The Politics of Oromo Betrayal: A Critical Investigation into Post-2018 Ethiopian State Trajectory

Ethiopian Regimes and the Oromo Struggle: A Brief Overview

Ethiopia has experienced three distinct political regimes over the past half a century (Begashaw 2019). The imperial system, characterized by social oppression, economic exploitation, and cultural marginalization for over a century (Regassa and Emmenegger 2023), ended in September 1974 (Brietzke 1976; Isaac 2025; Jima 2021). It was replaced by Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam’s military regime, which ruled with an iron fist for 17 years until its collapse in 1991 (Hussein 2008; Isaac 2025; Temin and Badwaza 2019; Weber 2018). Following the demise of the military regime, a coalition of four ethnic-based parties formed the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which monopolized power for nearly three decades. Of the 27 years of EPRDF rule, 21 years were under Meles Zenawi’s dictatorship, while the remaining six years were under Hailemariam Desalegn’s largely symbolic leadership (Dias and Yetena 2022).

Historically, Ethiopian regimes have perceived the Oromo as threats to their dominance, resorting to terrorizing, torturing, imprisoning, and executing their leaders (Hassen 2002; Jalata 2020a; Mollenhauer 2011). Jalata (2010) highlights that the cruelty endured by the Oromo was systematic across regimes, from Emperor Haile Selassie to Colonel Mengistu and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Jalata (2010, 176) asserts that “[t]he Haile Selassie government terrorized the Oromo of Raya-Azabo, Wallo, Hararghe, Bale and other regions because of their political and cultural resistance to the Amhara-Tigray domination. It also imprisoned, tortured or hanged prominent Oromo leaders, such as Mamo Mazamir and Haile Mariam Gamada.” Similarly, Mengistu’s regime conducted mass shootings of Oromo populations to suppress their spirit of independence, with victims buried in mass graves. Mengistu’s regime too executed prominent Oromo leaders, including Colonel Hailu Ragassa, General Tadesse Birru, and Reverend Gudina Tumsa (Hassen 2002). Under Meles Zenawi, massacres targeting the Oromo and other ethnic groups were routine, despite his reputation in the West as a reformist (Jalata 2010).

Unlike his predecessors, Abiy Ahmed initially inspired wind of hope across the regions, including Oromia, which is his sociopolitical base (Workneh 2021). Early measures included media reforms, releasing political prisoners, and welcoming opposition groups like the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ginbot 7 (Abdi 2019). While Abiy’s rebranding of the OPDO into the ODP was initially viewed as a pragmatic step toward building a more resonant Oromo organization (Tronvoll 2024), the subsequent and rapid transformation of the ODP into the Prosperity Party (PP) fueled widespread skepticism (Yimenu 2021). This transition was perceived by many Oromo as an effort to dissolve an entity rooted in Oromo national identity in favor of a pan-Ethiopian nationalism designed to undermine the existing ethnic-based federalist structure (Wilson et al. 2021). Scholars likened his leadership tactics to global figures like Mandela and Gorbachev (Workneh 2021). Abdi (2019, 20) observed that “[t]he despotic society…started inhaling the fresh and healing wind of change.”

However, Abiy Ahmed’s initial promises quickly gave way to disillusionment. By the end of his first year in office, his actions that derailed these promises had already instigated widespread dissent among the Oromo, who were acutely aware of the potential signals of betrayal (Gardner 2024). This prompted many Oromo youth to join armed struggles, while prominent Oromo leaders were re-imprisoned in subsequent years, discrediting Abiy’s legitimacy both nationally and internationally (Alem 2025; Posey 2020). This brief overview is intended to provide a historical lens through which the Ethiopian regimes’ treatment of the Oromo can be understood, highlighting the persistent challenges faced by the group across different political eras. The remainder of the article presents the conceptual framework, literature review, research questions, methods, analysis, discussions, and conclusions.

Betrayal as Conceptual Framework

The concept of betrayal is often related to the act of breaking, violating, or even delaying trust, promise, confidence, or a presumed contract, causing moral and psychological conflicts in relationships between individuals, organizations, or both. Betrayal fundamentally entails severe violations of trust and loyalty, posing a significant threat to future relationships and integrity (Ben-yehuda 2018; Hannon et al. 2010). Betrayal is always a breach of trust (Stout 2022). In this study, the concept of betrayal can be defined as the perceived violation of established norms or expectations that govern the relationship between a group and a regime. Betrayal involves supporting a certain group or breaking agreed-upon or presumed norms at the expense of the betrayed. Marder (2020) further states that betrayal is often intentional and calculated with specific goals.

Scholars distinguish betrayal into private or public forms (Ashenden and Hess 2020; French et al. 2009; McClintock 2019). Private betrayal occurs in friendships and personal relationships, affecting individuals. In contrast, public betrayal impacts larger groups or nations, often equating to treason (Asako 2015; Oh 2018). Betrayal can severely damage an individual’s sense of self, leaving them devastated, enraged, and bewildered. Its effects may last a lifetime unless soothed by forgiveness (French et al. 2009).

Judith Shklar and Peter Johnson are notable scholars who conceptualized betrayal with trust as the focal point (Grinchenko and Narvselius 2017). Shklar views betrayal as an “ordinary vice” common in daily life, while Johnson explores trust’s role in betrayal’s origin and recommends forgiveness and forgetting as remedies. Betrayal in socio-political contexts stems from vices like arrogance, pretension, and pessimism (Ashenden and Hess 2020).

Grinchenko and Narvselius (2017) summarize theoretical assumptions of betrayal: (1) betrayal targets relationships, (2) it requires a betrayer and betrayed, (3) it is perceived and defined by either party, and (4) it is painful, threatening the betrayed. For political leaders, betrayal often involves a failure to compromise. Tillyris (2017) states leaders with moral rigidity—characterized by purity obsession, conflict elimination, and reluctance to compromise—may face challenges. This rigidity can result from populism that undermines political interests or a negative view of issues requiring compromise, creating obstacles for leaders seeking long-term power.

Literature Review

Manifestations of Political Betrayal

This section explores the manifestation of betrayal in a political context based on existing literature. Ashenden and Hess (2020) argue that betrayal follows a promise an individual or a group undermines to satisfy after winning election or assuming political position. Political discourses are obviously full of promises where candidates announce plans they vow to accomplish. However, once the electorates entrust the position to them, they often tend to compromise those promises after the aspired position is successfully held (Asako 2015; Tillyris 2017). Even in countries where democracy is said to have been “well established”, betrayal is a common phenomenon. For instance, Asako (2015) confirms that in 1988 George H. W. Bush publicly swore to not increase taxes, although after assuming office, he derailed from the promise and increased taxes which both the media and the electorates marked as a betrayal. Consequently, Bush lost the 1992 election as the majority of voters determined to cast their votes for his opponent (Ibid). What marks betrayal as a brutal act is that it is calculated; it is forethought, and consciously decided by betrayer to achieve personal gains be they political or economic (Marshall 2008). Giurlando (2021) further extends this argument that political betrayal occurs when the betrayer fails to fulfil a contractual “feelingful discourse” (p. 561), an agreement made between citizens and political elites which can motivate the citizenry to opt for political change.

