaders work both vertically and horizontally to connect them. Instead, such leaders would prefer to surround themselves with sycophants, thereby avoiding reliable or accurate feedback on their activities.

Magarsa recognized the deficiencies of self-centered leaders and mentored younger Oromos to hold leadership positions in the Oromo national movement. His leadership qualities were impressive; he was an effective listener and speaker while dealing with people. Influential leaders balance their “leading” and “led” selves through interactive, conversational relationships. In this dialogue, some followers may emerge as leaders or assume leadership roles. Constructive dialogue fosters mutual understanding and agreement among leaders and followers within an organization or movement. An effective conversation within leadership and between leaders and followers can help develop strategic innovations from diverse perspectives and experiences, as well as find new solutions for existing problems. Plans of action that emerge from participants’ specific knowledge and experiences are more likely to succeed than those imposed by confident leaders (Amsalu and Graff, 2006: 90). Magarsa understood these qualities of leadership and effectively utilized them. In addition, the effectiveness of leadership depends on personal and structural resources (Jones 1989, 3–14). Individual resources and commitment determine leadership performance. Personal resources involve mental and emotional power, focused energy and attention, analytical capacity, dedication and determination, communication skills, and the ability to blend the practices of leadership and followership by integrating “leading” and “led” selves. Structural and personal resources include layers of groups that share ideological and strategic ideas, formal and informal networks of people, political and economic systems, patterns of cultural expectations, the political dynamism of followers, the recognition and overcoming of institutions’ constraints, and leadership creativity.

Leaders’ creativity depends on their openness and willingness to learn new skills, which will help them gain the expertise needed to develop new political visions, policies, and strategies. The expertise of individuals helps build and maintain political cohesion, take actions contingent on time and place, and continually renew political institutions or organizations. “Effective leadership … involves a capacity to reassess, change tack, explore unknown territory, advance and retreat, and learn creatively. New possibilities disclose themselves; old action patterns prove inefficacious” (Barker et al. 2001, 15). The primary leadership responsibilities include guiding the constituent community in the struggle for organizational survival, policy achievement, and power acquisition by building expertise, developing internal cohesion, and securing aid from supporters, sympathizers, and others. Creative and influential leaders understand the importance of division and specialization of labor, delegating tasks to experts or specialists, and how these activities increase efficiency and productivity within the organization (Fiorina and Shepsle 1989, 18–19). Visionary, pragmatic, and democratic political leaders create new possibilities in history by acting as agents of social change. There are two general types of leadership: transformative and transactional. The former changes the paradigm, and the latter maintains the status quo. Maintaining a balance between the two forms of leadership is necessary to introduce change while maintaining stability.

Just as introducing new ideas and innovations invigorates an organization, maintaining stability prevents it from falling into chaos. Magarsa understood that human agency and objective factors determine leaders’ performance. By raising political consciousness in secret study circles and networks, Magarsa worked diligently to enhance individuals’ ability to understand complex realities, build influential team players, and develop the determination and courage to take well-thought-out actions. He recognized that individual leaders and their teams could not accomplish everything they wanted since objective factors may limit their activities. For instance, the lack of political opportunity structures, such as foreign assistance or economic resources, negatively affected the actions of the Oromo national movement. To overcome these challenges, Magarsa and his network members tried to establish connections with the embassies of China, Somalia, Cuba, and the former Soviet Union to obtain material and financial resources for the Oromo national movement.^[78] Western countries have strong ties with the Ethiopian government. They are not even willing to recognize the existence of the Oromo people and their suffering under Ethiopian colonialism (Jalata 2011, 131–154). As discussed above, since the Somali government wanted to colonize and Somalize some Oromos, it rejected the appeal of Oromo nationalists and the OLF

Magarsa and his network members performed five significant tasks (Gibb 2001, 64–65). The first task was defining the movement’s objectives by establishing short- and long-term goals. The second task that Oromo leaders performed was to provide the means of action by effectively identifying and channeling members’ talents and energies, as well as securing resources. The third task was for Oromo leaders to establish and maintain the organization’s structure and cohesion by regulating tensions, addressing adversarial situations that might have destabilized the movement, and controlling the circulation of information. The fourth task was to expand membership and mobilize members’ support for the movement’s objectives by appealing to the campaign’s interests and collective identity. The final mission was to build the collective identity of members, supporters, and sympathizers by invoking their collective memory to create a new understanding of current conditions and a new vision of future possibilities. Magarsa and his teams sought to preserve and promote Oromo traditions and collective identity, thereby strengthening community cohesion, with a strong emphasis on reclaiming and safeguarding Oromo history, oral traditions, and cultural memory.^[79] Intellectually, Magarsa stood among the central figures of the Oromo liberation movement, producing critical ideas and analyses that interrogated the historical marginalization of the Oromo and articulated conceptual frameworks for independence and self-determination.^[80]