Earlier works studied betrayal in terms of relationships—whether affecting private or public interests—highlighting how occurrences like unexpected betrayals against ‘well-built trust’ can extinguish the light of trust in those relationships. The current study is conceptually grounded in the post-2018 politics of Oromo betrayal, examining how the current administration’s trajectory diverged from the foundational demands of the popular mobilization that brought the 2018 change. Rather than treating this phenomenon as a series of isolated political events, this study analyzes the structural mechanics of betrayal through three interconnected analytical lenses: 1) the institutional mechanisms and state actions that characterize the regime’s pivot toward authoritarian consolidation; 2) the socio-political framing of promised democratic reforms and the subsequent collective perception of marginalization among the Oromo; and 3) the broader historical patterns of political betrayal within Ethiopia’s institutional landscape and collective memory. When Abiy Ahmed was nominated for premiership as a representative of the Oromo People Democratic Organization (OPDO), there was significant enthusiasm and expectation that his leadership would end the historical suffering experienced by Ethiopians, particularly among the Oromo (Lashitew 2019).

To many external observers and general public segments, the 2018 political transition positioned the incoming administration as a vital mechanism to resolve Ethiopia’s long-standing political crises and socioeconomic challenges. However, critical segments of the Oromo political elite and intelligentsia expressed early structural reservations. For instance, media figures and political actors like Jawar Mohammed warned that accepting the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization’s (OPDO) nomination of a premier candidate prior to the 2018 selection could result in a strategic historical miscalculation for the Oromo national movement (Atoma 2020). Similarly, political scientist and senior opposition leader Professor Marara Gudina openly voiced skepticism regarding the administration’s structural commitment and competence to institutionalize the country’s long-awaited democratic space (Ibid). These early elite contentions demonstrate that the post-2018 politics of betrayal were preceded by clear warnings regarding the fragility of the transition’s institutional alignment.

Despite brief initial doubts and warnings that the incumbent administration would fail to realize the Oromo cause or transition Ethiopia into a democracy, Jawar Mohammed officially endorsed this government at a grand homecoming ceremony in August 2018 (Gardner 2024). Notwithstanding his significant role in mobilizing the Oromo diaspora and domestic population through social media to withstand TPLF-led state aggression (Arora 2020), Jawar Mohammed contributed to the demobilization of the Qeerroo by asserting that the primary political struggle had been won. This rhetoric effectively dissolved the movement’s collective power without institutionalizing its influence within the new governance system, thereby removing the checks and balances necessary to ensure the regime remained accountable to the Oromo people’s longstanding demands (Forsén and Tronvoll 2021). Moreover, Abiy’s systemic gestures toward opposition parties—exemplified by the homecoming of groups formerly labeled as terrorists, including the OLF—created a facade of inclusivity designed to fracture the Oromo political front (Østebø and Tronvoll 2020). The ruling party initiated and led dialogues among Oromo political leaders, underpinned by flamboyant promises that the 2021 sixth national election would be free and fair, regardless of PP’s exclusive win in all of Oromia (Lyons and Verjee 2022). These maneuvers effectively functioned as a form of asymmetric electoral authoritarianism, leading Oromo elites to accept the regime as genuine and consolidating Abiy Ahmed’s domestic legitimacy during a critical transitional period (Forsén and Tronvoll 2021).

The Oromo across Ethiopian Regimes

The practice of Gadaa, the Oromo egalitarian sociopolitical and governance system with over 500 years recorded history, was debilitated in the 19th century, leading to the systemic weakening of Oromo unity. Consequently, self-conscious and self-confident Oromo nationalists fighting to uphold their values and raise awareness among their fellow Oromo became targets of elimination and assassination (Hassen 2002; Jalata 2010). The assassination of Professor Haile Fida, General Tadesse Birru, and Reverend Gudina Tumsa in 1970s and 80s, among many others, is worth noting as unforgettable memory in the history of Oromo struggle to conceive that conscious Oromo nationalists and political leaders have been target of elimination (Jalata 2020b). Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam was committed to sustaining and perpetuating the efforts to transform multicultural, multilingual, and multi-religious Ethiopia—initiated by his predecessors—into a unitary state. This transformation necessitated the brutal assassination of suspected Oromo politicians, including his own cadres, such as key party member Teferi Benti in 1977 (Gardner 2024).

When the military regime was ousted in 1991, there was hope that the new political system would address Ethiopia’s political crisis by establishing accommodative framework and leveling the field of political landscape that respects the cultural diversity of the country’s nations and nationalities through the EPRDF’s nominal ‘ethnic-based federalism’ (Cohen 1995). However, this constitutional promise was starkly contradicted by the EPRDF’s operational reality. Under the guise of a new federal arrangement, the regime perpetuated a legacy of state-sponsored violence, characterized by the systematic harassment, extrajudicial killing, and elimination of Oromo voices—ranging from student activists to academic professionals (Mollenhauer 2011).

As noted by Jalata (2017), Tigrayan-dominated Ethiopian state officials perceived Oromo intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and community leaders as existential adversaries to be neutralized. This era was marked by the brutal assassinations of prominent cultural and political figures such as artist Ebissa Adunya, Jirenya Ayana, Usmayo Mussa, and OLF leader Nadhi Gammada (Atoma 2020). While it is impossible to quantify the full scope of those martyred over the past 35 years, the historical record remains clear. It is crucial to note here that Abiy Ahmed himself was a security agent for 27 years of EPRDF rule, a period defined by the widespread persecution and imprisonment of Oromo nationalists under Meles Zenawi (Fisher and Gebrewahd 2019). Despite this career-long loyalty to the previous administration, Ahmed has since attempted to curate a political persona that distances himself from those atrocities by publicly condemning the very system he helped maintain until the 2018 transition.

The Coming to Power of Abiy Ahmed

For the past half-century, under successive autocratic regimes, Ethiopians in general and the Oromo in particular have endured a system of centralized, one-person rule (Arriola and Lyons 2016). Today, neither the broader Ethiopian populace nor the Oromo people have fully recovered from the trauma of this protracted suppression. This lingering impact continues to shape the nation’s collective memory, reinforcing the notion that history is not merely a static past but a dynamic force influencing the present (Gardner 2024). While the federal system introduced following the 1991 collapse of the Derg regime initially offered multifaceted structural benefits—such as institutionalizing the recognition of identity and facilitating the integration of Afaan Oromoo into mainstream media (Habtu 2003; Sorsa 2026), TPLF ultimately facilitated its rise as an oligarchy under the guise of EPRDF’s federal structure (Lyons 2019).

The administrative promise of federalism was starkly undermined by the 21-year absolute dictatorship of Meles Zenawi (Arriola and Lyons 2016; Holcomb and Klemm 2018; Tola 2019). Under Zenawi’s rule, thousands of Oromo were subjected to systemic state-sponsored violence, including arbitrary harassment and torture within a sprawling carceral network. This era was defined by egregious human rights violations: the physical mutilation of political detainees, the mass arrest of journalists, the forced closure of independent media, and the denial of the fundamental freedoms of assembly and expression (Eisen and Dugo 2018). Consequently, opposition parties were decimated, with leadership either imprisoned or forced into exile, leaving a legacy of institutionalized repression.

This systematic suppression was sustained through employing the “divide and rule” mechanism which finally birthed disobedience and grassroots dissent (Holcomb and Klemm 2018). Even after the death of Meles Zenawi in 2012, EPRDF determined to operate in the same old fashion under his successor Hailemariam Desalegn (Dugo 2016). For the next six years, Hailemariam determined to sustain the legacy of Zenawi’s administration through exercising forceful measures. The peaceful protests that first broke out in Oromia later grew into nationwide resistance, albeit aggressive and repressive government measures (Amnesty 2014; Fisher and Gebrewahd 2019).

The leaderless Qeerroo peaceful protest, backed by elite groups and diaspora activists, through social media was further mobilized beyond the controlling capacity of the ruling party (Arora 2020; Dibaba 2019). The protest had a significant impact on the country’s economy and weakened the financial sector, as they were accompanied by market boycotts. Later, the participation of protesting groups from regions such as Amhara and Sidama further fueled the Qeerroo protest together placing irrevocable pressure on the ruling party, ultimately leading to severe weakening and eventually shaking the TPLF led symbolic EPRD from its core (Dibaba 2019; Fisher and Gebrewahd 2019). Two years after vowing at the 2016 UN general assembly that “Facebook fueled the protest in Ethiopia and that it must be shut down”, Hailemariam Desalegn was eventually forced to resign on February 15, 2018. Hailemariam’s resignation followed a seventeen-day, closed-door ‘deep renewal’ (tilq tehadiso) evaluation conducted by the EPRDF central committee (Fisher and Gebrewahd 2019). Following the OPDO’s strategic ascendancy during this evaluation period—mainly driven by the sustained momentum of the Qeerroo movement and the high-stakes negotiations led by figures such as Lama Magarsa—Abiy Ahmed leveraged his position as a Member of Parliament to secure the party’s nomination for the EPRDF chairmanship. Although Lama Magarsa was widely popular and more acceptable even beyond his political and social base far beyond Abiy Ahmed, his seat in the Chaffee (Regional Council) constrained his becoming prime minister (Ademo 2018; Begashaw 2019; Jalata 2020b; Weber 2018; Workneh 2019; 2021).

Although Ethiopia is a nation where freedom of expression and press freedom have been discouraged, with media often serving as a mouthpiece for the ruling party (Teshome-Bahiru 2009), the Abiy Ahmed administration introduced a short-lived period transform in the media landscape. Mainstream media practitioners were made busy in exposing the wrongs of the “previous” government while side by side were engaged in reporting the reforms his government introduced one after the other. Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC), Fana Broadcasting Corporation (FBC), and Oromia Broadcasting Network (OBN), among others, highly contributed to widely promoting Abiy Ahmed and his reforms in his early days. These media houses engaged in exposing and live-televising testimonies of people who mercilessly suffered under the arms of the “former” system (Horne 2018). They covered the reforms Abiy’s regime brought while investigating and broadcasting testimonies of thousands of prisoners who suffered from torture, harassment, whipping, etc. under the “former” leadership on the other side. This perception led the general public, and the Oromo in particular, to perceive the regime as “genuine” that would heal long-standing wounds inflicted by decades of state oppression.

Despite being the numerical majority, the Oromo had historically occupied the position of a political minority—a paradox the Abiy regime sought to address initially. These early reforms, combined with a flamboyant discursive strategy, led many Oromo to view Abiy Ahmed as a potential liberator. This sentiment was further solidified during the 9^th OPDO general assembly in September 2018 in Jimma (Tronvoll 2021). On this platform, Ahmed publicly vowed that no Oromo would endure oppression under his administration. Instead, he promised that his governance would offer Africa a novel democratic political philosophy, drawing inspiration from the Gadaa system—a traditional Oromo institution of democratic governance—as a gift from their forefathers to the global political landscape (Ibid).

Research Questions

To analyze the structural dynamics of post-2018 Oromo politics, this study addresses the following central research questions:

1. How do the post-2018 politics of Oromo betrayal systematically manifest in the structural transition from mobilization to state-enforced marginalization?

2. In what ways do contemporary processes of political betrayal and regime consolidation link to Ethiopia’s broader historical-political legacies and collective memory?

3. Through what mechanisms, discourse, and state actions has the current administration diverged from the foundational political demands of the 2018 transition?

Materials and Method

This study utilizes a qualitative research design, employing data triangulation across a diverse corpus gathered between June and December 2020 to ensure a multifaceted analytical perspective. The empirical foundation consists of in-depth interviews, media texts systematically sourced from YouTube, Facebook, digital newspapers, and blogs, which facilitate a comprehensive capture of the digital discourse surrounding Ethiopia’s political volatility during this period, further consolidated by critical observation of Ethiopian political landscape. Specifically, the study analyzes the final interview of artist Hachalu Hundessa; given his subsequent assassination approximately one week later, this text serves as a critical primary source that enhances data validity and strengthens the findings regarding the state of Oromo dissent. Furthermore, the study examines Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s interviews on the Oromia Broadcasting Network (OBN). This analysis scrutinizes the Prime Minister’s claims—such as his symbolic use of Afaan Oromoo on social media—against the material demands of the Oromo people. By comparing official state rhetoric with the lived realities and sacrifices made to achieve the 2018 change, this methodology exposes the dissonance between the administration’s claims and the prevailing sociopolitical expectations.

Central to the primary data collection are 31 semi-structured, in-depth interviews conducted in Addis Ababa with a purposively sampled group of stakeholders. This cohort includes academics, opposition politicians, historians, community leaders, former officials, and media professionals such as journalists and bloggers. Despite the significant security constraints and political sensitivities prevalent during the fieldwork, Addis Ababa served as a critical research site due to its concentration of well-informed perspectives and its role as the epicenter of the shifting political climate. These interviews provided unique, nuanced insights into the internal dynamics of the political tensions and the state’s subsequent responses, which might otherwise be obscured in official narratives.

By synthesizing these varied textual and testimonial threads, the study constructs a holistic understanding of the incident, stitching together fragmented perspectives into a cohesive narrative of history and discourse. The methodology is guided by a systematic thematic analysis, which serves to bridge the gap between raw data and theoretical claims. This approach allows for a rigorous concretization of findings, effectively demonstrating how the assassination and the ensuing political realignment have shaped the broader trajectory of contemporary Ethiopian politics.