Through education and the dissemination of liberation knowledge, he inspired critical thinking among Oromo youth and scholars, transforming passive communities into politically conscious actors. His approach emphasized deliberate, strategic reflection over reactive responses, cultivating long-term awareness, resilience, and empowerment. As his comrades, Dhugasa Bakakkoo, Wolde Y. Hundee Huriso, Ibssa Gutama, and Taha Abdi noted above, Magarsa was deeply engaged in grassroots mobilization, advocacy, and institution-building. Through entities such as the MTA, he facilitated networks of solidarity, mutual support, and collective action. He encouraged diverse Oromo political factions, emphasizing dialogue, negotiation, and inclusive decision-making. By working with his comrades, such as Baro Tumsa, he strategically combined visionary long-term goals with pragmatic tactical actions, supporting individuals and initiatives that enhanced Oromo political leverage at both the local and national levels. Magarsa articulated a coherent ideology of Oromo self-determination that was grounded in historical justice, cultural revival, and political sovereignty. He understood the struggle for liberation not merely as a political project but also as a cultural and moral one, in which national emancipation is inseparable from the restoration of dignity. By advocating the creative integration of tradition and modernity, he demonstrated that Oromo nationalism could draw strength from indigenous governance principles while remaining responsive to contemporary political realities.^[81]

Conclusion

Through his combined contributions, which included preserving Oromo culture, fostering intellectual empowerment, mobilizing people for political action, initiating the development of national Oromummaa and Oromo nationalism, and articulating a principled ideological framework, Magarsa played a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of the Oromo national movement. His legacy reflects a holistic vision of liberation, where historical awareness, ethical leadership, and strategic political engagement reinforce one another in the pursuit of justice, self-determination, and sovereignty through egalitarian democracy. The untimely death of Magarsa with his comrades on April 15, 1980, prematurely silenced the valuable insights and revolutionary leadership. This tragedy resulted in a devastating blow whose effects have continued to negatively affect the Oromo national movement. Consequently, the Oromo lost a revolutionary and visionary political leader and bridge-builder, which have been essential for developing the collective identity and unity of the Oromo nation. Magarsa’s work and influence highlighted that liberation required more than arms, and it demanded ideas, visions, liberation knowledge, and the courage to think independently against the narratives imposed by colonial and imperial powers. In the history of the Oromo liberation, Magarsa stood as an enduring example of what a revolutionary leader can be, rooted in tradition and understanding critical modernity, guided by principles, skilled in tactics, and visionary in strategy. His politics was never that of mere survival, but of rebirth.

Magarsa, Baro, and their colleagues challenged the ideology of Ethiopianism, which has promoted the supremacy of the Habasha Cultura, Orthodox Christianity, the Amhara language, values, and the structures of Ethiopian settler colonialism. The Habasha or Ethiopian colonial elites have objectified the Oromo cultural heritage by using the ideological, political, and historical claims of the Nafxanya state. Magarsa and the other OLF leadership challenged these elites by recognizing, accepting, and developing Oromo indigenous knowledge, theory, and critical theories, such as Neo-Marxism and left-liberal traditions. Oromo nationalist intellectuals rejected dogmatic Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, which most Ethiopian leftist scholars adopted to address the Ethiopian Empire’s political, economic, and cultural problems without critically studying the Empire’s conditions. Magarsa and his comrades rejected aspects of Marxism that considered people like the Oromo backward, identified and explained social development stages, such as civilized and non-civilized societies, and glorified the working class at the cost of the peasantry.

Similarly, they ignored the aspects of liberalism that praise the racist capitalist class, colonialism, and imperialism to promote and practice bourgeois democracy and praise the Euro-American-centric world at the cost of egalitarian democracy. Without being misled by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist dogma and mainstream liberal traditions, and without being imprisoned by the Oromo tradition, Magarsa and his colleagues critically learned from positive contributions of these phenomena and practically integrated their best elements into the Oromo democratic tradition known as the gadaa/siiqqee system in the Oromo national movement. They critically understood the importance of Oromo collective identity and grievances and the necessity of creating an independent Oromo national organization to build the Oromo national movement. This is a prerequisite for restoring Oromia’s sovereignty by reestablishing a free Oromo society in which Oromo humanity and human rights are protected and respected. Magarsa was one of the central figures who helped shape the Oromo national movement and the OLF, which continues to galvanize the Oromo people in their quest for liberation and sovereignty.