Analysis

Unveiling Betrayal of the Oromo

The Oromo have carried an enduring struggle for self-determination for protracted decades. The most profound of their struggle in modern history has been the Qeerroo and Qarree protest between 2014-2018. In these protest years alone, the Oromo sacrificed the lives of over 5,000 sons and daughters (Bedaso 2021; Jalata 2020b), who gave out their lives for the Oromo cause—self-determination and equality. This raises alarming questions about the number of additional lives lost over the preceding decades. Abiy Ahmed ascended to power as the first Prime Minister from Oromia by the pressure of this youth protest (Forsén and Tronvoll 2021; Kelecha 2025). However, erecting statues of Ethiopian emperors and vowing to restore the notion of ‘Great Ethiopia,’ the premier swiftly demonstrates not only his alignment with his predecessors but also his active effort to erode Oromo nationalism (Posey 2020; Regassa 2021). This trajectory raises concerns not only about the future of Oromo identity but also political agency of the Oromo under this regime. Tom Gardner, in his book The Abiy Project, portrays Ahmed as someone wanting to be friends with everyone while remaining loyal to none (Gardner 2024). This implies that Abiy Ahmed’s regime has no tolerance for nationalists of any ethnic group; however, the Oromo case stands out, as he presents himself as Oromo while systematically undermining Oromo nationalism at every level, an act widely perceived as a profound betrayal. The re-labelling of the OLF as a terrorist group under the Abiy regime within a year of welcoming them home, along with the removal of active and self-conscious Oromo politicians from core political positions such as Lama Magarsa, imprisonment of Oromo political leaders, and the informal enforcement of illegitimate state of emergency in various parts of Oromia for extended periods, were some of the manifestations of his disloyalty. Additionally, the repeated shutdown of the internet and telephone services in the Wallagga and Guji zones of Oromia further exemplifies commitment to suppress Oromo voices (Tolo et al. 2021).

Moreover, during his visit to neighboring Kenya on December 9, 2020, the Prime Minister publicly vowed to eliminate the Oromo Liberation Front^[1] (OLF), framing this commitment as a measure to safeguard regional peace and security. By equating the OLF with Al Shabab, the Prime Minister sought to delegitimize a significant political competitor while justifying aggressive actions against dissenting voices. It appears too late for the Oromo to recognize that the Abiy Ahmed’s regime aims to complete the project initiated by Emperors Menilik and Haile Selassie in the 19^th and 20^th centuries (Abebe 2021), which seeks to dismantle federalism in favor of an Ethiopianism that promotes a singular language, religion, and ethnicity (Abebe 2023; Fiseha 2019; 2021; Ishiyama 2021). The OLF has played a central role in the Oromo struggle against oppression and the pursuit of emancipation since the early 1970s, fostering a profound moral, emotional, and psychological connection to the Oromo resistance against suppression (Jalata 2023).

Consequently, the allegations made against the OLF are perceived by the Oromo as indirect attacks on their collective identity and struggle. The Oromo community’s sense of betrayal by the Abiy Ahmed administration became evident when he reneged on his promise to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which had allowed its members to compete in elections upon their return from exile. This reversal of commitment deepened feelings of disillusionment and mistrust among the Oromo people. The renovation and erection of commemorative statues for Menelik II and Haile Selassie by the current regime in the National Palace are regarded as a blatant act of betrayal against the Oromo and their cause (Regassa and Emmenegger 2023). For the Oromo and other marginalized groups, these figures represent deep-seated symbols of shame, defeat, and oppression, further fueling feelings of betrayal and alienation towards his administration (Bearak 2019; Regassa and Emmenegger 2023; Woldemariam 2019).

Additionally, Abiy Ahmed quickly transformed the OPDO into the ODP and then into the PP within a single year, effectively stripping away elements of Oromo identity and seemingly aiming to dissolve Oromummaa altogether. This signals the regime’s underlying interest of restoring unitarist Ethiopian state (Posey 2020; Regassa 2021). The promise the Premier made at the 9^th OPDO general assembly in late 2018 to keep the legacy of Gadaa system of the Oromo through introducing a new brand of political philosophy as a contribution to Africa and the world was all in vain. As the time passed by, Oromo elites started to question the regimes’ trustworthiness critiquing the mismatch of his promises and actions eventually unveiling the concealed commitment of perpetuating the project of deterring the Oromo struggle.

The Institutional Containment of Afaan Oromoo

The institutional containment of Afaan Oromoo from attaining the status of a federal working language constitutes a profound manifestation of political betrayal, precisely because it is the mother tongue of Ethiopia’s largest linguistic community. To deny this constitutional recognition is, in effect, to exclude nearly sixty million citizens from seeing their language represented at the federal core—despite the fact that elevating Afaan Oromoo poses no systemic threat to Ethiopia’s existing multilingual framework. The Oromo demand is not a quest for linguistic hegemony but rather a structural struggle for parity and justice in national language policy, grounded in the universal principle of equality. Other ethno-linguistic groups equally reserve the right to advance similar claims within a federal system that officially acknowledges the coexistence of more than 85 languages. It is therefore untenable, politically, economically, socially and linguistically, to justify the exclusivity of a single federal working language for a population exceeding 130 million. Ultimately, the call for Afaan Oromoo’s federal recognition operates as a broader structural demand for linguistic equality, cultural dignity, and the institutional preservation of identity within Ethiopia’s pluralistic federation (Sorsa 2026).

During an interview on OBN on July 15, 2020, when asked about plans to make Afaan Oromoo a federal working language, Abiy Ahmed emphasized his personal efforts to promote the language rather than explaining how the issue would be addressed within a policy framework. Ahmed claims,

“I was the one who used to struggle to make Afaan Oromoo a federal language. Today we developed a policy, and it has unanimously been approved. … [A]m I not writing my daily activities both in Amharic and Afaan Oromoo? Is it not a new experience for a prime minister to write in the two languages? Did we have such a practice in Ethiopia? We are teaching a new experience! We have raised the question of making Afaan Oromoo a federal language. We are answering this question legally. We are demonstrating it in our day-to-day activities. It will be revealed in the course of time.”^[2]

Despite this rhetoric, no real policy changes have occurred to grant Afaan Oromoo federal language status in the past eight years of Abiy’s reign. One of the goals behind Oromo’s decades of priceless struggle was for Afaan Oromoo to become a federal language. Compared to the sacrifices made to achieve this goal, the premier’s claimed ‘new experience’ of writing daily activities in Afaan Oromoo falls short of what his administration should have accomplished. The study indicates the anticipation that Afaan Oromoo would gain federal language status under Abiy Ahmed is unlikely to materialize, as leadership shifts remain distant and uncertain. Instead, it will persist as a driving force behind the Oromo struggle for independence, especially given the historical reality that peaceful transitions through democratic elections are exceedingly rare. This assertion corroborates a controversial video of the premier highlighting his stance toward Oromo nationalism. The leaked video was roughly translated as,

“Oromo nationalism belittles the great people of Oromo and prevents them from thinking at a national and continental level.”^[3]

A closer examination of the extract reveals that Oromo nationalism continues to be a target for elimination under the Abiy Ahmed regime. Oromo nationalism—comprising language, identity, culture, values, and history (Jalata 2020a)—is a shared foundation that unites the Oromo people as a collective nation, connecting them to their ancestral roots and collective memories. The underlying message in the discourse reveals that inciting aggression against the Oromo is a strategy employed to thrive in the Ethiopian political landscape, targeting political parties associated with the Oromo cause to diminish potential threats to power. In other words, this excerpt reiterates scholarly claims that Abiy’s administration favors Ethiopianism to Oromo nationalism (Gardner 2024; Jalata 2025). Ethiopianism is a unitarist ideology that seeks to disintegrate and dissolve the country’s cultural diversities, aspiring to restore a monolithic Ethiopian identity while disregarding the richness of cultural and linguistic diversity and the values therein (Ishiyama and Basnet 2022). Language plays a central role in multi-ethnic federal countries (Bhusal and Breen 2023). Given that the Oromo constitute Ethiopia’s majority population, it is unprecedented in the history of federalism for a multicultural society to deny official language status to a language spoken by half of its populace.

The Oromo, the largest ethnic group in the Horn of Africa, along with Afaan Oromoo as the continent’s third most spoken language, expected Abiy Ahmed—born and raised among them—to prioritize language politics and address the pressing linguistic issues facing their community. Beyond politics, language is intrinsically connected to linguistic rights and serves as a driver of economic development, enhancing prosperity. Kymlicka (1995) asserts that the right to use one’s native language is essential for well-being and prosperity, highlighting how this can be effectively institutionalized within a federal system. Ethiopia serves as a pertinent example, where the Oromo and other ethnolinguistic groups now have the right to use their languages and receive primary education in their mother tongues but limited to provincial and regional level. However, language in general—and Afaan Oromoo in particular—remains contentious in Ethiopia, reflecting the government’s reluctance to endorse additional federal languages beyond Amharic—a change the Oromo have long anticipated. In a federal political structure like Ethiopia’s, maintaining a single federal language in a nation of over 130 million people, encompassing more than 85 ethnolinguistic groups, is fundamentally undemocratic. Continued delays in addressing this issue are likely to perpetuate inequality and grievances, further intensifying the ongoing struggles for recognition and equality.

An interviewee reflects that,

“The Prime Minister appeals to emotion while failing to address the social problems that matter most. Instead of establishing Afaan Oromoo as a federal language, for example, he posts in the language on social media—projecting a false sense of progress by doing what his predecessors did not. However, this falls far short of what the Oromo people have struggled for and continue to demand.” (Participant 22, October 2020)

Imperial Restoration Disguised in Ethiopian Greatness

Since coming to power, Abiy Ahmed’s most prominent slogan has been to ‘Make Ethiopia Great Again’ (Gabul 2024). From a denotative and common-sense vantage point, the slogan might amenably be acceptable. However, by reassessing Ethiopian political history and the heated political narrative therein, one could ask, “Whose Ethiopia was great and how great was Ethiopia?” The Oromo and other political minorities, deeply aware of colonial legacies, resolutely resist the notion of a “Great Ethiopia of the past,” which can only be realized through the restoration of imperial Ethiopia. The Oromo and subjugated groups strive to forge a new Ethiopia that embraces diversity, champions equality, and cultivates mutual respect and tolerance, thereby dismantling the concept of first-and second-class citizens. Under historical and colonial Ethiopia, the Oromo and other ethnicities suffered, oppressed, and enslaved to comfort only the few (Assefa 2022; Kelecha 2023), and were regarded as second-class citizens (Jalata 1998). Behind Abiy’s slogan to “Make Ethiopia Great Again” seems to lie a desire to restore an old, brutal, undemocratic Ethiopia (Posey 2020). This sentiment perpetuates historical injustices and undermines the democratic aspirations of marginalized communities as was gestured through erection of statues for Ethiopian emperors under whose arms political minorities suffered and oppressed (Regassa and Emmenegger 2023).

For the Oromo and historically oppressed southern nations, the old Ethiopia is a symbol of disgrace and humiliation, and Abiy’s reform would have been to rectify this historical injustice. It was under the same Ethiopia that the Gadaa system and unity of the Oromo had been broken. Abiy’s slogan “We will make Ethiopia great again” reminds the Oromo as well as other political minorities of the scars of oppression, repression, humiliation and slavery which their forefathers had borne. Prime Minister Abiy’s technocratic populism involved directing appointed ministers to implement ambitious reforms, substituting political maneuvers with televised displays of green initiatives (Eranfeno et al. 2024). The Oromo read in the slogan Abiy’s betrayal for they hesitate to see any good sense in it. One point to be made clear is the preposition “again” at the end of the slogan. The Oromo do not have any objection in the fair development of Ethiopia and its prosperity. But they do not want Ethiopia to operate in the old system with dichotomy of oppressor vs oppressed, ruler vs ruled, abuser vs abused, exploiter vs exploited relation (Jalata 2020b).

At the time of writing this article, Ethiopians appear more divided than ever, with the threat of further civil wars looming after the Tigray war, which was one of the deadliest conflicts of its kind (Assefa 2022; Green 2022). If the government or any armed internal faction like OLA-OLF, Fano or external body like the neighboring Eritrea initiates war, the damage would be worse than the deadly Tigray war. Studies show that the Tigray war claimed nearly a million lives and ravaged infrastructure in just two years (Isaac 2025; Weldemichel 2025).

The Assassination of Hachalu Hundessa

June 29, 2020, marks one of the greatest tragedies in the modern history of the Oromo peaceful struggle. This day left behind the mystery of assassination of Hachalu Hundessa—a fearless popular vocalist in the Oromo resistance song (Stein and Abebe 2023). It would remain impossible for the Oromo to accept the rationale behind Hachalu’s assassination by any means. Many Oromo vocalists known for their resistance songs—such as Ebisa Adunya, Usmayo Musa, Yosef Gamachu, and Jirenya Ayana—have been mercilessly killed, during Meles Zenawi’s regime while many others have been forced to flee their country (Regassa 2023). And Hachalu too was jailed for five years while he was a minor by the same regime. If Hachalu had been assassinated prior to the 2018 change under Meles Zenawi’s command, it might have been seen as normal, given that similar tragedies had occurred to many beautiful souls. However, Hachalu’s brutal assassination under Abiy Ahmed’s regime—where the artist played a significant role in bringing this government to power—is morally, psychologically, and politically unacceptable—unforgettable and unforgivable. The government’s profound failure to protect this hero and its ongoing neglect of justice for the last six years since his assassination in 2020, warrant serious reproach and signify a deep betrayal.

Following the assassination of Hachalu Hundessa on June 29, 2020, both the government and the opposition party leaders bitterly condemned each other, blaming this cruel act on one another and accusing each other of orchestrating the murder. A close reexamination of Hachalu’s final interview on OMN with host Guyo Wariyo on June 23, 2020—just six days prior to his assassination—provides critical insights suggesting that his assassination was a calculated, politically motivated act, regardless of which faction ultimately orchestrated it. The entire interview took 45 minutes with over 26000 live viewers. The journalist set his questions in BBC’s HardTalk format. Hachalu’s responses to the questions were honest and audacious accompanied by complete confidence. Hachalu boldly complained that the change the Oromo struggled for has not been achieved yet. He asserted that the Abiy Ahmed regime derailed off its course, compromising the Prime Minister’s legitimacy. One of Guyo Wariyo’s questions directly confronted Hachalu to clarify his perspective on the Abiy Ahmed administration, particularly regarding how the Oromo people are treated under the transitional government. Hachalu was fearlessly straightforward in responding to the questions.

He asserts,

The Oromo remain oppressed, now by their own. Abiy Ahmed’s failure to address fundamental concerns and his disregard for our political psyche represent a profound betrayal. Criticism stems from his neglect of our enduring suffering. The TPLF has fallen, yet we sacrificed countless lives to achieve this. Today, the enemy is not external; we are turning against each other. Abiy, as an Oromo leader must not further stain his hands with our blood. None of our questions have been resolved. My new album, Eessa Jirta? —roughly translated as ‘Where are we?’ or ‘What have we achieved?’ is forthcoming. (Hachalu’s interview on OMN, 23 June 2020, translated from Afaan Oromoo)

This extract demonstrates that Hachalu Hundessa violated the rules of the game. Hachalu complained in the interview that the goal the Oromo struggled for has not yet been achieved. He asserted that the same sniper-guns used yesteryear are still used to kill Oromo youth. For Hachalu, the critical distinction lay in the shifting source of violence: whereas the pre-2018 era was defined by external adversaries targeting the Oromo, the post-2018 landscape was tragically marked by internal fragmentation and fratricidal conflict (Kelecha 2025). Hachalu Hundessa’s stance indicates not only his concern about the suffering of Oromo today, but also Abiy Ahmed’s failure to protect the Oromo—the constituency on whose persitent struggle propelled him to power. This seems to damage the reputation as well as legitimacy of the PM. In response to his claim about the current suffering of the Oromo under the “new” administration, Hachalu promised his upcoming album has a lot to say. It seems this is a very serious business for the Abiy Ahmed regime for the fact that Hachalu is known for resistance songs, and he is deep in the hearts of millions of Oromo (Jabessa et al. 2025). In other words, if Hachalu was not stopped from mobilizing people through his protest songs, it was very likely that opposition party leaders would beat in the 6^th National Election.

The other point for which Hachalu objected the Abiy Ahmed regime was on his erecting Menelik’s statue under National Palace renovation project (Gardner 2024; Regassa and Emmenegger 2023). Hachalu argued that Menelik never deserved such reverential commemoration in light of the historical cruelty he inflicted on various nations and nationalities in the country, particularly the Oromo. The extract below is English version translated from Hachalu’s interview in Afaan Oromoo. Hachalu reflects,

I find it difficult to understand why the current government chose to erect a statue of Menelik in the National Palace. Menelik was a criminal, and the root of many political problems in this country can be traced back to his actions. I cannot comprehend why Abiy Ahmed would honor him within the premises of the National Palace. It seems unjust to commemorate a figure responsible for the suffering and bloodshed of millions of innocent people. This decision feels fundamentally wrong to me. (Hachalu’s interview on OMN on 23 June 2020)

Through this extract, Hachalu openly objected to Abiy’s renovation project of the National Palace, particularly regarding the erection of statues for historical leaders like Menelik. Given Hachalu’s significant prominence among the Oromo people due to his impactful protest songs, which had the power to mobilize support, it was likely that the Abiy Ahmed administration viewed him as a threat to its authority. Hachalu’s plans to release a new album and his dissatisfaction with Abiy’s administration were likely major concerns for the government. Following his live televised interview on OMN on June 23, 2020, he remained a prominent topic on social media until his tragic assassination on June 29, 2020.

The Assassination of Hachalu Hundessa as a Political Pretext

Following Hachalu Hundessa’s June 23 interview on OMN, hosted by Guyo Wariyo, a social media influencer known as Yonas Muluneh aka Yoni Magna, publicly denounced and criticized Hachalu’s stance—focusing on Hundessa’s reflections on Menelik. Yonas Muluneh is an ordinary fearless commentator on social media, addressing various topics without taking into account the consequences that come with the subject matter he brings on board. He has garnered a substantial following, with nearly 300,000 followers on Facebook and over 200,000 likes, as of July 2020 showcasing his influence in the social media domain as well as his reach in public discourse. The rationale for analyzing Muluneh’s video stems from the precise temporal correlation between his rhetoric and Hachalu’s assassination. The fact that the event occurred within the specific timeframe suggested by Muluneh indicates that such discourse may have functioned as more than mere commentary, potentially serving as a tactical or ideological signal. Below is a rough translation of Yonas Muluneh’s video in response to Hachalu Hundessa’s last interview.

The Oromo have brought up … idiot people… people who are not doing something worthy. Shame on them. They have come up with treachery. We will come for you [Hachalu]. You will see it. We expect Abiy Ahmed’s action in the next two weeks. Abiy Ahmed will do something to [Hachalu] in two weeks’ time, I swear to the heavens and the earth. You will see me. [Abiy] you are a descendent of Atse Menelik. You are disgraced because Atse Menelik was disgraced. If you do not polish your gun when they dishonor Atse Menelik, you are nothing. Tomorrow, they will also downsize you. I am Neftegna. Hachalu you are putrid. You have started it; we will finish it⁴ (pejorative words were deliberately omitted).

In the extract, Yonas Muluneh provocatively asserted that the government had two weeks to act against Hachalu Hundessa in response to his resentment towards Menelik, reflecting his striking confidence in Hachalu’s punishment. While direct evidence linking Yonas Muluneh to the planning of Hachalu’s assassination may be absent, his inflammatory rhetoric—notably the assertion that failing to ‘polish [a] gun’ in defense of Atse Menelik rendered one ‘nothing’—illustrates the hostile discursive environment preceding the event. This suggests that the actors involved may have leveraged both Hachalu’s critical public stance toward the administration and the reactionary vitriol of social media figures to establish a pretext for the assassination. Although identifying Hachalu’s killer remains complex, the government cannot escape responsibility for two reasons: 1) for failing to provide Hachalu proper protection owing his crucial role in mobilizing the Oromo against generational oppression and spearheading the Oromo protest through music, 2) for failing to hold perpetrators responsible as of the writing of this article for the last six years.

More importantly, the actual assassination of Hachalu Hundessa with Yonas Muluneh’s set timeframe could not be a mere coincidence. Findings of the study reveal that Hachalu’s assassination was not a spontaneous reaction to his media appearance and was not a sudden event. Furthermore, some leaders who condemned the assassination were allegedly aware of the plots to kill him. Regardless of the underlying reality, assassinating leaders of a political struggle is tantamount to halting the entire political movement and interests of society. However, this strategy is ineffective with the Oromo, as they are not a society that abandons revolution. Historical events demonstrate the resilience of Oromo resistance, which is likely to persist until liberation.

Narrowing the Political Sphere Through Mass Detention

The assassination of Hachalu Hundessa was followed by government’s implementation of series of repressive measures manifested through arresting influential Oromo opposition leaders, including Jawar Mohammed, Professor Bekele Garba, Hamza Borena, Dr. Shugux Galata, Shemsedih Xaha, Abdi Ragassa, and Colonel Gamachu Ayana, and many others. Additionally, the government confiscated OMN’s studio equipment, shut down its office in the capital, and imprisoned its journalists, thereby discouraging private media and freedom of expression. Our interviews reveal that the government’s attempt to link Hachalu’s assassination to opposition leaders serves as a pretext to suppress the playing field. This strategy significantly not only narrows opposition parties’ political participation but also discourages the Ethiopian political landscape.

An interviewee states that,

“Whosoever laid his hand to slain him, the assassination of Hachalu Hundessa created a conducive environment for the government. The regime turned the incident into a systemic strategy to arrest key opposition party leaders and members to narrow the playing field and excluding strong opposition parties from the 6^th national election through imprisonment.” (Participant 3, June 2020)

The systemic suppression of dissent voices becomes evident not only through assassination of Hachalu Hundessa and other prominent Oromo figures but also through disguised paralysis of legitimate Oromo opposition parties. By infiltrating and dividing groups like the OLF into factions deemed legitimate and illegitimate, the government undermines democratic processes and discourages a peaceful transition of power through elections, as seen in the contentious 6^th National Election in 2021. The Oromo people had envisaged and longed for a transition to democracy after the extensive bloodshed during the Qeerroo protests from 2014 to 2018.

A participant suggests,

“By postponing the 6^th national election, the administration risked a total vacuum of authority. As Jawar Mohammed and Lidetu Ayalew argued at the time, once the clock struck midnight on September 30th, the government’s mandate didn’t just expire—it became illegitimate.” (Participant 11, July 2020)

The Abiy Ahmed regime has shown little interest in fostering a reasonable democratic relationship with opposition parties (Simpson 2024). One of the reforms that followed the 2018 peaceful transition was welcoming home all opposition parties who once were declared terrorist groups (Eranfeno 2022). The historical OLF leaders welcoming festival on September 16, 2018, in the capital of Ethiopia was one of the ground shaking incidents after the 2018 change which likely have changed the mindsets of both the transitional government led by Abiy Ahmed and OLF.

A professor emphasizes that,

“The OLF homecoming was a shock to the system. The government saw millions in the streets and felt terror; the OLF saw them and felt invincible. But expecting a security veteran to deliver a true democracy? That wasn’t reform—that was our own political naivety.” (Participant 20, August 2020)

Many interviewees tend to relate the arrest of tens of opposition party leaders and thousands of Oromo along with a number of Oromo opposition leaders to the stringent argument Jawar Mohammed made on OMN early in May a month before the assassination of Hachalu Hundessa.

A historian explains that,

“Jawar’s last interview on OMN was so powerful and logical that it had the potential to influence millions. People directly link the subsequent arrest of thousands of Oromo and opposition leaders to the weight of the arguments he made just a month before Hachalu’s assassination.” (Participant 09, July 2020)

An interviewee shares similar thoughts with the earlier participants who reflects that,

“The government’s move to arrest Oromo politicians felt almost inevitable. Specifically, Jawar’s ability to mobilize and influence the masses through that final OMN appearance was a power the state simply could not leave unchecked.” (Participant 07, July 2020)

Elite Displacements and the Sidelining of Oromo Reformers

Regardless of the accolades granted to Abiy Ahmed owing to the “reforms” witnessed with his rise to power, there are charges against his administration for systematically displacing key Oromo leaders from power. An interviewee asserts,

“Lama Magarsa was more than just a regional leader; he was the architect of the transition. He formed ‘Team Lama’ in secret, bridging the gap between Oromo and Amhara youth to challenge the TPLF-led EPRDF from the inside. This pressure is ultimately what forced Hailemariam Desalegn to resign. During those critical 17 days of closed-door EPRDF negotiations, it was Lama who navigated the committee toward selecting an OPDO member for the chairmanship, which paved the way for Abiy Ahmed. However, his subsequent removal from the presidency of the Oromia Regional State stands in stark defiance of the Chaffee Constitution; it was a move that ignored our legal frameworks and betrayed the very unity he worked to build.” (Participant 09, July 2020)

Another interviewee reiterates the above assertion that Ahmed came to power on the back of the Oromo struggle in general and President Lama Magarsa in particular only to end up in systematically dismissing Lama Magarsa from presidential position and team Lama altogether.

She states that,

“The removal of Lama Magarsa from the presidency, along with his core team—including Tayiba Hassan and Milkessa Midhaga—is nothing short of a betrayal. Lama was a great leader who successfully cemented Oromo unity, a force that was instrumental in toppling the TPLF regime. Now, many of the young Oromo leaders who were vital to ‘Team Lama’ have been systematically purged, sidelined, or distanced through strategic transfers.” (Participant 10, August 2020).

Another interviewee reflects that,

“There is a widespread belief that removing Lama from Oromia had a hidden motive: to weaken the Oromia Regional State itself. Lama’s leadership was not only about uniting the Oromo; it was about the ‘Oromara’ initiative he launched in Bahir Dar. That move fostered a cooperative relationship between Amhara and Oromo elites that prevented our society from disintegrating. Since the sidelining of Lama Magarsa and Gedu Andargachew from their respective regional leadership roles, that vital unity has completely deteriorated.” (Participant 03, June 2020)

Beyond his regional influence, some discourse suggests that Lama Magarsa’s path to the premiership remained a viable alternative despite his lack of a parliamentary seat. As Kestler-D’Amours (2018) notes, there were arguments that a special election could have been facilitated to secure him a seat, thereby qualifying him for the Prime Minister’s office. This highlights a critical ‘what if’ in the transition period: the possibility of Lama assuming the top executive role instead of being sidelined to the Ministry of Defense. This move to the federal cabinet—a position he held only briefly—is often interpreted by observers like Endeshaw (2020) as a strategic effort by the regime to neutralize a popular rival.

Discussions

Before transitioning to the conclusion, it is necessary to consolidate the arguments regarding the Abiy administration’s perceived betrayal of the Oromo by drawing from both empirical and historical contexts. This perception of betrayal primarily hinges on five major factors. The factors underpin the trust that many within the Oromo population place in him regarding their aspirations and causes. Firstly, Abiy Ahmed has come to power following the relentless generational Oromo struggle to realize democratic governance (Dibaba 2019; Tola 2019). Secondly, Abiy Ahmed officially promised to the Oromo on the 9^th OPDO general assembly that his administration was committed to sustain legacy of the Oromo struggle by offering a new political philosophy to Africa and beyond the same way their forefathers offered the Gadaa system to the world (Gardner 2024). Thirdly, Abiy Ahmed pleaded that his government was committed to make Afaan Oromoo the federal language right away when he assumed office (Ibid). In reality, however, Afaan Oromoo has been pushed to the margin. The promise didn’t go beyond its use along with either English or Amharic posts on social media by some officials speaking the language such as the prime minister. It is less likely to anticipate that Afaan Oromoo would be recognized as a federal working language under the regime whether Berhanu Nega stays or Ararso Bikila replaces him (Tufa 2012).

Fourth, during his Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony in Oslo, the premier made a heartfelt promise to the world, declaring himself “the guardian of his brothers and sisters”. This public commitment resonated deeply with the Oromo people, reinforcing their belief in his dedication to their collective well-being and aspirations. And finally, Abiy swore that no Oromo shall die anymore and that he would make the 2020 election free and fair, annotating that his party would be always ready to step down if beaten in election paving way for democratic power transfer (Gardner 2024). Embracing these promises, both Ethiopians and the international community hoped the Abiy Ahmed administration would guide the nation toward democracy by fostering political reform and inclusivity (Østebø 2025; Regassa 2021).

However, it is observed that Abiy Ahmed swiftly abandoned the promises and deviated from the path of democratizing Ethiopia’s political landscape shortly after consolidating power in his first year in office (Østebø 2025). The involvement of long-standing democratic fighters among the political elite was obstructed. For example, he denied parties such as the OLF and OFC the opportunity to build and consolidate their institutions, thereby crippling their role in advancing good governance and guiding a gradual transition to democracy through peaceful means. This deviation struck at the very core of the Oromo struggle, which had been waged in the first place for democratic governance and equality. Instead, the regime initiated a systematic distancing of Oromo political parties and elites from the political arena, targeting and eliminating individuals who were well-versed in and committed to advancing Oromo interests at various stages. The marginalization of Oromo political parties from central politics has manifested in two primary ways. First, through forceful exclusion—via segregation and incarceration as exemplified by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Second, through resignation resulting from the narrowing and eventual closure of avenues for peaceful political engagement, as demonstrated by the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), whose members withdrew from the 2021 election campaign in response to widespread civil unrest and conflict (Regassa and Tadesse 2023).

In established democracies, it is recognized that political threats to parties necessitate a systematic mapping of these threats, underscoring the need for new public laws and policy solutions. However, the Ethiopian political landscape has yet to develop an independent body capable of ensuring a level playing field, along with the necessary legal frameworks for enforcement and correction through check and balances. On the second promise, concerning the promotion of the Gadaa system, Abiy’s government has failed to uphold expectations since coming to power. The Gadaa system, an egalitarian, deeply rooted Oromo political and social institution, could have been strengthened and elevated as a foundation of democracy and cultural identity. Under the same regime, the Gadaa system has yet to see any progress, it has rather been marginalized, its leaders labeled as allies of the OLA, their role stigmatized, and their dignity reduced. The brutal killing of fourteen Karrayyu Gadaa leaders in East Shawa in December 2021 (Gardner 2024) stands as profound evidence representing a chilling manifestation of the regime’s systematic effort to undermine indigenous Oromo democratic governance institutions.

The other promise, highlighted in Abiy’s 2019 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance, states that his Medemer government resonates with the proverb ‘I’m my brother’s keeper; I’m my sister’s keeper,’ (Abdi 2019) pledging to safeguard and support his brothers and sisters—ultimately the Oromo and, by extension, all Ethiopians. Having endured generations of brutal oppression, the Oromo anticipated that the Abiy Ahmed regime would end their marginalization. However, the promise not only failed to materialize but also resulted in an outcome that was contrary to the intended goals. The only distinction between the oppression under the imperial regime and that of the current regime is that now it is Abiy Ahmed who ascended to power on the back of persistent Oromo struggle and generous blood sacrifices of the youth, mainly Qeerroo (Kelecha 2025). Today, the Oromo have experienced indiscriminate measures under the Abiy Ahmed regime, inclusive of extrajudicial killings targeting individuals critical of his regime, that were by far tougher than those during the Derg or EPRDF regimes (Gardner 2024). Findings from the empirical data indicate that the Oromo have not experienced violations of rights and abuses on such a scale in over a century as they have under Abiy’s rule.

As Prime Minister of Ethiopia, representing the former OPDO, later ODP, and now the Prosperity Party, what the Oromo people demand is not special privilege, but long-denied equality. They seek genuine and consistent treatment as equal citizens socially, economically, politically, and culturally, so that the systemic marginalization of the Oromo becomes a thing of the past, and they can stand as equals in building a peaceful, shared Ethiopian future.

At the epicenter of Abiy regime’s politics of Oromo betrayal—and by extension, the Ethiopian state—lies the implementation of his ambitious Medemer philosophy, which fundamentally undermined the foothold of the country’s multinational federal structure. The Prosperity Party, established as the institutional foundation of Medemer, neglected the contextual realities of Ethiopia’s diverse cultural values and political identities with the latent intent of restoring a unitarist state (Gemechu 2022). Furthermore, while Abiy leveraged the Qeerroo protests as a propelling force to ascend to power, his administration moved rapidly to power consolidation by waging war within Oromia well before the outbreak of the Tigray conflict (Ibid), failing to realize its long-expected promises.

Conclusions

As has been the historical pattern in Ethiopia, successive regimes have consistently utilized persuasive discursive strategies to secure both internal and external legitimacy upon assuming power. However, as power consolidates, initial commitments and public promises are often relegated to the periphery in favor of personal interests and the singular goal of retaining authority. In this regard, Abiy Ahmed remains unparalleled in his use of flamboyant and cunning language, particularly during his early years in office. While his initial reform measures—including the release of political prisoners and the welcoming of opposition groups—secured him a Nobel Peace Prize, the subsequent humanitarian crises and state-sponsored violence suggest that these accolades were profoundly premature.

The Abiy Ahmed administration stands out for its unprecedented threats to the Oromo for two primary reasons. First, he rose to power explicitly on the back of the Oromo youth protest movement and as a member of the OPDO, yet he has fundamentally failed to shield his own base from systemic oppression, brutal assassinations, and arbitrary arrests. Second, despite public vows to safeguard the Oromo and end the era of terror, he has systematically dismantled the very political and cultural structures that sought to represent them. This trajectory represents a calculated political betrayal; by explicitly leveraging the Qeerroo struggle to gain power and subsequently criminalizing Oromo nationalism, the regime has transitioned from a promised liberator to the architect of a more pervasive form of state repression. Despite his early promises to protect the Oromo and transition Ethiopia into a democratic country, the Prime Minister has instead restored unitarist imperial narratives that further marginalize the very people who facilitated his rise.

Furthermore, the administration’s reluctance to grant Afaan Oromoo federal working language status serves as a tangible symbol of this broken trust. For nearly sixty million citizens, the denial of linguistic recognition at the federal level is not merely a policy failure but a denial of cultural dignity and parity in a supposedly pluralistic federation. The regime’s preference for a unitarist “Ethiopianism” over the recognition of majority linguistic rights highlights a strategic retreat from the democratic aspirations of the 2018 transition.

Ultimately, the Abiy administration has betrayed not only the Oromo people but the collective hope of all Ethiopians. Since his ascension, every region of the country has faced unprecedented tragedies, including mass internal displacement, brutal warfare, and the erosion of basic social services. The regime’s departure from the path of democratization has replaced the promise of a “new Ethiopia” with a landscape defined by ethnic conflict, economic ruin, and a profound crisis of institutional legitimacy.

Crucially, a deeply concerning dynamic has emerged wherein non-Oromo ethnic groups increasingly conflate the current administration with the broader Oromo population. By viewing systemic political, economic, and social grievances strictly through the lens of a ruling elite, collective blame is mistakenly attributed to the Oromo public. In reality, this regime serves only a narrow network of co-opted cadres who exploit ethnic identity for political capital. This dangerous conflation fosters a legacy of resentment that obscures a grim reality: the vast majority of ordinary Oromo citizens do not benefit from this administration, but rather endure the very same systemic marginalization and suffering—often to an even greater degree.

Future Directions

Future research should employ a more comprehensive methodological approach, integrating an expanded range of data sources to enhance empirical robustness. Because the current findings are bounded by the June–December 2020 timeline, subsequent studies must account for recent longitudinal shifts. Specifically, there is a critical need for comparative research that systematically analyzes the divergence between official state-led development narratives and the documented socioeconomic and political realities within underreported areas of Oromia and other marginalized regions.